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CUTTING IN ON THE CHEVRON TWO-STEP
Catherine M. Sharkey*
Consider the following scenario: an ambiguous statutory provision could
plausibly mean A or B—which could in fact be the opposite of A. A federal
agency, drawing upon its scientific and/or experiential expertise, either has
or could develop policy-based reasons backed by fact-intensive evidence to
prefer one interpretation over the other. But instead of developing and
setting forth its policy reasons and subjecting them to vetting in a notice-andcomment rulemaking, the agency instead justifies its interpretive choice in a
rule, setting forth its legal analysis of statutory text, perhaps legislative
history, and the purpose and structure of the statute as a whole.
Subsequently, in a dispute over how the statutory provision should be
interpreted, the agency claims that its interpretive view merits judicial
deference. In statutory interpretation cases, courts typically invoke the
Chevron Two-Step framework and, given that the agency has promulgated a
rule, assuming the court agrees that the statutory provision is ambiguous at
Step One, the agency is all but assured deference at Step Two.
What is wrong with this scenario?
First, from a comparative
institutionalist perspective, deference to agencies’ statutory interpretations
should be premised upon the agencies’ policy-based expertise; thus, it should
be withheld where agencies have not provided policy-based rationales for
their interpretive choices. Second, the “reasoned decisionmaking” element
of judicial review drops out of the picture altogether and thus judicial
oversight of agencies is diminished. In other words, it should not be “per
se” reasonable when an agency chooses—based on unarticulated and thus
unvetted policy variables—between two permissible statutory
interpretations.
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Christopher Weldon provided excellent research assistance. The Filomen D’Agostino and
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This Article proposes a doctrinal solution: the incorporation of State Farm
hard look review into the Chevron Two-Step framework. The main goal is to
extend the domain of State Farm “reasoned decisionmaking” review,
widening the scope of agency rules subject to hard look review. By
incorporating this hard look review within the Chevron framework, the
model highlights the extent to which agency statutory interpretations are
driven by underlying policy choices. And by collapsing the conceptual
acoustic separation of Chevron and State Farm, the model makes it difficult
for an agency to evade hard look review by convincing a court that it is a
Chevron, not State Farm, case. Moreover, where the Chevron interpretive
issue arises between private parties when the agency is not a party, and
litigants accordingly cannot raise a direct State Farm challenge to the
rulemaking, the model would open the door to an indirect State Farm
challenge. This Article explores how this new doctrinal approach, one of
hard look review of agency policy decisions at Chevron Step Two, will affect
courts and agency decision-making.
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court seems to have reached a critical juncture
for Chevron. This particular form of Chevron retreat—widening the space
for the application of State Farm—is fundamentally distinct from, and
preferable to, setting Chevron aside. Whereas knocking down the Chevron
pillar deals a blow to overexuberant regulators and promises to stem the tide
of overregulation of the economy and health and safety, heightened judicial
scrutiny of the Chevron-State Farm variety will force the agency’s hand in
the context of deregulation as well.
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INTRODUCTION
Chevron1

attack.2

is under
Justice Gorsuch, the U.S. Supreme Court’s
newest member, has denounced Chevron as “a judge-made doctrine for the
abdication of the judicial duty.”3 Chief among his complaints is that Chevron
deference enables an agency to “reverse its current view 180 degrees anytime
based merely on the shift of political winds and still prevail [in court].”4
1. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. Today, there are calls to abandon Chevron, originating not only in academia but from
the halls of Congress and chambers of judges as well. Recent U.S. Supreme Court opinions,
eliding Chevron altogether or declining to defer for one reason or another, have led some
scholars to proclaim the “terminal” state of the venerable doctrine of agency deference in
statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Michael Herz, Chevron Is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1868 (2015) (“[R]eports of Chevron’s death seemed to get significant
confirmation at the end of the Supreme Court’s 2014–2015 Term, when the Court decided
three important cases that suggested that Chevron’s condition was, if not terminal, at least
serious.”); see also Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187, 1190
(2016) (“[T]he Supreme Court has revealed some hesitation about Chevron.”); Jody Freeman,
The Chevron Sidestep: Professor Freeman on King v. Burwell, ENVTL. L. PROGRAM,
http://environment.law.harvard.edu/2015/06/the-chevron-sidestep [https://perma.cc/WZ95HEXN] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018) (“[T]his may be annus horribilus for Chevron.”); Chris
Walker, The “Scant Sense” Exception to Chevron Deference in Mellouli v. Lynch, YALE J.
ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 2, 2015), http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/the-scant-senseexception-to-chevron-deference-in-mellouli-v-lynch-by-chris-walker [https://perma.cc/2D
WP-A85B] (“[M]aybe, just maybe, [Mellouli v. Lynch] may . . . signal a further retreat from
the once highly deferential approach under Chevron to judicial review of agency statutory
interpretations.”). Cary Coglianese astutely captures that “[w]hat seems most clearly to have
died . . . is any illusion of doctrinal simplicity that Chevron’s two basic steps might have
promised.” Cary Coglianese, Chevron’s Interstitial Steps, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1339, 1343
(2017).
3. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring). This view is shared by some legal academics as well. See, e.g., PHILIP
HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 12–13 (2014); Geoffrey Parsons Miller,
Regulation: Political, Administrative, and Constitutional Accountability 2 (Nov. 29, 2016)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (“[Judges] defer to agency
interpretations of legal norms and examine agency determinations under a standard so
deferential as to make judicial review, in many cases, little more than a chimera.”); id.
(manuscript at 62) (“The administrative state—that modern Leviathan whose reach extends to
every nook and cranny of modern life—has evolved to the point where it now operates
virtually free of judicial oversight or supervision.”).
4. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1152 (emphasis omitted).
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Justice Gorsuch minces no words: “We managed to live with the
administrative state before Chevron. We could do it again.”5
Can it be that Chevron’s durability is at risk?6 A seemingly banal case at
the time it was decided, Chevron has become a pillar of the administrative
state for what it has come to signify regarding the allocation of power and
decision-making authority among Congress, federal agencies, and the
courts.7 When agencies act with the force of law in interpreting statutory
mandates, the Chevron “Two-Step” framework for judicial review asks first,
whether Congress has answered the precise issue at hand (“Step One”), and
second, only if not, directs courts, in the face of congressional silence or
ambiguity, to defer to “permissible” or “reasonable” agency interpretations
(“Step Two”).8

5. Id. at 1158.
6. Some have linked the Court’s pushback to wider hostility toward the ever-encroaching
administrative state that allegedly threatens individual liberty and democratic governance. See
generally Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933 (2017);
Catherine M. Sharkey, The Administrative State and the Common Law: Regulatory
Substitutes or Complements?, 65 EMORY L.J. 1705, 1715 (2016) (“In a set of administrative
law decisions over the past five years—primarily addressing the scope of deference that courts
should give to federal agencies’ interpretations of congressional statutes (Chevron deference)
and to agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations (Auer deference)—the conservative
core Justices have outlined a wide-scale attack on the administrative state.”); Cass R. Sunstein
& Adrian Vermeule, The New Coke: On the Plural Aims of Administrative Law, 2015 SUP.
CT. REV. 41; New Chevron Skeptics, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Jan. 15, 2016), http://www.fedsoc.org/multimedia/detail/the-new-chevron-skeptics-event-audiovideo [https://perma.cc/25
BF-PZRP] (“When Chevron was first decided it was generally welcomed on the right side of
the political spectrum . . . . But as the administrative state continues to grow, some now see
Chevron as removing an important check on government power and an abdication of the
judiciary’s authority to say what the law is.”). Whether the Court is chipping away at Chevron
or signaling its longer-term demise is a question that has attracted much commentary, almost
all of it plagued by a formidable baseline problem given the accumulated empirical evidence
of the uneven and unpredictable manner in which agency deference doctrines have been
applied over time by the Supreme Court (as well as the lower federal courts). See, e.g., William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment
of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1120–23
(2008); Linda D. Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to Senescence,
59 ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 772 (2007); Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory
State: An Empirical Assessment, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 722–23 (2014).
7. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental
Landmark, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 398, 399–428 (Peter Strauss ed., 2006).
8. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984); id.
at 842–43 (“When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers,
it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction
on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather,
if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court
is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”); see
also id. at 844 (“[A] court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory [provision]
for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”).
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It is too soon to stop the Chevron dance. But it is high time for State Farm9
to cut in.10 State Farm’s absence from Justice Gorsuch’s cynical view of
courts’ abdication to agencies’ political whims is telling.
This Article urges the incorporation of State Farm into the Chevron
framework.
Put simply, State Farm’s demand for “reasoned
decisionmaking”11 from agencies puts the brakes on Chevron as a mandate
for judicial acquiescence to agency statutory interpretations. The ChevronState Farm conceptual framework acknowledges the inextricable link
between questions of statutory interpretation (typically the domain of
Chevron) and questions of agency discretionary policymaking authority
(typically the domain of State Farm). Such a framework impacts a wide
range of agency regulations, requiring agencies to provide factual support
and reasoned explanation to support policy-based choices and determinations
that undergird the agencies’ statutory interpretations. It also has significance
for questions pertaining to the role of cost-benefit analysis in agency
regulation and many other fact-based interpretive questions as well, with
courts applying arbitrary and capricious review to agencies’ policy-based
preferences for one statutory reading as opposed to another.
Deploying this framework, courts will defer only to reasoned agency
interpretations, and agencies will thus be led to disclose their policy reasons
and, ultimately, to make better regulatory decisions. The framework should
induce agencies to articulate and defend the underlying policy reasons for
their decisions (where relevant), rather than proffering legal briefs in support
of their chosen statutory interpretation.
The stakes are larger than a doctrinal revision or twist would seem to
portend. First, incorporating State Farm review into the Chevron framework
highlights the agency expertise rationale for agency deference, particularly at
Step Two.12 The archetypal Chevron question is how best to construe
ambiguous statutory terms in light of competing policy interests. The
9. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
10. Under State Farm, an agency rule is arbitrary or capricious if the agency (1) grounds
its rule on factors that “Congress has not intended it to consider,” (2) does not address “an
important aspect of the problem,” (3) explains its decision in such a way that “runs counter to
the evidence before the agency,” or (4) offers an explanation “so implausible that it could not
be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Id. at 43.
11. Id. at 52.
12. It is worth a reminder that “[t]here is no single widely accepted rationale for Chevron.”
Emily Hammond et al., Judicial Review of Statutory Issues Under the Chevron Doctrine, in A
GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 65, 69 (Michael E. Herz et
al. eds., 2015). But it is fairly standard to recognize that “[i]n addition to characterizing
statutory ambiguities as implicit delegations by Congress, the Court justified deference on two
additional grounds: agency expertise and the superior democratic accountability of agencies
as compared to courts.” Id.
This Article pushes decidedly in the direction of expertise. To the extent that one advocated
political accountability as the normative thrust of Chevron, then the fate of the Chevron-State
Farm model would be less well assured. The incorporation of State Farm hard look review
could be seen as infringing upon the agency’s policy turf. Moreover, it might allow judges,
under cover of hard look review, to mandate their preferred policy outcomes. In this way,
hard look review might undermine the goal of uniformity, as judges with divergent ideological
predilections might decide cases differently.
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Chevron Court itself justified deference to agencies “whenever decision as to
the meaning or reach of a statute has involved reconciling conflicting
policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the
given situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting
the matters subjected to agency regulations.”13 While elaborating on this
judge-made doctrine, the Court has emphasized a comparative institutional
rationale, namely that great deference is “justified because ‘[t]he
responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving
the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial
ones,’ and because of the agency’s greater familiarity with the ever-changing
facts and circumstances surrounding the subjects regulated.”14 Agencies, in
other words, have comparative policy expertise vis-à-vis courts; in the more
recent words of the Court, “agencies are better equipped to make [these
choices] than courts” and use their “expert policy judgment to resolve . . .
difficult questions.”15
Second, the new framework reinvigorates the judicial role in ensuring that
agencies have engaged in “reasoned decisionmaking.”16 The incorporation
of State Farm into the Chevron framework recalibrates the balance and tradeoffs between judicial oversight and an agency’s discretion and flexibility.
Several scholars have persuasively rebutted the claim that Chevron deference
is tantamount to judicial abdication of responsibility to “say what the law is”
per Marbury v. Madison,17 or to “decide all relevant questions of law” and
“interpret . . . statutory provisions” per Administrative Procedure Act (APA)

13. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (emphases added) (quoting Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v.
Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699–700 (1984)).
14. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (alteration in
original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866).
15. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980, 1003
(2005); see also William N. Eskridge Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A Comparative
Institutional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret Statutes,
2013 WIS. L. REV. 411.
16. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 53 (2011) (“[C]ourts retain a role, and an important
one, in ensuring that agencies have engaged in reasoned decisionmaking.”).
17. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); id. at 177 (“It is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is.”); see, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, The Dialogue
at Sixty-Five 35 (Oct. 23, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review) (“[T]here has never been a pervasive notion that limited government mandated an allencompassing judicial duty to supply all of the relevant meaning of statutes. Rather, the
judicial duty is to ensure that the administrative agency stays within the zone of discretion
committed to it by its organic act.” (quoting Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the
Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 33 (1983))).
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§ 706.18 At the same time, they insist that “judicial control of administrative
action is a necessary condition for a legitimate constitutional order.”19
While fully consistent with these accounts, the Chevron-State Farm model
is distinctly premised on the idea that effective judicial oversight—leading to
effective agency regulation—is dependent upon forcing agencies to justify
their policy-based choices (where relevant) when issuing rules that interpret
statutes. This Article highlights the situation in which the agency’s
permissible legal interpretation of a statute triggers deference that amounts
to acquiescence to the agency’s unexamined policy-based choice between
two or more potential readings of the statute without sufficient judicial
oversight.
Part I describes how the traditional Chevron Two-Step framework can
devolve into what Judge Patricia Wald termed “obsequious deference.”20 A
high-profile, decades-long legal challenge to the Environmental Protection
Agency’s (EPA) promulgation of the Water Transfers Rule is a vivid
illustration of the core problem—namely, an agency effectively uses Chevron
Step One legal statutory interpretation arguments to justify what should be a
policy-based interpretation at Step Two. This case is part of a wider trend of
the weakening, if not effective nullification, of judicial oversight at Chevron
Step Two. This application of Chevron Step Two is marred by courts’
tendency to “infer permissible means from permissible ends”21 instead of
probing agencies’ implicit policy-based choices via State Farm-type review.
Part II evaluates the normative significance of the Chevron-State Farm
conceptual framework at the dawn of what may be a new age for hard look

18. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (“To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”); id.
§ 706(2)(A) (providing that the reviewing court shall set aside an agency action, finding, or
conclusion where it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law”); Coglianese, supra note 2, at 1347 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706); see also
John F. Manning, Chevron and the Reasonable Legislator, 128 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (2014)
(“[T]he reviewing court fulfills its duty to ‘interpret’ the statute by determining whether the
agency has stayed within the bounds of its assigned discretion—that is, whether the agency
has construed its organic act reasonably.”); Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—
Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145
(2012).
19. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 35. As Monaghan elaborates, “The precise scope of
judicial intervention is another matter. It may very well be that ultra vires review of
administrative law making is all that is required in the (non-constitutional) law declaration
context. The APA, however, seems to establish a more demanding scope for judicial
intervention . . . .” Id. at 36; id. at 37 (“[I]t is interesting that, as of this writing, no one seems
to pay much attention to the actual language of § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act.”);
see also Hammond et al., supra note 12, at 69 (“[T]he Chevron Court defined the reviewing
court’s role to be less extensive than not only the traditional one of saying what the law is, but
also the role apparently envisioned in the APA . . . .”).
20. Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in Midpassage: The Uneasy Partnership Between
Courts and Agencies Plays On, 32 TULSA L.J. 221, 258 (1996) (“[After fifty years] we have
yet to agree on how this review should operate in practice. We are still struggling with where
to draw the line between obsequious deference and intrusive scrutiny.”).
21. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA (Catskill III), 8 F. Supp.
3d 500, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), rev’d, 846 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 2017).
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review at Step Two and explores how this new doctrinal approach will impact
judicial review in the lower courts and its ultimate target: agency decisionmaking.
Any new conceptual framework in what Peter Strauss has aptly termed the
“Chevron space”22 must confront formidable skepticism. First, scholars have
spilled so much ink over competing interpretations of the Chevron
framework—whether the canonical Chevron Two-Step analysis is really just
one step, is preceded by a “Step Zero,” or has three or more steps, and on and
on23—that Jerry Mashaw once quipped that the Supreme Court should have
issued an “environmental impact statement” when it issued its opinion.24
Second, questions can be raised regarding what difference doctrinal language
makes: does tinkering further with the Chevron framework simply transfer
existing power and authority from one set of doctrinal boxes to another?25 In
what ways does it affect judicial outcomes?26 In what ways do doctrinal
changes affect agency administrators’ behavior?
Part II tackles these questions, albeit against the existing backdrop
characterized by various approaches (and much confusion) with respect to

22. Strauss, supra note 18, at 1145.
23. E.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REV.
611, 624–25 (2009) (arguing that Step One addresses statutory permissibility whereas Step
Two addresses reasonableness); Richard M. Re, Should Chevron Have Two Steps?, 89 IND.
L.J. 605, 620 (2014) (“[T]he vision of Chevron propounded by Bamberger and Strauss might
be relabeled ‘three-step Chevron.’”); Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron
Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597, 602 (2009) (“[I]nterpretation is an exercise in
identifying the statute’s range of reasonable interpretations, a range that opens up a ‘policy
space’ within which agencies may make reasoned choices . . . .”); see also Coglianese, supra
note 2, at 1345 (“[T]he prevailing legal justification for Chevron deference at Step 2 depends
on courts ascending several additional steps after Step 1.”); Daniel J. Hemel & Aaron L.
Nielson, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 757, 760 (2017) (“After deciding
that the statute is ambiguous but before deciding whether the agency’s construction is
permissible, these courts ask a separate question: whether the agency itself recognized that it
was dealing with an ambiguous statute.”). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero,
92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006).
24. JERRY MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 222 n.19 (1997).
25. Cf. Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has
Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 838–40 (2010)
(noting that the Court generally splits along ideological lines regardless of deference doctrine
deployed); Michael Herz, Judicial Review of Statutory Issues Outside of Chevron, in A GUIDE
TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES, supra note 12, at 129, 153 (“[I]t
is not clear that we can or should take the doctrine at face value. Deference rules do not
reliably constrain judges. Experience with Chevron has shown that judges have not simply
folded their tents and ceded the field to agencies. One judge’s ambiguity is another’s clarity,
one’s reasonableness another’s arbitrariness.”).
26. Richard Pierce, having reviewed empirical studies that examined the rate at which the
Supreme Court and courts of appeals affirmed agency action under State Farm (64 percent),
Chevron (60 to 81.3 percent), Skidmore (55.1 to 73.5 percent), Auer (90.9 percent), substantial
evidence standard (64 to 71.2 percent), and de novo (66 percent), concludes that—apart from
Auer—deference doctrines appear to have little influence on the rate of affirmance. See
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63
ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 85 (2011).
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the overlap and/or interplay between Chevron and State Farm,27 the
stringency of State Farm “hard look” review, and what suffices for “reasoned
decisionmaking” by agencies. Returning to the core problem, if Chevron
Step One is framed as whether the statute is ambiguous enough to support
the agency’s interpretation, then the analysis effectively ends at Step One if
the mere fact that the agency chose the interpretation is enough to trigger
deference. But, even if Step Two is rendered meaningless, why should that
matter so long as State Farm review comes in as, essentially, Step Three?
In other words, what is significant about the incorporation of State Farm
into the Chevron framework? The incorporation model expands the domain
of State Farm review, widening the berth of agency rules subject to hard look
review. Several courts have taken the position that in statutory interpretation
cases only a narrow subset of agency rules—either those with “procedural
defects” or those where the agency has changed its prior position—are
subject to an additional layer of independent State Farm review (either preor post-Chevron review). Indeed, some litigants do not even bring
independent State Farm challenges in Chevron statutory interpretation cases.
Perhaps most significantly, where the Chevron interpretive issue arises
between private parties and thus the agency is not a party, litigants cannot
raise a direct State Farm challenge to the rulemaking. The incorporation
framework would allow an indirect challenge to the agency’s decisionmaking. In this way, the model increases the scope of pre-enforcement
review in cases between private parties while increasing the specter of
judicial review, in whose shadow the agency operates.
Part III frames the significance of the Chevron-State Farm conceptual
framework for judicial review at a critical juncture for Chevron. This Article
argues that this particular form of Chevron retreat—widening the space for
the application of State Farm—is fundamentally distinct from setting
Chevron aside. At a time of Chevron retreat, this approach seems preferable
to jettisoning Chevron altogether or augmenting what has come to be known
as Chevron Step Zero.28
At present, there is a sharp debate (among scholars and increasingly the
courts) on where the Supreme Court stands with respect to Chevron generally
and, more particularly, the extent to which an agency must support its
statutory interpretation with factual evidence or cost-benefit analyses for the
interpretation to be considered reasonable. Prior Court cases seem to suggest
that a full-fledged State Farm “hard look” standard may not apply to agency
interpretations of particular statutory provisions.

27. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Chevron at the Roberts Court: Still Failing After All
These Years, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 731, 745–46 (2014) (asserting that the Supreme Court’s
“puzzling” reasoning in recent cases yields a framework that “fails to provide a satisfactory
boundary between Chevron cases and arbitrary or capricious cases”).
28. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833,
836 (2001). See generally Sunstein, supra note 23.
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But, a central premise of this Article is that Michigan v. EPA29 and Encino
Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro30 signal a subtle yet momentous shift. While
scholars have seized upon these cases to signal the demise or retreat of
Chevron, they have missed a significant angle: the Court seems to have
signaled its potential embrace of the proposed Chevron-State Farm
framework. This present moment of Chevron retreat augurs well for the
incorporation of meaningful arbitrary and capricious review at Step Two,
which may now become a doctrinal reality (decades after some scholars first
proposed certain versions of it).31
I. THE CHEVRON TWO-STEP AS JUDICIAL ACQUIESCENCE TO AGENCIES
A recent Second Circuit case, Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout
Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA (Catskill IV),32 highlights the potential significance of
the new Chevron-State Farm framework. The dispute concerns the
interpretation of ambiguous statutory language by courts in the face of a
choice of one permissible interpretation over another made by a regulatory
agency. The Catskill Mountains litigation fits a wider body of cases
deploying a perfunctory Chevron Step Two analysis;33 these cases show the
need to incorporate State Farm to resuscitate Chevron’s anemic Step Two.34

29. 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
30. 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016).
31. While scholars advocated variants of hard look review at Step Two, see infra Part
II.A.1, the approach basically fell on deaf judicial ears. Within the last few years—some two
decades later—the Supreme Court has signaled this could now become doctrinal reality. See
infra Part III.B.1.
32. 846 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 2017), cert. denied No. 17-446, 2018 WL 1037580 (U.S. Feb.
26, 2018).
33. It is received wisdom that “it is rare for a court to set aside an agency interpretation in
step two.” STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY:
PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 319 (8th ed. 2017). The paucity of agency reversals at Step Two
has also been demonstrated empirically. See, e.g., Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker,
Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 34 (2017) (reporting a 6.2 percent reversal
rate in circuit court decisions (from 2002 to 2013) that were resolved at Step Two); Orin S.
Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 47 (1998) (reporting an 11 percent reversal rate at
Step Two in a more limited study of circuit court decisions from 1995 through 1996).
34. To the contrary, Judge Harry Edwards and Linda Elliott argue:
It is not really surprising that most agency constructions of authorizing statutes
survive review under Chevron Step Two. After all, in most such cases the agencies
are acting pursuant to delegated authority, to achieve congressionally mandated
policy objectives within their areas of expertise. The courts therefore properly defer
to agency actions in such cases because deference is required under Chevron.
HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOTT, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW: REVIEW OF
DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS AND AGENCY ACTIONS 177 (3d ed. forthcoming 2018). This line
of argument, however, would hardly seem to justify a case like Catskill IV, in which the court
accords mandatory Chevron deference to the EPA’s legal interpretation, not its policy-based
reasoning. Indeed, while it may follow that agencies’ statutory interpretations should usually
survive Step Two, this Article advocates that mandatory Chevron deference should be
predicated upon agencies’ policy-based reasoning, not their legal interpretations.
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A. Catskill Mountains as a Vivid Illustration
Catskill Mountains, a decades-long environmental dispute regarding
whether the EPA must issue water-pollution permits for systems that
transport water from one waterbody to another, illustrates how the
conventional Chevron Two-Step can devolve into automatic judicial
acquiescence to agency statutory interpretations.
1. The EPA’s Policymaking via Rulemaking
The complex water-pollution dispute at issue can be reduced to a simple
analogy:
Two buckets sit side by side, one with four marbles in it and the other with
none. [There is a rule prohibiting any addition of any marbles to buckets
by any person.] A person comes along, picks up two marbles from the first
bucket, and drops them into the second bucket. Has the marble-mover
“add[ed] any marbles to the buckets”? On the one hand, [as the plaintiffs
might argue,] there are now two marbles in a bucket where there were none
before, so an addition of marbles has occurred. On the other hand, . . . [as
the EPA would decide,] there were four marbles in buckets before, and
there are still four marbles in buckets, so no addition of marbles has
occurred.35

When the interpretive question is confronted by a court, it is fair to say, as
did the Eleventh Circuit, that “[w]hatever position we might take if we had
to pick one side or the other we cannot say that either side is unreasonable.”36
Since the passage in 1972 of the Clean Water Act (CWA), which prohibits
“the discharge of any pollutant by any person,”37 the EPA has taken the
position that water transfers—which it defined in a regulation as activities
that “convey[] or connect[] waters of the United States without subjecting the
transferred water to intervening industrial, municipal, or commercial
use”38—were exempt from “National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System” (NPDES) requirements. The EPA, however, did not formalize its
position until 2008, when it promulgated the Water Transfers Rule in

35. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA (Catskill III), 8 F. Supp.
3d 500, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Friends of Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist.
(Friends I), 570 F.3d 1210, 1228 (11th Cir. 2009)), rev’d, 846 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 2017). The
analogy is helpful in terms of framing the conceptual issue. Nonetheless, it may be misguided
to the extent that it suggests that the marbles (i.e., pollutants) and buckets (i.e., water bodies)
do not have any complicated interactive properties, as is the case with pollutants that interact
in complex ways depending on the nature of the specific properties of varying water bodies.
36. Friends I, 570 F.3d at 1228.
37. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2012). “[D]ischarge of a pollutant” is defined as “any addition
of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.” Id. § 1362(12)(A). The statutory
ambiguity is whether the phrase “any addition of any pollutant to” waters of the United States
refers to an “addition” to a particular navigable water body, or instead (as the EPA has
determined) an “addition” to the waters of the United States collectively.
38. 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(i) (2018).
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response to numerous legal setbacks, namely, courts’ refusal to defer to the
agency’s informal, albeit long-standing, position regarding water transfers.39
Environmental conservation groups40 and several states41 challenged the
EPA’s 2008 Water Transfers Rule as an impermissible exemption to the
CWA’s prohibition against the “discharge of any pollutant” without an
NPDES permit.42 Several other states, municipalities, and agricultural
groups intervened; they argued that requiring NPDES permits for water
transfers essential for maintaining their water supplies would be disruptive
and impose enormous costs.43
2. The EPA’s Legal Analysis in Lieu of Policy-Based Reasoning
The origins of the EPA 2008 Water Transfers Rule can be traced to the
“Klee Memorandum,” a 2005 legal memorandum issued by EPA General
Counsel Ann Klee to all regional EPA administrators.44 The Klee
Memorandum analyzed the CWA’s language, its legislative history, and

39. According to a brief by New York and other states, “EPA promulgated the Water
Transfers Rule in the face of uniform federal circuit court precedent holding that the Clean
Water Act requires a NPDES permit for the transfer of polluted water into a clean water body.”
Brief for the State of New York et al. at 14, Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited,
Inc. v. EPA (Catskill IV), 846 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 14-1823(L)); see also id. at 15
(“EPA adopted the Water Transfers Rule in 2008 in an attempt to overturn these decisions and
similar court rulings.”). Indeed, in the interim period, the EPA lost several challenges to its
informal position on water transfers. See, e.g., Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited,
Inc. v. City of New York (Catskill I), 273 F.3d 481, 490 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that Chevron
deference did not apply to the EPA’s interpretation of the statute because it was “based on a
series of informal policy statements made and consistent litigation positions taken by the EPA
over the years” which “do not deserve broad [Chevron] deference”). Moreover, the Second
Circuit rejected the EPA’s views under lesser Skidmore “power to persuade” deference. Id. at
491. In August 2005, the EPA’s Office of General Counsel issued a memorandum interpreting
the statute to exclude water transfers from the NPDES program. After issuance of this
interpretive memorandum, the Second Circuit declined to reconsider its holding in Catskill I.
Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York (Catskill II), 451
F.3d 77, 81, 83 n.5 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that the informal memorandum before the court was
not eligible for Chevron deference).
40. The environmental plaintiffs included Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited,
Inc.; Theodore Gordon Flyfishers, Inc.; Catskill-Delaware Natural Water Alliance, Inc.;
Federated Sportsmen’s Clubs of Ulster County, Inc.; Riverkeeper, Inc.; and Waterkeeper
Alliance, Inc. Catskill III, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 515 n.7.
41. The state plaintiffs included New York, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Washington, and the government of the Province of
Manitoba, Canada. Id. at 515 n.9.
42. Id. at 544. In their complaint, plaintiffs requested that the Water Transfers Rule be
vacated as unlawful and arbitrary and capricious under APA § 706(2). Complaint for
Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 12, Catskill III, 8 F. Supp. 3d 500 (No. 08 Civ.
5606).
43. The intervenor-defendants included Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming; South Florida Water
Management District; and multiple municipal water providers from western states. Catskill
III, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 516.
44. Id. at 513 (describing the Memorandum from Ann R. Klee to EPA Regional
Administrators on Agency Interpretation on Applicability of Section 402 of the Clean Water
Act to Water Transfers (Aug. 5, 2005)).
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relevant case law.45 It concluded: “Congress intended to leave the oversight
of water transfers to authorities other than the NPDES program.”46
The EPA initiated notice-and-comment rulemaking on a proposed rule
codifying the Klee Memorandum’s legal position that water transfers
between navigable bodies of water do not require NPDES permits.47 On June
13, 2008, the EPA issued its final rule—which it described as “nearly
identical to the proposed rule”48—adding as an “exclusion” to the NPDES
program “[d]ischarges from a water transfer.”49
To justify its rule, in its preamble and in response to comments, the EPA
explicitly provided “legal” statutory interpretation reasoning: its analysis
focused exclusively on inferring congressional intent from the language and
structure of the statute.50 The preamble states, “The Agency has concluded
that, taken as a whole, the statutory language and structure of the Clean Water
Act indicate that Congress generally did not intend to subject water transfers
to the NPDES program.”51 The EPA’s interpretation of “addition”—namely
that “water transfers . . . do not constitute an ‘addition’ to navigable waters
to be regulated under the NPDES program”52—followed inexorably from its
conclusion regarding congressional intent. In the EPA’s own words, it
reasonably based the Water Transfers Rule on . . . Congress’s intent
reflected in 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) and (g) and § 1370 to avoid unduly
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 514 (citing 71 Fed. Reg. 32,887 (June 7, 2006)). According to a comparative
analysis conducted by the district court, “much, if not most, of the language in the preamble
to the proposed rule is almost identical to language in the Klee Memorandum.” Id. at 540
(citations omitted).
48. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Water Transfers Rule, 73
Fed. Reg. 33,697, 33,699 (June 13, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122). According to
the district court,
this was also an understatement because, not only was the final rule nearly identical
to the proposed rule, but much of the language in many sections of the final rule’s
preamble was also nearly identical to various parts of the proposed rule’s
preamble—which, again, was nearly identical in many respects to parts of the Klee
Memorandum.
Catskill III, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 541. In the intervening two years, “EPA received over 18,000
comments on the rule, and it responded to the issues raised by these comments in a document
filed as part of the Administrative Record.” Id. at 514.
49. Catskill III, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 514 (citing National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) Water Transfers Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 33,708); see also Brief for the State
of New York et al., supra note 39, at 16 (“To justify the Rule, EPA analyzed the ‘legal
question’ of whether moving dirty water into clean water ‘constitutes an “addition”’ of
pollutants under the Act. (This analysis derives from, and is essentially identical to, a legal
memorandum issued in 2005 by EPA’s then-General Counsel Ann R. Klee (‘Klee
Memorandum’), which [the Second Circuit] found unpersuasive in Catskill II.)”).
50. In the preamble to the proposed rule, the EPA stated that the “proposed rule [was]
based on the legal analysis contained in” the Klee Memorandum, which it referred to as an
“interpretive memorandum.” See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
Water Transfers Proposed Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 32,887, 32,889 (June 7, 2006) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 122); see also National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Water
Transfers Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 33,697–708 (preamble); id. at 33,703 (response to comments).
51. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Water Transfers Rule, 73
Fed. Reg. at 33,701.
52. Id. at 33,703.
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burdening state authority over water allocations and water resources,
including for critical drinking water, agriculture, and flood control needs;
and EPA’s conclusion that Congress would have considered pollution
effects of water transfers to be treated through nonpoint source programs.53

As the district court summarized, “EPA thus employed the same ‘holistic
analysis’ it used in the Klee Memorandum and analyzed the same statutory
provisions and excerpts of legislative history to support the same conclusion
it adopted in the Klee Memorandum . . . .”54
What is missing from the EPA’s legal exegesis is any fact finding, critical
analysis, or even explicit acknowledgement of the underlying policy
considerations embedded in what is essentially an interpretive rule.55 By
relying solely on its view that it was Congress’s intent to avoid unduly
burdening the states,56 the EPA did not independently evaluate any statespecific evidence of the impact of the proposed rule.
Moreover, having concluded that congressional intent tipped the balance
in the direction of these state interests, the EPA did not engage in any kind
of scientific analysis of water transfers in order to consider the competing
policy considerations, namely the potential environmental, health, and
economic harms caused by some interbasin transfers.57 The EPA explicitly
disclaimed reliance on any type of cost-benefit analysis or assessment of
these competing policy considerations.58 Indeed, the EPA was emphatic that
its “Rule was not premised on assumptions about specific costs or benefits
but on the conclusion that EPA’s interpretation of the statute was more
53. Brief for Defendants-Appellants EPA and Gina McCarthy at 36, Catskill Mountains
Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA (Catskill IV), 846 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 141823(L)) (citing National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Water Transfers
Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 33,698–99, 33,701–02).
54. Catskill III, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 541; see also id. at 543 (“In promulgating the Water
Transfers Rule, . . . EPA relied entirely on a ‘holistic approach’ to statutory interpretation that
it applied to answer the narrow question whether Congress intended to regulate water transfers
under the NPDES program.”).
55. See Brief for the State of New York et al., supra note 39, at 71 (“EPA explicitly stated
that the Rule is based on EPA’s legal interpretation rather than a scientific or factual analysis
of the costs or benefits of NPDES permitting.”).
56. As the district court stated, the EPA “focused almost exclusively on the statutory
provisions supporting the CWA’s states’ rights goals.” Catskill III, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 543.
57. As recounted by the district court:
[I]n the preamble’s sole paragraph addressing concerns “that water transfers may
have significant impacts on the environment, including (1) the introduction of
invasive species, toxic blue-green algae, chemical pollutants, and excess nutrients;
(2) increased turbidity; and (3) alteration of habitat . . . ,” EPA responded that the
Water Transfers Rule “does not interfere with any of the states’ rights or authorities
to regulate the movement of waters within their borders,” that “[s]tates currently
have the ability to address potential instream and/or downstream effects of water
transfers through their [Water Quality Standards (WQS)] and [Total Maximum
Daily Load (TMDL)] programs,” and that “[n]othing in [the rule] affects the ability
for states to establish WQS appropriate to individual waterbodies or waterbody
segments.”
Id. at 542 (alterations in original).
58. Reply Brief for Defendants-Appellants EPA and Gina McCarthy at 26, Catskill IV,
846 F.3d 492 (No. 14-1823(L)) (“EPA did not suggest that it relied on a cost-benefit review
of the type suggested by plaintiffs, and nothing requires EPA to have done so.”).
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conducive to Congress’s goal of avoiding undue interference.”59 In the
EPA’s own words, it “simply drew a line that, in its judgment, honored the
statutory purposes best.”60 The agency elaborated further: “EPA concluded
that adopting the Water Transfers Rule drew the appropriate line to guard
against undue interference. Nor did EPA need to explain further why it was
not unduly burdensome on states to apply the NPDES program to water flows
subject to intervening municipal or industrial use.”61 As the government
reiterated to the Supreme Court in its response to a petition for certiorari,
“EPA did not purport to engage in a freestanding comparison of the costs and
benefits of requiring NPDES permits for water transfers . . . . Instead, it
simply attempted to ascertain the best reading of statutory provisions that
Congress had enacted.”62
What is significant—and a point to which this Article returns—is that the
EPA’s “legal” interpretation of the Act depends upon factual assumptions
that the EPA neither supported nor explained.63 Moreover, the EPA
acknowledged that it did not engage in any scientific or factual analysis of
the effects of the Rule, which, it argued, was not necessary in light of its legal
statutory interpretive analysis.
3. A Rare Chevron Step Two Loss Overturned on Appeal:
State Farm Drops Out
In a rare Chevron Step Two loss for the EPA, the district court granted
plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.64 At Chevron Step One, the court
held the CWA to be ambiguous as to whether Congress intended the NPDES

59. Id. at 27.
60. Id. at 27 n.7; see also Brief for Defendants-Appellants EPA and Gina McCarthy, supra
note 53, at 50 (“[A]pplication of concepts like ‘unnecessary’ or ‘undue’ is necessarily a linedrawing exercise, and it is within EPA’s discretion to draw that line.”).
61. Brief for Defendants-Appellants EPA and Gina McCarthy, supra note 53, at 50.
62. Brief for the Federal Respondents in Opposition at 29, New York v. EPA, No. 17-418
(U.S. Jan. 19, 2018), 2018 WL 496967, at *29.
63. See Brief for the State of New York et al., supra note 39, at 74 (“Drawing a line that
assumes certain facts while affirmatively refusing to consider any facts on either side of that
line is the essence of arbitrary and capricious decision-making.”); see also Catskill Mountains
Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA (Catskill III), 8 F. Supp. 3d 500, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(“[A]gencies deserve deference only for reasonably explained choices, and not for
assumptions.”), rev’d, 846 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 2017).
64. Catskill III, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 567.

2374

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

program to apply to water transfers.65 At Step Two, the court held the Water
Transfers Rule to be an unreasonable interpretation of the CWA.66
In setting forth its interpretation of the CWA in its Water Transfers Rule,
the EPA recognized that “the heart of this matter is the balance Congress
created between federal and State oversight of activities affecting the nation’s
waters” and recognized the underlying tension between the CWA’s dual
purposes “to protect water quality” and to “recognize[] the delicate
relationship between the CWA and State and local programs.”67 The district
court likewise recognized that the EPA was “‘called upon to balance two
legislative policies in tension’—which is ‘precisely the paradigm situation
Chevron addressed.’”68 More specifically, in this case, the district court
emphasized how the agency’s exercise of its delegated authority to interpret
ambiguous statutory language “involve[d] difficult policy choices.”69
As part of its Step Two analysis, the district court chose an unconventional
path and applied the State Farm standard.70 The court explained that
“[b]ecause State Farm identifies certain factors relevant to whether an
agency’s action is ‘arbitrary and capricious’ under the APA, those same
factors are relevant to whether EPA’s action is ‘arbitrary and capricious’
under Chevron step two.”71 The court emphasized that the “EPA’s obligation
to provide a reasoned explanation for its decision requires it to undertake
some kind of analysis—scientific, technical, or otherwise—and it is the
Court’s job, at step two, to determine whether that analysis was sufficient.”72
65. Id. at 524 (“Ultimately, the Court agrees with EPA that the statutory text alone is
ambiguous and is arguably susceptible of either interpretation.”). The district court elaborated:
Here, the Court has already found that the statutory text, by itself, does not resolve
the issue. Now, it further finds that a holistic analysis of the statute does not help
clarify the statutory text. It therefore agrees with EPA that “the overall statutory
context and legislative history do not resolve, but rather reinforce, the[] textual
ambiguities,” and thus it also agrees with EPA and the Eleventh Circuit that “the
‘broader context of the statute as a whole’ [leaves] ambiguous whether the NPDES
program was intended to apply to water transfers.”
Id. at 532 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
66. Id. at 543 (“For multiple reasons, the Court finds EPA’s analysis to be arbitrary and
capricious.”).
67. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Water Transfers Rule, 73
Fed. Reg. 33,697, 33,701 (June 13, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122).
68. Catskill III, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 532 (quoting Mich. Citizens for an Indep. Press v.
Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1285, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
69. Id. at 533.
70. Id. (“[T]o help courts ensure that an interpretation is permissible, an agency must
provide a reasoned explanation for its action.” (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983))); see also id. (noting that “it is the agency’s
responsibility, not [a court’s], to explain its decision” and rejecting an agency interpretation
where “the agency ha[d] failed to supply the requisite ‘reasoned analysis’”); id. (“Furthermore,
‘an agency’s action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis articulated by the agency itself,’ and
a court ‘may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not
given.’” (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, 50)).
71. Id. at 533–34 n.19.
72. Id. at 534 n.19. At this point in its analysis, however, the court seems to contemplate
that a purely “legal” statutory analysis might suffice. See id. (“Here, EPA chose to undertake
a statutory—or, in its words, ‘legal’—analysis. Assuming that this choice was appropriate,
EPA still had to apply the analysis in a reasonable fashion.”). As this Article explains in Part
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According to the court, “[t]he agency . . . also has a duty to consider
alternative policies and explain why it chose one option over others.”73
Moreover, “it has ‘a duty’ to ‘examine’ and to ‘justify’ the ‘key assumptions’
underlying its interpretation.”74
The district court rejected the Water Transfers Rule as an unreasonable and
arbitrary construction for several reasons.75 Significant for purposes of this
Article, the court criticized the EPA for refusing to consider reasonable
policy alternatives76 and for “fail[ing] to provide a reasoned explanation to
support a number of critical choices and determinations EPA made, either
implicitly or explicitly, when it adopted the Water Transfers Rule.”77
One significant unaddressed fact-dependent issue bearing upon the
agency’s statutory interpretation was its failure to articulate why watertransfer regulation is an “unnecessary interference” with state-level actions.
Throughout the preamble, the EPA highlighted Congress’s intent that the
federal government not “unnecessarily” or “unduly” burden or interfere with
states’ water-management activities.78 But, as the district court noted, in
stating that requiring NPDES permits for water transfers would unnecessarily
or unduly interfere with state authority, “its failure to articulate why watertransfer regulation is an ‘unnecessary’ interference ‘[did] not so much answer
the question as ask it.’”79 Although “[p]erhaps EPA could have explained
II.B.1, a purely legal statutory analysis should not suffice where such an analysis inevitably
hinges on policy choices dependent upon facts that the agency should have to justify.
Alternatively, an agency’s legal interpretations should be subject to Skidmore deference (at
Chevron Step One), not mandatory deference at Step Two.
73. Id. at 534 (citing State Farm, 463 U.S. at 48).
74. Id. at 535 (quoting Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 135 F.3d 791, 818 (D.C. Cir.
1998)).
75. Id. at 546 (“EPA’s interpretation was not supported by a reasoned explanation because
it chose a flawed methodology from the start. To resolve the ambiguity. . . , it asked questions
that were too narrow and thus could not logically support EPA’s conclusion.”); id. at 548
(“The Court finds EPA’s decision to rely exclusively on one statutory goal while largely
ignoring the other to be arbitrary and capricious for a number of reasons.”); id. at 550 (“EPA
applied its chosen methodology in a way that was internally inconsistent and was not
sufficiently explained in light of EPA’s self-imposed and statutory duty to consider multiple
and competing statutory goals.”); id. at 557 (“[I]n addition to finding that EPA did not provide
a reasoned explanation for its decision in the context of its duty to balance the statute’s
competing goals, the Court also finds that EPA failed to explain how its action was consistent
with and why it does not frustrate the one goal it did consider.” (citing State Farm, 463 U.S.
at 43)).
76. Id. at 553 (“EPA’s failure to consider reasonable alternative policy choices that would
have been consistent—indeed, possibly more consistent—with its interpretation of the statute
renders its ultimate policy choice arbitrary and capricious.” (citing State Farm, 463 U.S. at
51)); id. at 551 (“In addition to failing to explain why it chose not to regulate water transfers
under NPDES, EPA also failed to provide a reasoned explanation for its decision to reject the
designation-authority option. . . . [T]his proposal would have allowed EPA, on a case-by-case
basis, to designate certain water transfers as requiring an NPDES permit. In this way, the
designation-authority option was somewhat of a compromise between the ‘total regulation’
approach EPA rejected and the ‘minimal regulation’ approach it ultimately chose.”).
77. Id. at 558.
78. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Water Transfers Rule, 73
Fed. Reg. 33,697, 33,700–02 (June 13, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122).
79. Catskill III, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 554 (alteration in original) (quoting Shays v. FEC, 414
F.3d 76, 101 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
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why,” the district court found that “the administrative record ‘[was]
insufficient to permit [the] [C]ourt to discern [EPA’s] reasoning or to
conclude that [EPA] has considered all relevant factors’ related to this issue,
and the Court ‘may not itself supply a reasoned basis for [EPA’s] action that
the agency itself has not given.’”80
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that it was error for the
district court to have incorporated the stricter State Farm standard into its
Chevron Step Two analysis.81 The court concluded: “While we have great
respect for the district court’s careful and searching analysis of the EPA’s
rationale for the Water Transfers Rule, we conclude that it erred by
incorporating the State Farm standard into its Chevron Step Two analysis
and thereby applying too strict a standard of review.”82 The appellate court
agreed with the district court’s view that the EPA’s statutory interpretation
implicated policy choices: “[I]n light of the potentially serious and disruptive
practical consequences of requiring NPDES permits for water transfers, the
EPA’s interpretation here involves the kind of ‘difficult policy choices that
agencies are better equipped to make than courts.’”83
Nevertheless, it did not hesitate to accord Chevron deference to what was
essentially an interpretive rule (that nonetheless was subjected to notice-andcomment rulemaking).84 And, in doing so, it articulated a role of minimal
judicial oversight: “We view the EPA’s promulgation of the Water Transfers
Rule here as precisely the sort of policymaking decision that the Supreme
Court designed the Chevron framework to insulate from judicial second- (or
third-) guessing.”85 More specifically, the appellate court made clear that it
viewed State Farm’s scope as rather limited; it was relegated to “noninterpretive rule[s]” or “rule[s] setting forth a changed interpretation of a
statute.”86 The court set forth a dichotomy, whereby “State Farm is used to
evaluate whether a rule is procedurally defective as a result of flaws in the
80. Id. at 556 (third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh alterations in original). Here, the
district court makes an implicit connection to the Chenery doctrine, to which this Article
returns. See infra Part II.B.2.
81. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA (Catskill IV), 846 F.3d
492, 520 (2d Cir. 2017) (“At last, we reach the application of the second step of Chevron
analysis, upon which our decision to reverse the district court’s judgment turns.”), cert. denied
No. 17-446, 2018 WL 1037580 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2018); id. at 523–24 (“[T]he plaintiffs’
challenge to the Water Transfers Rule is properly analyzed under the Chevron framework,
which does not incorporate the State Farm standard.”).
82. Id. at 521 (“An agency’s initial interpretation of a statutory provision should be
evaluated only under the Chevron framework, which does not incorporate the State Farm
standard.”).
83. Id. at 533 (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545
U.S. 967, 980 (2005)).
84. Id. at 506.
85. Id. at 500–01. The court emphasized that, when the judicial branch intervenes in
administrative law disputes that involve all three branches of government, “we are not only
last, we are least.” Id. at 507. Moreover, the court continued, “For us to decide for ourselves
what in fact is the preferable route for addressing the substantive problem at hand would be
directly contrary to this constitutional scheme.” Id.
86. Id. at 521; see also id. at 523 (“[I]f all interpretive rules were reviewable under APA
§ 706(2)(A) and the State Farm standard, [the Court’s] pronouncements in Brand X and Fox
Television Stations would have been unnecessary.”).
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agency’s decisionmaking process,”87 while “Chevron . . . is generally used
to evaluate whether the conclusion reached as a result of that process—an
agency’s interpretation of a statutory provision it administers—is
reasonable.”88
Having decided that State Farm should fall out of the equation in the case
of the EPA’s rule, the court readily found that the EPA’s rationale for its
interpretation “was sufficiently reasoned to clear Chevron’s rather minimal
requirement that the agency give a reasoned explanation for its
interpretation.”89
B. A More Widespread Problem, in Theory and in Practice
What is most troubling about Catskill Mountains is that the “reasoned
decisionmaking” element of judicial review drops out altogether. The court
implies that Chevron Step Two reduces to intuitive “reasonableness” of result
and that deference can be accorded to what is essentially an interpretive rule.
Moreover, State Farm reasonableness review is foreclosed.
The notion of Chevron Step Two as judicial acquiescence to agency
statutory interpretation relies to some extent on a background principle of
acoustic separation of Chevron and State Farm review.90 Thus, the EPA
persuaded the Second Circuit in Catskill Mountains that “the requirement of
a ‘reasoned explanation’ is ‘quite a different enterprise’ in a statutoryinterpretation matter than in a standard arbitrary-and-capricious case.”91 This
distinct perspective enabled the EPA to rely implicitly on unsupported factual
conclusions (that would not be reviewed under State Farm) while claiming
to rely on a purely legal analysis (that warranted Chevron deference).
Echoing this view, a panel from the D.C. Circuit has voiced the opinion
that “[t]he Chevron step two question . . . is not whether [a] proposed
alternative is an acceptable policy option but whether the [agency’s] rule

87. Id. at 521 (citing Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016));
id. at 522 (“If the rule is not defective under State Farm . . . that conclusion does not avoid the
need for a Chevron analysis, which does not incorporate the State Farm standard of review.”).
This Article disagrees with the Second Circuit’s interpretation of Encino Motorcars, discussed
infra Part III.B.1.b. In Encino Motorcars, the Supreme Court did rely on the procedural nature
of the agency’s error. Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2125. In that case, the “procedural”
error consisted of writing a conclusory opinion devoid of any reasoning whatsoever and failing
to take into account any of the rulemaking comments. Id. at 1227. Thus, while the Court
termed this “procedural,” it was akin to hard look review under APA § 706(2)(A).
88. Catskill IV, 846 F.3d at 521.
89. Id. at 524 (“[W]e can see from the EPA’s rationale how and why it arrived at the
interpretation of the Clean Water Act set forth in the Water Transfers Rule.”).
90. There is a rife debate surrounding whether State Farm review is akin to “hard look”
review or rather a minimum rationality review. But certainly if it is the former, more searching
inquiry—and, as this Article argues, even if a more lax approach is adopted—the persistence
of Chevron Step Two as agency acquiescence rests, in large part, on its distinctness from State
Farm.
91. Brief for Defendants-Appellants EPA and Gina McCarthy, supra note 53, at 39
(quoting Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
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reflects a reasonable interpretation of [the statute].”92 When courts toe this
line, Step Two review seems fated to be perfunctory.
1. Acoustic Separation of Chevron and State Farm
Chevron and State Farm are sometimes presented as two pillars of
administrative law in significant tension with one another—with Chevron
ushering in an era of deferential judicial review of agency legal interpretation
and State Farm one of robust judicial review of agency policymaking.
One way scholars and courts have resolved the alleged tension is to insist
upon an acoustic separation, with Chevron deference applying to the “legal”
domain of statutory interpretation and State Farm hard look review
governing the “policy” sphere of discretionary agency adjudication and
rulemaking.93 As Ron Levin aptly put it, “The habit of thinking about
Chevron and arbitrariness review in separate conceptual boxes is deeply
entrenched.”94 Several conventional administrative law textbooks (perhaps
for sound pedagogical organizational reasons) reinforce this view of Chevron
as the relevant judicial review standard for issues of statutory construction,
as distinct from State Farm review, which applies to the realm of agency
rulemaking.95 Following this expository view, at Chevron Step Two, courts
accord no deference to an agency’s unreasonable statutory interpretation—

92. Coal. for Common Sense in Gov’t Procurement v. United States, 707 F.3d 311, 317
(D.C. Cir. 2013).
93. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 20, at 244 (“Arbitrary and capricious review focuses on an
agency’s decisionmaking processes and explanations. Chevron, on the other hand, focuses on
statutory language, structure and purpose.”).
94. Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1253, 1296 (1997). As Levin elaborated:
Chevron proclaims itself to be a case about “construction of a statutory provision.”
That phrase, to many minds, connotes a set of distinctively “legal” issues, involving
(for example) statutory language, legislative history, structure and purposes, and
canons of construction, as distinguished from the kind of inquiry a court makes when
it is overseeing an exercise of administrative discretion.
Id. at 1266–67 (citation omitted) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984)).
95. Accord, e.g., RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
130–37, 161–67 (6th ed. 2011) (including Chevron within “Judicial Review of Questions of
Law” and State Farm within “Arbitrary and Capricious Review of Questions of Fact or
Policy”). Compare JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND
REGULATION 737–854 (2d ed. 2013) (discussing Chevron throughout a chapter entitled
“Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State”), with id. at 668–735 (discussing State
Farm in a subsection entitled “Modern ‘Hard Look’ Review and State Farm” within “Judicial
Review of Agency Rules” in a chapter entitled “The Regulatory Process”). There are notable
exceptions. PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES
AND COMMENTS 1029 (11th ed. 2011) (recognizing the interaction between Chevron and State
Farm and including a section entitled “Notes on the Relationship Between Chevron and State
Farm”); see also RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.4, at 604 (5th
ed. 2010) (“[T]he question whether an agency engaged in reasoned decision-making within
the meaning of State Farm often is identical to the question a court must answer under step
two of the test announced in Chevron . . . —is an agency’s construction of an ambiguous
provision in an agency-administered statute reasonable?”); id. § 3.6, at 219 (“It seems apparent
that step two of Chevron is State Farm.”). For further discussion, see infra Part II.A.1.
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that is, “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”96
Although both cases employ the “arbitrary or capricious” formulation, State
Farm’s arbitrary and capricious review under the APA probes an agency’s
technical and factual findings that underpin policy decisions and
rulemakings.97 A court deems an agency rulemaking (or adjudication)
arbitrary or capricious if the agency failed to consider “an important aspect
of the problem,” to “examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory
explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts
found and the choice made,” or to consider “alternative way[s] of achieving”
the statute’s objective.98
For some scholars and courts, there is a distinct dividing line between
agency interpretation and policymaking. At a descriptive level, Jack
Beermann explains that “[t]he analysis under Chevron Step Two is
completely different from the usual analysis under the arbitrary or capricious
standard.”99 In a similar vein, Cary Coglianese suggests that “[t]he key
lesson is that [Chevron] Step [Two]’s reasonableness criterion calls for an
inquiry into interpretive reasonableness, which is different than policy
reasonableness or reasoned decisionmaking under the APA’s arbitrary and
capricious standard.”100
At a normative level, Matthew Stephenson and Adrian Vermeule advocate
keeping the interpretive question and “reasoned decisionmaking” question
analytically distinct.101 Likewise, Kenneth Bamberger and Peter Strauss
believe that oversight of agency interpretation should involve different
factors from oversight of agency policymaking.102 Similarly, a panel of the
D.C. Circuit reasoned that although Chevron Step Two “sounds closely akin
to plain vanilla arbitrary-and-capricious style review,” it should be clear that
“interpreting a statute is quite a different enterprise than policymaking.”103
This separation of Chevron and State Farm is too rigid as a conceptual
matter: there are myriad instances in which an agency’s interpretive view is
dependent upon its resolution of policy choices. Moreover, in practice, it has
led some courts down the primrose path to a largely perfunctory Step Two.
96. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
97. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 SUP. CT.
REV. 177, 181 (“[T]he courts have used this language [from APA § 706] to force agencies to
take, and later to initiate on their own, a ‘hard look’ at the factual and policy issues involved
in regulation.”); see also id. at 183 (“The procedural and substantive elements of the hard-look
doctrine are a controversial gloss on judicial review for arbitrariness, which is authorized by
the APA.”).
98. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 48
(1983).
99. Beermann, supra note 27, at 745.
100. Coglianese, supra note 2, at 1386.
101. Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 23, at 604 (“Our proposed revision would clarify
the doctrine while keeping the interpretive question and the ‘reasoned decisionmaking’
question analytically separate.”).
102. Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 23, at 622 (“Indeed, there is good reason to conclude
that oversight of agency interpretation should appropriately incorporate factors distinct from
those developed in the review of an agency’s exercise of policymaking expertise in light of a
technical or scientific record . . . .”).
103. Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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2. Perfunctory Chevron Step Two (and Missing State Farm)
In Catskill IV, the EPA’s view of Chevron review as categorically distinct
from, and more deferential than, State Farm review ultimately prevailed.
Namely, according to the EPA, courts should accord great deference to
agencies at Step Two, recognizing that “the ‘reasoned explanation’
requirement sets a low threshold” in light of “the great deference Congress
has granted implementing agencies.”104 More specifically, the agency need
not explain nor justify its policy-relevant choice among competing viable
statutory interpretations: “Chevron does not require the agency to convince
the courts that its chosen interpretation is the best; instead, the agency’s
interpretation must simply be among the permissible alternatives.”105 But,
as the district court had deftly noted, “if the fact that [the EPA] chose” among
plausible interpretations was “enough to trigger deference,” then Chevron
Step Two is effectively a nullity.106
When State Farm review drops out of the equation (as it did at the Second
Circuit), Chevron deference is tantamount to judicial acquiescence to the
agency’s interpretation. The Second Circuit is perhaps uniquely forthright
about its track record: “[I]n many recent cases, we have applied Chevron
Step Two without applying State Farm or conducting an exacting review of
the agency’s decisionmaking and rationale.”107
Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Sidamon-Eristoff108 is another case in point.
Reaching Chevron Step Two in a challenge to the EPA’s interpretation of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),109 the Second Circuit
declared that the challenger (an operator of a hazardous waste site in New
104. Brief for Defendants-Appellants EPA and Gina McCarthy, supra note 53, at 39.
105. Id. at 48.
106. See Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA (Catskill III), 8 F.
Supp. 3d 500, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[T]he Eleventh Circuit’s step-two approach renders step
two almost entirely unnecessary, because if the question at step one is framed as whether the
statute is ambiguous enough to support the agency’s interpretation, then the analysis
effectively ends at step one if the fact that the agency chose the interpretation is enough to
trigger deference.”), rev’d, 846 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 2017). Matthew Stephenson and Adrian
Vermeule make this point and explain a host of problems this creates. See Stephenson &
Vermeule, supra note 23, at 603–08. They do not consider, however, the extent to which the
redundant Step Two might be displacing independent State Farm review.
107. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA (Catskill IV), 846 F.3d
492, 522–23 (2d Cir. 2017) (citing Stryker v. SEC, 780 F.3d 163, 167 (2d Cir. 2015), cert.
denied No. 17-446, 2018 WL 1037580 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2018); Florez v. Holder, 779 F.3d 207,
211–12 (2d Cir. 2015); Lee v. Holder, 701 F.3d 931, 937 (2d Cir. 2012); Adams v. Holder,
692 F.3d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 2012); WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2012)), petition
for cert. filed, No. 17-446 (U.S. Sept. 14, 2017). WPIX stands apart from these other lax Step
Two cases. There, the court applied heightened judicial scrutiny by applying Skidmore at
Chevron Step Two. WPIX, 691 F.3d at 283.
108. 3 F.3d 40 (2d Cir. 1993).
109. Section 6926(g)(2) of the RCRA provides, “The Administrator shall, if the evidence
submitted shows the State requirement to be substantially equivalent to the [federal
requirement], grant an interim authorization to the State to carry out such requirement in lieu
of direct administration in the State by the Administrator of such requirement.” Id. at 48–49
(alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6926(g)(2) (2012)). Ciba argued that after state
authorization, the federal program was entirely displaced. The court readily found that the
italicized language was ambiguous and proceeded to Step Two. Id. at 49.

2018]

CUTTING IN ON CHEVRON

2381

York) “must show that EPA’s interpretation fails a highly deferential
reasonableness test, applied with due regard to the statutory purpose.”110
The court’s Step Two analysis consisted of an invocation of the statutory
purposes (“protection of the environment and public health”), followed by a
cursory statement that the administration of federal permits will avoid
potential gaps in regulation if left to the states alone.111 There is nary a
reference to any such policy reasoning by the agency in the administrative
record. The court therefore seems in essence to be giving Chevron deference
to the agency’s legal interpretation of the statute.
The Second Circuit is hardly the only court to deploy an anemic Step Two.
Indeed, it largely followed the Eleventh Circuit’s approach to an earlier
challenge to the EPA’s Water Transfers Rule. At Step One, the court
concluded that Congress had not answered the precise question at issue given
that there were two reasonable ways to read the statute.112 Then, at Step Two,
the court deferred to the agency’s interpretation, explaining that “[b]ecause
the EPA’s construction is one of the two readings we have found is
reasonable, we cannot say that it is ‘arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute.’”113 According to the court, “[a]ll that matters is
whether the regulation is a reasonable construction of an ambiguous statute.
In other words, there must be two or more reasonable ways to interpret the
statute, and the regulation must adopt one of those ways.”114 But this
effectively renders Step Two a nullity—all of the work is done at Step One;
having determined that there is ambiguity such that two or more
interpretations are within the zone of reasonableness, there is nothing further
that the agency must explain or justify with respect to its choice among these
interpretations.115
The D.C. Circuit certainly has issued its fair share of lax Step Two
decisions as well. In Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Department of
Transportation,116 the court held that “‘[r]easonableness’ in this context
means . . . the compatibility of the agency’s interpretation with the policy
goals . . . or objectives of Congress.” According to the court, under this “less
exacting standard,” even a “not particularly compelling” interpretation
should be upheld if it is “not patently inconsistent with the statutory

110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. Id. (“Continued administration of federal permits past the immediate moment of state
authorization avoids the gap in regulation that might occur if the state failed to immediately
issue a new permit containing all applicable requirements, and allows the state and federal
regulators the opportunity to coordinate in an effective manner a gradual transfer of
jurisdiction.”).
112. See Friends of Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. (Friends I), 570 F.3d 1210,
1227 (11th Cir. 2009).
113. Id. at 1228 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984)).
114. Id. at 1219.
115. Id. at 1221 (noting that “deciding how best to construe statutory language is not the
same thing as deciding whether a particular construction is within the ballpark of
reasonableness” required under Chevron).
116. 843 F.2d 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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scheme.”117 Indeed, only an agency interpretation that “actually frustrated
the policies that Congress was seeking to effectuate” should be overturned.118
Adirondack Medical Center v. Sebelius119 provides another stark
illustration of how an agency’s policy analysis that underlies its statutory
analysis evades judicial scrutiny. Following a change to the formula used to
calculate reimbursements to hospitals under Medicare, some hospitals
received overpayments.120 Congress enacted a limited legislative solution,
and the Secretary of Health and Human Services, acting on a broad grant of
authority, decided to spread the fiscal pain of the fix more broadly than
Congress’s targeted solution would allow.121 By statute, the Secretary was
authorized to provide for adjustments to payment amounts “as the Secretary
deems appropriate.”122 At Chevron Step One, the court held that the statute
was ambiguous given that there were “two plausible readings of the
statute.”123 Having so determined at Step One, there was little further
scrutiny at Step Two into the “reasonableness of the Secretary’s
What is entirely missing is anything from the
interpretation.”124
administrative record regarding the Secretary’s weighing of the pros and cons
between what are concededly equally plausible readings. Indeed, in response
to the Hospital’s challenge of the Secretary’s action on policy grounds, the
court emphatically demurred: “Such policy arguments are more properly
addressed to legislators or administrators, not to judges.”125
Even in some situations where the D.C. Circuit has remanded cases back
to the agency, it has not demanded policy reasons to support the agency’s
statutory interpretation. In Prime Time International Co. v. USDA,126 the
D.C. Circuit maintained that, “[o]n remand, USDA did exactly what we
asked of it” where the agency revised its previous view that its interpretation
was “mandated by the plain text” of the statute to its being “the optimal
reading” of the statute.127 The case involved a challenge to the USDA’s “Per
Stick Rule,” whereby it calculated each cigar manufacturer’s statutorily
mandated “pro rata” assessment based on the number of cigars (i.e., “sticks”)
that the manufacturer put into commerce.128 On remand, the USDA solicited
public comments on whether it should revisit its Per Stick Rule.129 But when
it issued its determination declining to revisit the Rule, it simply set forth its

117. Id. at 1452.
118. Id. at 1453.
119. 740 F.3d 692 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
120. Id. at 695.
121. Id. at 695–96.
122. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(I)(i) (2012)).
123. Id. at 698.
124. Id. at 700.
125. Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864
(1984)).
126. 753 F.3d 1339 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
127. Id. at 1340–41.
128. Prime Time, a manufacturer of small cigars, argued that the Rule’s equal treatment of
small and large cigars violated the statutory “pro rata basis” requirement. Id.
129. Id. at 1340.
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prior legal interpretation as the “optimal” one.130 On appeal, the D.C.
Circuit—guided by two lines of established case law affording Chevron
deference to “agency actions that resolve ‘interstitial . . . legal question[s]’
related to an agency’s expertise”131 and “reasoned agency decisions made in
response to remands”132—readily found the agency’s interpretation of
ambiguous language “reasonable.”133 What is entirely missing is any
discussion of the actual reasons why USDA classified cigars on a per-stick
basis.134 If the USDA is entitled to Chevron deference based on its expertise,
presumably it should be required to set forth its policy-relevant reasons based
on its experience and judgment.
The Supreme Court has a similar track record of laxity at Step Two and of
specifically conferring deference on the basis of an agency’s purely legal
interpretive view. In Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research
v. United States135—where the Court upheld the Treasury Department’s
interpretation of whether medical residents were “students” within the
meaning of a tax statute—the Court decided that the “ultimate question” was
whether Congress “would have intended and expected” the agency to fill the
statutory gap.136 The Court stated upfront that “[r]egulation, like legislation,
often requires drawing lines.”137 And its Step Two review was an extremely
light touch; it was enough that the agency’s statutory interpretation was
“perfectly sensible,” it “would further the purpose” of the statute, and that the
agency “did not act irrationally.”138 The Court did not require any fact
finding or empirical basis to support the agency’s policy-relevant choice; so
long as it had not drawn an irrational line—or one at odds with congressional
purpose—its choice was acceptable.
More than a decade earlier, in Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp. v. LTV
Corp.,139 the Court likewise exercised a light touch by deferring to an
agency’s interpretation based upon its “judgments about the way the real
world works” without requiring any empirical basis or vetting of such
“judgments” in the administrative record.140 The Court ultimately upheld the
agency’s interpretation141 based on the agency’s conclusion that certain
pension plans would “frustrate one of the objectives” of the statute because
it would reduce “employee resistance” to plan termination.142 The Court was
satisfied that the agency’s “judgments about the way the real world works”
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1341 (alteration in original) (quoting Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Thompson, 389 F.3d
1272, 1279–80 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
132. Id. (quoting PDK Labs. Inc. v. DEA, 438 F.3d 1184, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
133. Id. at 1341–43.
134. Nor does the agency’s brief mention any relevant policy considerations. See Final
Brief for the Appellees, Prime Time, 753 F.3d 1339 (No. 13-5204).
135. 562 U.S. 44 (2011).
136. Id. at 58, 60.
137. Id. at 59.
138. Id. at 59–60.
139. 496 U.S. 633 (1990).
140. Id. at 651–52.
141. Id. at 656.
142. Id. at 651.
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provided adequate justification and did not require anything further to
demonstrate reasoned decision-making.143
In sum, this relatively lax Step Two analysis, highly deferential to agency
legal interpretations—with State Farm entirely missing—proceeds as
follows: so long as the agency, acting pursuant to Congress’s delegated
authority (express or implied), sets forth a “permissible” interpretation based
entirely on traditional tools of statutory interpretation, then courts (having
already determined delegated authority and ambiguity at Step One) should
defer thereto, absent any evidence of policy-based reasoning. Such judicial
acquiescence sets the stage for the introduction of a competing model
featuring more searching judicial scrutiny—namely, the incorporation of
State Farm into Chevron Step Two—to which we now turn.
II. A NEW CHEVRON-STATE FARM FRAMEWORK
The new Chevron-State Farm framework proposed here charts a different
path. First, it acknowledges that the realms of agency statutory interpretation
and discretionary agency action like rulemaking can be inextricably linked.
The idea of injecting State Farm review into the Chevron Two-Step is to
direct courts to look to the administrative record—the preamble justifying the
agency’s interpretation and, specifically, the factual support and policy
justifications for the agency’s choices. Under this framework, courts at Step
Two should demand the relevant agencies’ policy-relevant analyses and not
instead be lulled into accepting agencies’ legal interpretations on the basis of
statutory text, legislative history, and canons of statutory interpretation
(which might guide courts at Step One).144
The agency, operating under the shadow of such heightened judicial
review, should focus on the empirical consequences of making various policy
choices that inform its legal interpretation of the statute. This apparatus will
apply to a host of statutory interpretation contexts; namely, wherever the
agency’s policy choices, backed by empirical factual support, guide its
interpretation of ambiguous statutory provisions.145
143. Id.
144. As Hammond et al. explain:
Courts have long considered agency interpretations of statutory language to be
persuasive evidence of statutory meaning for various institutional reasons. Agency
staff often play a major role in drafting legislation; agencies are responsible for the
initial application of the statute; and agencies’ day-to-day interactions with
particular statutes make it likely that they will have a relatively sophisticated view
of how a statute fits into a coherent regulatory scheme.
Hammond et al., supra note 12, at 87. But see Herz, supra note 25, at 129, 151 (“To my
knowledge, no court has expressly stated that Skidmore applies within step one; some courts
have expressly rejected any sort of deference within step one. Nonetheless, the Skidmore
factors ‘seem to keep popping up as considerations that courts recite while applying Chevron
step one,’ suggesting that something along these lines may be happening.” (quoting Ronald
M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 771, 782 &
n.50 (2002))).
145. Consider, in this vein, how Don Elliott argued that “Chevron moved the debate from
a sterile, backward-looking conversation about Congress’ nebulous and fictive intent to a
forward-looking, instrumental dialogue about what future effects the proposed policy is likely
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The Chevron-State Farm model would expand the reach of State Farm
review, widening the berth of agency rules subject to hard look review.
Several courts have taken the position in statutory interpretation cases that
only a narrow subset of agency rules—either those with “procedural defects”
or those where the agency has changed its prior position—are subject to an
additional layer of independent State Farm review (either before or after
Chevron review). Exacerbating this trend, some litigants do not bring
independent State Farm challenges in Chevron statutory interpretation cases.
Perhaps most significantly, where the Chevron interpretive issue arises
between private parties—that is, when the agency is not a party and thus
litigants cannot raise a direct State Farm challenge to the rulemaking—this
Article’s framework would allow for an indirect State Farm challenge to the
agency’s decision-making. The model thus increases the scope of preenforcement review in cases between private parties, all the while extending
the specter of judicial review, in whose shadow the agency operates.
Moreover, the specter of judicial review impacts agencies’ internal
structures and regulatory choices. If, “[a]t the margins, agency decisions
after Chevron reflect more weight on policy choices and less on legalistic
interpretations,”146 that effect would be augmented with the infusion of State
Farm-type review. Moreover, if Chevron already has helped to “reduce[] the
relative power of lawyers within agencies and [has] strengthened the voices
of officials in other disciplines,”147 the infusion of State Farm review should
hasten this trend as well.
A. The Interplay of Chevron and State Farm
This Part considers the evolution of academic proposals and judicial efforts
to incorporate heightened judicial scrutiny into the Chevron framework. For
decades, several scholars have advocated and, more recently, some judges
have started to deploy, a more muscular Chevron Step Two. There
nonetheless remains much confusion in the courts about the doctrinal
relationship between Chevron Step Two and State Farm arbitrary and
capricious review.148
1. Growing Academic Consensus
This Article stands on the shoulders of giants in administrative law who
have previously advocated, in various forms, for the incorporation of some
variant of State Farm hard look review into Chevron Step Two.
In the 1990s, Mark Seidenfeld advocated a “revamping of the Chevron
doctrine as one means of ensuring that agencies act deliberatively yet remain
to have.” E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles
of Congress, Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 13 (2005).
146. Elliott, supra note 145, at 13.
147. Id. at 2.
148. See, e.g., Hammond et al., supra note 12, at 70 (“Just as there is no general consensus
as to Chevron’s proper justification, so there is no general consensus as to how Chevron should
operate.”).
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politically accountable.”149 Seidenfeld’s “syncopated” Chevron would
“downplay[] the first beat of the Chevron two-step and emphasize[] the
second beat by requiring reviewing courts to scrutinize more carefully the
reasonableness of agencies’ statutory interpretation.”150 With respect to
Chevron Step One, “deliberative democracy counsels placing primary
responsibility for statutory interpretation in the administrative agency.”151
But, at the same time, at Step Two, in order “to ensure deliberative
decisionmaking, as well as to avoid excessive special interest influence and
agency capture, courts must retain the authority to review agency
interpretations in a meaningful manner.”152
Most relevant here, Seidenfeld specifically advocated “[t]aking a hard look
under Chevron’s step two.”153 Seidenfeld’s chief concern was that agencies
would make political choices “to appease political pressure from an interest
group.”154 For this reason, his two-step model is designed to reveal whether
the action “constitutes a direct benefit accorded to a particular interest group,
[in which case] the agency must explain why that benefit is good public
policy in light of the statutory objectives.”155 He elaborated:
[I]n reviewing an agency’s interpretation, courts should require the agency
to identify the concerns that the statute addresses and explain how the
agency’s interpretation took those concerns into account. In addition, the
agency should explain why it emphasized certain interests instead of
others. . . . The agency should also respond to any likely contentions that
its interpretation will have deleterious implications.156

Tackling the issue from the standpoint of doctrinal clarity, Ron Levin
proposed a “simple solution” to the quandary faced by the D.C. Circuit
regarding the respective domains of Chevron Step Two and arbitrary and
capricious review under APA § 706(2)(A): “these two steps in the review
process should be deemed not just overlapping, but identical.”157 Levin
reasoned that, “If the courts would define the scope of the Chevron step one
inquiry and of arbitrariness review as broadly as they should, there would be

149. Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in
Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 127 (1994).
150. Id. at 87.
151. Id. at 127. Seidenfeld’s approach “frowns upon courts using traditional tools of
statutory construction to remove questions of law from agency discretion.” Id. at 133.
152. Id. at 127.
153. Id. at 128; see id. at 129 (“Substituting something akin to hard look review for the
deferential reasonableness standard that courts have used in Chevron’s step two would go far
toward implementing the deliberative model.”); see also Eskridge, supra note 15, at 454
(“Chevron Step Two needs to have some teeth, if for no other reason than to keep agencies
aware that their work is being monitored and, sometimes, to require further deliberation from
the agency.”).
154. Seidenfeld, supra note 149, at 131.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 129.
157. Levin, supra note 94, at 1254. Levin acknowledges Seidenfeld’s prior work:
“Although Professor Seidenfeld believes that under current law step two is so deferential as to
be almost inconsequential, he thinks it should be invigorated through an infusion of ‘hard look’
methodology.” Id. at 1266 n.59 (citation omitted).
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no need for a separate and distinct Chevron step two, and that test could
simply be absorbed into arbitrariness review.”158
Peter Strauss and Ken Bamberger joined an emerging academic consensus
on this point. In their account, Step One is an “interpretive” question to be
resolved by independent judicial judgment.159 Conceptually, Step One is the
process of defining the area in which the agency can operate; this “zone of
indeterminacy”160 that constitutes an agency’s “Chevron space” “must be
judicially determined.”161 In other words, it is “a statement of what the law
is.”162 Agency input is welcome at this step, but it is accorded “Skidmore
weight” commensurate with its power to persuade.163 In sum, at Step One,
courts define the statutory boundaries in which the agency can act.164
If Step One defines boundaries for the realm of “reasonable” agency
interpretations, then Step Two probes the “reasoned decisionmaking” of the
agencies.165 On this view, Step Two is a decision-making question where
the court plays an oversight function. Strauss has conceived of this “Chevron
space” as one where an agency can make a “policy judgment permitted by
the statutory language” that “could be revisited as changing circumstances
might suggest.”166
While this Article leans heavily on each of these prior accounts, each of
these variants of hard look review at Step Two differs in subtle ways from
this Article’s approach. Bamberger and Strauss agree that Step Two is
properly viewed as arbitrary and capricious review but, in their view, the
particular context presented in cases applying Chevron means that this review
is not akin to State Farm hard look review.167 This is because the focus at
158. Id. at 1254–55; see also Gary S. Lawson, Reconceptualizing Chevron and Discretion:
A Comment on Levin and Rubin, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1377, 1378–79 (1997) (“Professor
Levin would convert step one into an all-things-considered assessment of the substantive
reasonableness of the agency’s interpretation and make step two a straightforward application
of arbitrary or capricious review. There would then be no separate application of § 706(2)(A)
to agency legal conclusions. Sign me up.”).
159. Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 23, at 611 (distinguishing “questions of statutory
implementation assigned to independent judicial judgment (Step One) from questions
regarding which the courts’ role is limited to oversight of agency decisionmaking (Step
Two)”).
160. Strauss, supra note 18, at 1165 n.101 (quoting Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot:
Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187, 199
(1992)).
161. Id. at 1165.
162. Id.
163. Other scholars agree with this conception of Step One. See, e.g., Herz, supra note 2,
at 1880–81 (describing courts’ role at Step One as doing “what Congress wants” and giving
“the statute the best possible reading, not . . . adopt[ing] the best possible policy”).
164. Accord Eskridge, supra note 15, at 451 (“The judiciary’s main comparative advantage
is its ability to enforce the rule of law and jurisdictional limits upon agencies that stray from
legal constraints, which justifies the Supreme Court’s focus on Step One.”).
165. Accord Herz, supra note 2, at 1885 (arguing that courts’ Step Two review should be
focused on “determining whether the agency, free of statutory constraint, engaged in reasoned
decisionmaking”).
166. Strauss, supra note 18, at 1163; see also Herz, supra note 2, at 1883 (describing how
courts, at Step Two, are not looking at an agency “interpretation” of the statute but instead at
“a policy judgment” to be reviewed “pursuant to the arbitrary-and-capricious test”).
167. Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 23, at 625.
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Step Two may be on interpretive methods as opposed to the soundness of
fact-based judgments.168 Specifically, they argue that at Step Two courts
determine “whether agencies have permissibly exercised the interpretive
authority delegated to them by reasonably employing appropriate methods
for elaborating statutory meaning” such as legislative history and normative
canons of construction.169
Similarly, in Seidenfeld’s model, “to satisfy the second step of the
syncopated Chevron, the agency should explain why its interpretation is good
policy in light of the purposes and concerns underlying the statutory
scheme.”170 Moreover, with this endeavor in mind, at Step Two, “the courts
should employ traditional tools of construction.”171
Levin’s vision of hard look review at Step Two comes the closest to this
Article’s. Levin examined a line of D.C. Circuit cases that he endorsed: “The
hard look case law basically requires an agency to generate a ‘reasoned
analysis’ supporting its exercises of discretion, ‘examin[ing] the relevant data
and articulat[ing] a satisfactory explanation for its action.’”172 As Levin
succinctly explained, “the court has transformed the Chevron step two
question of whether the agency action was ‘reasonable’ into a question of
whether it was ‘reasoned.’”173 Levin, nevertheless, remained agnostic with
respect to the stringency of judicial review.174
This Article builds on this descriptive account and seeks to provide
normative justification beyond doctrinal clarity. Significantly, the agency
does not deserve Chevron deference for its resolution of ambiguities unless

168. More specifically, Bamberger and Strauss claim that State Farm review does not play
“much of a role in review of lower-stakes NLRB ‘unfair labor practice’ determinations or SSA
benefit determinations,” and as such, they doubt that “the State Farm factors always identify
the totality of factors involved in a reasonable process of statutory construction.” Id. at 622.
169. Id. at 623–24.
170. Seidenfeld, supra note 149, at 129.
171. Id. at 130.
172. Levin, supra note 94, at 1263 (alterations in original) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 57 (1983)).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1255 (“[D]espite the prominence of the arbitrariness test in my analysis, I also
will not explore whether that test is being applied too intrusively or too deferentially.”); see
also id. at 1296 (“The skeptical reader may have doubts about the social utility of my
analysis—a pure exercise in attempted clarification, with no aspiration to promote either more
deferential or more intrusive judicial review.”). David Zaring extended Levin’s analysis to
argue that the two tests are one and the same. See David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA.
L. REV. 135, 162 (2010) (“The idea is that a court must first decide whether the agency is
interpreting its legal authority reasonably, and then secondly, that it should decide whether the
action is, in a more general sense, arbitrary or capricious. But we do not need two tests for
these sorts of cases. If Chevron review does in fact turn on reasonableness, the possibility that
an agency interpretation of law might be presumed to be reasonable despite failing the arbitrary
and capricious test is awfully unlikely. Indeed, to my knowledge, no court has concluded that
reasonable legal interpretations are nonetheless components of arbitrary agency action.”). But
Zaring claimed that this test is “something without much substantive bite at all” and should be
seen as “chiefly imposing procedural obligations on agencies, so that courts can act in the few
cases where they feel comfortable concluding that an agency action is completely beyond the
pale, which they can only do if they have an adequate explanation of what, exactly, the agency
was doing.” Id. at 164–65.
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it can articulate a policy basis for that resolution that can meet the standards
of State Farm.
2. A Mixed Picture in the Courts
My fairly exhaustive review of D.C. Circuit jurisprudence on Chevron and
State Farm revealed no consistent approach to the Chevron-State Farm
interplay or the level of scrutiny deployed under either judicial review
standard.175 Looking at a larger set of Chevron cases in all of the circuit
courts from 2003 to 2013, Kent Barnett and Christopher Walker have
likewise found inconsistent approaches to Chevron Step Two (albeit without
probing the significance of the interplay with State Farm).176
Several D.C. Circuit cases have defined “arbitrary and capricious” or
“unreasonable” at Chevron Step Two with a nod to State Farm.177 Other
cases are more equivocal but likewise seem to suggest something more than
a lax Step Two standard tantamount to judicial acquiescence.178 In other
cases, State Farm operates in tandem with Chevron analysis—typically as
Step Three (but in some cases preceding the Chevron analysis). But, even
where the D.C. Circuit has recognized the Chevron-State Farm overlap, the
court’s overall emphasis seems more skewed toward scrutiny of the agency’s
legal analysis.179

175. In order to get a sense of the interplay between Chevron and State Farm, I reviewed
all D.C. Circuit cases (a total of thirty-five) that cite both Chevron and State Farm over a tenyear period (from January 1, 2006, to June 30, 2016). In order to get a sense of the extent to
which State Farm was “missing” in statutory interpretation questions, I also reviewed all D.C.
Circuit cases that cite Chevron over a shorter two-year period (from January 1, 2014, until
June 30, 2016). There were forty-nine Chevron cases, which, because some cases include
multiple separate interpretations, constitute a total of fifty-six decisions. Of those, twelve cite
State Farm. Thus, State Farm was invoked in roughly one-fourth of the Chevron cases.
176. See generally Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Step Two’s Domain, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
177. See, e.g., North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 906 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (defining
“arbitrary and capricious” at Chevron Step Two with the incorporation of State Farm); Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Daley, 209 F.3d 747, 755–56 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
178. See, e.g., Village of Barrington v. Surface Transp. Bd., 636 F.3d 650, 660 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (“At Chevron step two we defer to the agency’s permissible interpretation, but only if
the agency has offered a reasoned explanation for why it chose that interpretation.”).
179. Barnett and Walker take up the Herculean task of attempting to code and then classify
circuit courts’ approaches to Chevron Step Two into three broad categories (leaving aside
“other” (28 percent of cases)): “hyper-textualism” (12 percent of cases); “hyper-purposivism”
(28 percent of cases); and “arbitrary-and-capricious review” (33 percent of cases). Barnett &
Walker, supra note 176 (manuscript at 5). Certainly textualist and purposivist reasoning
constitute components of the agency’s “legal” analysis. And Barnett and Walker agree that
“it is difficult to see how a similar or more expansive textual or structural inquiry at step two
adds much to the inquiry.” Id. (manuscript at 12). It is less clear the extent to which courts
engaged in a State Farm-like hard look review of discretionary policy choices in the category
of “arbitrary-and-capricious review.” As Barnett and Walker explain:
When courts apply the arbitrary-and-capricious approach at Chevron step two,
they usually focus on the quality of (or lack thereof) the agency’s reasoning, with
heightened scrutiny when an agency has changed its interpretation or advanced
conflicting interpretations. . . . Sometimes, however, the courts take a hard look at
the agency’s reasoning and fault the agency for failing to take into account certain
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Nonetheless, to the extent that there is a groundswell of enthusiasm among
individual judges, if not the majority of panel decisions in the D.C. Circuit,
for a more muscular Step Two or incorporation of State Farm into the
Chevron analysis, this trend may take root now that the Supreme Court seems
to have signaled approval of that approach.180
a. Chevron-State Farm Overlap
The Supreme Court’s decision in Judulang v. Holder181 intimates that
Chevron Step Two and arbitrary and capricious review under the APA are
substantially similar in context, but the case nonetheless raises questions
regarding the interplay between questions of statutory interpretation and
policymaking. Justice Kagan, writing for a unanimous Court, struck down
the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (BIA) use of a “comparable-grounds
approach” to determine the availability of deportation relief on the ground
that the BIA’s decision to adopt this method was arbitrary and capricious in
contravention of the APA.182 The lack of correlation between the BIA’s
method and the legitimate issue of an individual’s fitness to remain in the
United States illustrated that the agency’s decision had represented “a clear
error of judgment” or had not been “based on a consideration of the relevant
factors,” thus leading the Court to conclude that the BIA “ha[d] failed to
exercise its discretion in a reasoned manner.”183
Tellingly, the government had urged the Court to apply Chevron Step Two
rather than State Farm arbitrary and capricious review.184 The Court rejected
the government’s invitation but nonetheless suggested that the doctrinal
choice was irrelevant to the outcome of the case.185 The Court opined that
Chevron Step Two and arbitrary and capricious review are often “the same,
because under Chevron step two, [the court asks] whether an agency
interpretation is ‘arbitrary or capricious in substance.’”186 When an agency
action does not involve the interpretation of any statutory language, “the

factors. Sometimes, moreover, the courts fault the agency for failing to provide a
reasoned decision at all.
Id. (manuscript at 26–27) (footnotes omitted).
180. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing a few post-Michigan D.C. Circuit decisions); cf.
Barnett & Walker, supra note 176 (manuscript at 30) (“[T]he relatively strong showing of the
arbitrary-and-capricious review standard (which had a better showing than other analytical
methods) suggests that circuit courts have better internalized the Supreme Court’s repeated
references to that method than other methods.”).
181. 565 U.S. 42 (2011).
182. Id. at 53–55. Under the comparable-grounds method, the availability of deportation
relief to an illegal immigrant who resided in the United States and had one or more prior
criminal convictions was to be determined based on “whether the ground for deportation
charged in a case has a close analogue in [section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act’s] list of exclusion grounds.” Id. at 49.
183. Id. at 53.
184. Id. at 52 n.7.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 52 n.7 (citing Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562
U.S. 44, 53 (2011)).
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more apt analytic framework . . . is standard ‘arbitrary [or] capricious’ review
under the APA.”187
Several earlier D.C. Circuit cases similarly pointed out the overlap or
redundancy between Chevron Step Two and State Farm. Thus, in
Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America v. FTC,188 the court
remarked, “As is often the case, our review here of the FTC’s interpretation
of its authority under Chevron Step Two overlaps with our arbitrary and
capricious review under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).”189
Indeed, Judge Harry Edwards has suggested that “[t]he occasional
analytical overlap between Chevron Step Two and arbitrary and capricious
review can sometimes make it difficult to determine under which standard a
case should be decided.”190 Judge Patricia Wald has explained that
“[b]ecause both standards require the reviewing court to ask whether the
agency has considered all of the factors made relevant by the statute, this
court has often found the State Farm line of cases relevant to a Chevron step
two analysis.”191
b. A More Muscular Step Two
Here, this Article considers courts’ embrace of a more muscular Step Two,
albeit a heightened judicial scrutiny focused on the agency’s legal

187. Id.
188. 790 F.3d 198 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
189. Id. at 204 (“Therefore, the analysis [above] rejecting PhRMA’s Chevron Step Two
arguments applies here as well in our rejection of PhRMA’s claims resting on Section
706(2)(A).”); Agape Church, Inc. v. FCC, 738 F.3d 397, 410 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“The same
points that address Petitioners’ Chevron Step Two claim also make it clear that their arbitrary
and capricious claim fails. The analysis of disputed agency action under Chevron Step Two
and arbitrary and capricious review is often ‘the same, because under Chevron step two, [the
court asks] whether an agency interpretation is arbitrary or capricious in substance.’”
(alteration in original) (citing Judulang, 565 U.S. at 52 n.7)); Gen. Am. Transp. Corp. v.
Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 872 F.2d 1048, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[T]he questions
posed—has the Commission adopted an impermissible construction of the Act and is its . . .
policy arbitrary and capricious—are quite similar. Both questions require us to determine
whether the Commission, in effecting a reconciliation of competing statutory aims, has
rationally considered the factors deemed relevant by the Act.”).
190. HARRY T. EDWARDS ET AL., FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW OF DISTRICT COURT
DECISIONS AND AGENCY ACTIONS 218 (2d ed. 2013).
191. Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Wald, J., concurring). According
to Judge Wald, Chevron focuses on the substantive reasonableness of a particular agency
action whereas State Farm focuses on the process by which that action was undertaken. Id. at
619.
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justifications.192 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board193 marked the first time
that the Supreme Court rejected an agency’s interpretation at Step Two.194
The case involved FCC regulations that required Local Exchange Carriers to
provide market entrants with a panoply of services to ensure these entrants
could compete quickly without duplicating technologies that the market
incumbents already held.195 The FCC interpreted the statutory terms
“necessary” and “impair,” which were critical for the FCC’s policy of
requiring incumbents to provide access to a suite of network services to new
entrants.196 Notwithstanding the ambiguity of the word “necessary” and the
concomitant interpretive discretion implied by the statute’s structure, Justice
Antonin Scalia for the majority held that the agency’s interpretation was
unreasonable.197
A few years earlier, Judge Laurence Silberman penned the majority
decision in National Ass’n of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. Interstate
Commerce Commission,198 a paradigmatic example of a more muscular
approach to Chevron Step Two. In that case, the plaintiffs raised an APA
challenge to regulations that altered the interstate motor carrier registration
system, which had been promulgated by the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) under the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency
Act.199 Under the Act, Congress delegated to the ICC “the task of balancing
conflicting policy objectives.”200
At Chevron Step Two, the court examined the ICC’s decision-making
process and found it wanting, commenting that it “strikes us as not so much
a balance of conflicting policy goals as the acceptance of one without any
real consideration of the other.”201 The court further specified what it
expected to find in the regulatory record: “At minimum, the Commission
must explain how such an alternative could possibly substitute, under any
192. See Hammond et al., supra note 12, at 96 (“[T]he scope of what courts will consider
under this more rigorous approach varies. For example, courts that do not consider the broader
tools of statutory construction at step one, such as canons of construction and legislative
history, may apply these tools instead at step two. But opinions that have already considered
such materials at step one can appear awkward when they also look to these materials at step
two because the analyses appear duplicative. Such materials may include all the conventional
statutory sources: the terms or sections of the text of the statute, the overall structure of the
statute, the legislative history, and the court’s understanding of the purpose of the statute. The
range of statutory materials thus varies, and the comprehensiveness of the examination varies
as well.” (footnote omitted)).
193. 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
194. Hammond et al., supra note 12, at 99 (“Courts are also mindful of agency
interpretations that appear to ignore or misunderstand important statutory provisions. In the
first case in which an agency lost at step two before the Supreme Court, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa
Utilities Board, this was one of the agency’s failings.”).
195. AT&T Corp., 525 U.S. at 389.
196. Id. at 390–92.
197. Id. at 392 (“Because the Commission has not interpreted the terms of the statute in a
reasonable fashion, we must vacate.”); see also id. at 397–401 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(characterizing the majority’s decision as a Step Two decision).
198. 41 F.3d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
199. Id. at 723–24.
200. Id. at 728.
201. Id.
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plausible cost/benefit analysis, for the traditional—and congressionally
approved—method of roadside enforcement.”202 The court accordingly held
that the ICC had acted “unreasonably.”203
What is more, the court elaborated that its conclusion held “whether one
considers the case as one involving a question of Chevron Step II statutory
interpretation or a garden variety arbitrary and capricious review or, as we
do, a case that overlaps both administrative law concepts.”204 Judge
Silberman had previously explained the difference in terms of the scope of
the specific congressional delegation implicated205:
When Congress’ instructions are conveyed at a high level of generality, an
agency is not likely to consider its action as an “interpretation” of the
authorizing statute, nor is that action likely to be challenged as a
“misinterpretation.” . . . When, on the other hand, the statute is quite
specific, agency action normally is evaluated in terms of how faithfully it
follows the more detailed direction; in such cases the question is more
obviously whether the agency permissibly interpreted the statute.206

But the type of scrutiny called for by Judge Silberman—consistent with a
line of D.C. Circuit cases—is focused on legal reasoning.207 Judge
Silberman, concurring in Global Tel*Link v. FCC,208 similarly there
endorsed a level of review that would more closely scrutinize the reasoning
provided by the agency before providing Chevron deference. Recognizing
that there are ambiguities in statutes, which may be exploited to achieve
policy goals, he endorsed a heightened standard of review at Chevron Step
Two. Citing Michigan v. EPA, Judge Silberman called for “muscular use of
[Chevron Step Two] analysis” and argued that this is a necessary check on
“inappropriate administrative adventure.”209 Judge Silberman’s concern was
as follows:
Chevron itself involved a phrase “stationary source” that was not at all
defined and clearly could equally refer to (a) a factory complex, or (b) a
specific emitter of pollution. But it would have been unreasonable to refer
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 727 (“Whether an agency action is to be judged as reasonable, in accordance
with the APA’s general arbitrary and capricious standard, or whether it is to be examined as a
permissible interpretation of a statute vel non depends, at least theoretically, on the scope of
the specific congressional delegation implicated.”).
206. Id. (“[T]he more an agency purports to rely on Congress’ policy choice—as set forth
in specific legislation—than on the agency’s generally conferred discretion, the more the
question before the court is logically treated as an issue of statutory interpretation, to be judged
by Chevron standards.”).
207. See, e.g., Council for Urological Interests v. Burwell, 790 F.3d 212, 233 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (“In making [a Step Two] assessment, we look to what the agency said at the time of
the rulemaking—not to its lawyers’ post-hoc rationalizations.”); PDK Labs. Inc. v. DEA, 362
F.3d 786, 798 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[D]eference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute is not
appropriate when the agency wrongly ‘believes that interpretation is compelled by Congress.’”
(quoting Arizona v. Thompson, 281 F.3d 248, 254 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
208. 859 F.3d 39 (D.C. Cir. 2017). For discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying
notes 422–27.
209. Id. at 60 (Silberman, J., concurring).
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to (c) a whole city. Yet too many times agencies have taken advantage of
an ambiguity to pursue a (c), (d), or (f) interpretation that accorded with
policy objectives.210

In other words, ambiguity alone should not permit courts to abdicate their
responsibility to ensure that an agency’s interpretation of a statute is not
patently unreasonable.
Likewise, in National Mining Ass’n v. Kempthorne,211 the court
recognized the overlap between Chevron Step Two and arbitrary and
capricious review.212 But the court evaluated the agency’s rule solely
through tools of statutory construction to ensure that the agency provided an
interpretation that is “arguably consistent with the underlying statutory
scheme in a substantive sense.”213 The court did not scrutinize the agency’s
underlying policy justifications; nor was any State Farm challenge discussed
in the opinion. Instead, the court conducted a fairly searching review of the
legal basis for the agency’s action before deciding in its favor.214
By contrast, this Article proposes not more stringent scrutiny of legal
reasoning (which should take place at Step One) but rather State Farm hard
look scrutiny of policy reasoning at Step Two.
B. Agency Policy-Based Reasoned Decision-Making
Here, this Article comes to the heart of the Chevron-State Farm
framework—the normative goal of mandating “reasoned decisionmaking” by
agencies acting under a wide variety of congressional authorizing statutes.
The model is premised on the principle that courts, via judicial review, “retain
a role, and an important one, in ensuring that agencies have engaged in
reasoned decisionmaking.”215 Its normative scope rests on the notion that
“the resolution of ambiguity in a statutory text is often more a question of
policy than of law.”216 In other words, with respect to ambiguous statutory
language, agencies must often choose between viable (or permissible)
interpretations on the basis of policy-inflected choices. And, with State Farm

210. Id.
211. 512 F.3d 702 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
212. Id. at 710 n.4 (“Given the overlap between step-two Chevron review and the arbitraryand-capricious review called for by § 1276(a)(1) and the APA, the contention that the 1999
Rule violates § 1276(a)(1) fails for similar reasons.” (citation omitted)). This case concerned
the Secretary of the Interior’s interpretation of the term “valid existing rights” to prevent
surface mining in sensitive areas. Id. at 705. The National Mining Association asserted that
the Department of the Interior was depriving it of due process and effecting a taking of its
property in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 711.
213. Id. at 709–10 (quoting Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 88
F.3d 1191, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). The court sought to ensure that the construction of the
statute offered by the Department of the Interior was consistent with substantive canons of
construction.
214. Id. at 712 (“The district court properly accorded Chevron deference to the Secretary’s
interpretive rule.”).
215. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 53 (2011).
216. Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991).
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incorporated into Chevron Step Two, the agency is forced to give reasons for
choosing between these options.217
More specifically, no longer will conclusory explanations or legal analysis
suffice to justify policy choices.218 Agencies cannot cloak their policy
choices in legal statutory interpretation garb. Whereas, operating under the
specter of lax Step Two review agencies may have been incentivized to rely
on purely “legal” analysis to effectively insulate such positions from judicial
review, this strategy will, under my model, no longer work.
Nor is it enough that an agency has promulgated an interpretive rule
through notice-and-comment rulemaking if it has failed to vet its policy
choice by relying solely (or primarily) on legal statutory interpretation
arguments. Contrary to the winning argument of the EPA on appeal in
Catskill Mountains, the mere “exercise [of] its Chevron-triggering power to
make rules through notice and comment”219 should not suffice for
reasonableness. In other words, it should not be per se reasonable when an
agency chooses—based on unarticulated and thus unvetted policy
variables—between two permissible statutory interpretations.
Instead, the courts must assume an independent role to analyze the means
by which agencies choose statutory interpretations. In other words, “[A]t
step two, courts cannot infer permissible means from permissible ends—it is
instead their duty independently to analyze the means.”220
1. Elevating Policy over Law (or Why Courts Defer to Agencies)
The implications of adopting the Chevron-State Farm model go beyond
the outcomes of particular disputes. The model insists on adherence to the
normative justification for Chevron deference at Step Two, namely that the
agency has made a policy choice to which the courts should defer. It
highlights a functional comparative expertise rationale for agency deference.
It has always been the case that among “[t]he principles underlying” Chevron
deference is the need for an agency to apply “more than ordinary
knowledge”—that is, “agency expertise”—when “fill[ing] . . . gap[s] left,
implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”221
The incorporation model tips the balance further to make clear that “we
defer to an agency’s statutory interpretations not only because Congress has
delegated lawmaking authority to the agency, but also because that agency
217. Cf. Sw. Power Pool, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 736 F.3d 994, 995 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (“[W]e find that the Commission failed to provide a reasoned explanation for its
decision. It leapt to an interpretation of one item of evidence without explaining its implicit
rejection of alternative interpretations, and, equally without explanation (or at least adequate
explanation), it disregarded evidence that the applicable law required it to consider.”).
218. Cf. AT&T Wireless Servs. v. FCC, 270 F.3d 959, 968 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Conclusory
explanations for matters involving a central factual dispute where there is considerable
evidence in conflict do not suffice to meet the deferential standards of our review.”).
219. Brief for Defendants-Appellants EPA and Gina McCarthy, supra note 53, at 32.
220. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA (Catskill III), 8 F. Supp.
3d 500, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), rev’d, 846 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 2017).
221. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55–56 (2011)
(quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
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has the expertise to produce a reasoned decision.”222 This expertise, more
specifically, is policy expertise grounded in “the agency’s greater familiarity
with the ever-changing facts and circumstances surrounding the subjects
regulated.”223
Here, too, the EPA’s argument in Catskill Mountains against the
incorporation of State Farm puts the point into sharp relief: “It is . . . implied
delegation of authority, rather than a record of the application of special
expertise in a particular case, that gives rise to Chevron deference.”224 By
contrast, pursuant to the incorporation model, courts should defer to an
agency’s statutory interpretation only when the agency has demonstrably
applied expertise and rational thought to resolve a policy problem.
It is worth considering how the incorporation model would shape agency
behavior when promulgating rules. It should induce more policy vetting as
part of the administrative record to support agencies’ policy-based
reasons.225 Agencies operating in anticipation of State Farm review of the
underlying factual premises, which support the agency’s policy choice that
drives its interpretive rule, will vet the empirical evidence during the noticeand-comment period and ultimately make better regulatory decisions.
As a vivid counterexample, consider the EPA’s premise, adopted by the
Second Circuit in Catskill Mountains, that the Water Transfers Rule “lay well
within the agency’s discretion, and accordingly must be upheld under the

222. Village of Barrington v. Surface Transp. Bd., 636 F.3d 650, 660 (D.C. Cir. 2011). On
the “expertise-forcing” role of judicial review of agencies, see Jody Freeman & Adrian
Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 52, and
David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of
Agency Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1148 (2008). Cf. Ronald J. Krotoszynski,
Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of
Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 756 (2002) (suggesting that a reviewing court should
accord deference to “the extent that the agency can demonstrate that the action at issue reflects
and incorporates the benefit of agency expertise,” but when such a demonstration cannot be
made, “deference is not justified in light of the APA’s [arbitrary and capricious] mandate”).
223. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000).
224. Reply Brief for Defendants-Appellants EPA and Gina McCarthy, supra note 58, at 23.
A strong case can be made that the Supreme Court has signaled a shift of late toward this
agency-expertise rationale. In earlier cases, such as Mayo, the Court paid no particular heed
to the Treasury’s “expertise” in physicians’ employment or training in deferring to its
interpretation. Accord id. (“[I]n affirming the agency’s exercise of [its] discretion, the Court
[in Mayo] simply noted that the agency’s statutory interpretation was ‘perfectly sensible,’ that
it had determined it ‘would further the purpose’ of the statute, and it ‘did not act irrationally’—
with no mention of any Treasury ‘expertise’ in physicians’ employment or training.”). But
contrast this with the Court’s recent King v. Burwell decision, in which it denied Chevron
deference to the IRS, in part due to the agency’s lack of expertise. For further discussion, see
infra Part III.A.
225. As will be discussed further, the Court’s decision in Michigan v. EPA provides another
striking example. See infra Part III.B.1.a. In that case, the EPA provided a “Legal
Memorandum” accompanying its proposed supplemental finding. See Supplemental Finding
That It Is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and
Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 81 Fed. Reg. 24,420, 24,421 n.3 (Apr. 25,
2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63). The incorporation model, in sharp contrast, would
require the agency to consider empirically based costs and benefits in making its threshold
decision whether to regulate.
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To address the “reasonableness”
deferential Chevron standard.”226
requirement of Chevron Step Two, the EPA stated that it “reasonably
explained why, in light of the various indications of congressional intent, it
adopted what the district court acknowledged to be a permissible
interpretation.”227
Significant for the purposes of this Article, the EPA was quite explicit that
it believed it had authority to choose any possible “legal” interpretation of
the Act without engaging in fact finding of any sort.228 As the district court
noted (and the EPA did not dispute), the EPA “based its interpretation on an
analysis of many of the same provisions the Court analyzed at step one”—
the “parts of the statute and its legislative history that the Court discussed in
its step-one analysis.”229 Thus, the court continued, “the primary flaw
underlying EPA’s entire analysis is that EPA effectively attempted to use
Chevron-step-one arguments to justify its interpretation at step two.”230 As
the district court recognized, this problem effectively renders Chevron Step
Two defunct: “[I]n the context of what EPA acknowledges are two
permissible interpretations, it cannot explain its choice of one of those
interpretations by arguing only that the interpretation was permissible,
because permissibility alone is not a sufficient reasoned explanation.”231
How might this have looked under the Chevron-State Farm incorporation
model? The EPA would have been required to justify its choice between two
permissible legal interpretations by pointing to facts developed in the
administrative record. The record in that case reflected that the EPA, in its
response to public comments, asserted various, apparently unsubstantiated,
“beliefs” regarding the potential harms from interbasin transfers and the
potential burdens upon the states from requiring permits.232 Specifically, the
EPA asserted that exempting interbasin transfers from permitting
requirements would avoid “unnecessarily” or “unduly” burdening states’
water allocations.233
226. Reply Brief for Defendants-Appellants EPA and Gina McCarthy, supra note 58, at 2;
see also Brief for Defendants-Appellants EPA and Gina McCarthy, supra note 53, at 21 (“The
Water Transfers Rule is a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute, and should be
upheld under the deferential framework of Chevron.”).
227. Reply Brief for Defendants-Appellants EPA and Gina McCarthy, supra note 58, at 22.
228. Brief for Defendants-Appellants EPA and Gina McCarthy, supra note 53, at 37
(“Although EPA chose one of the interpretations of the statute recognized as permissible by
the district court, that court improperly required EPA to explain its choice in far more detail
than the law requires.”); id. at 48 (arguing that “the agency’s interpretation must simply be
among the permissible alternatives” and distinguishing State Farm as a “case involv[ing] an
agency’s detailed technical and factual findings, not a statutory construction”).
229. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA (Catskill III), 8 F. Supp.
3d 500, 539–40 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), rev’d, 846 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 2017).
230. Id. at 558. As the court elaborated, “Indeed, EPA employed the exact same ‘holistic
approach’ to statutory interpretation in both the Water Transfers Rule and in the step-one
analysis in this case.” Id.
231. Id.; see also Friends of Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. (Friends I), 570 F.3d
1210, 1228 (11th Cir. 2009) (reasoning that because the statute permitted the interpretation,
the EPA’s choice was per se reasonable).
232. Brief for the State of New York et al., supra note 39, at 72 n.13.
233. Catskill III, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 544.
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But determining whether the burdens of permitting justify the costs
requires factual findings that the EPA never made.234 Indeed,
EPA has conceded that the Rule is not based on any “scientific analysis of”
inter-basin transfers or any study of the effects of such unregulated transfers
“on the costs of drinking water treatment, recreation, or commercial
fishing.” Nor did EPA ever evaluate or find any facts regarding the burdens
of compliance with NPDES permitting.235

Moreover,
the principal reason that NPDES permitting would be costly is if water
transfers are highly polluted—the precise situation when compliance costs
might be justified by the benefits of cleaner water. But EPA has no way of
knowing how to weigh these competing interests because it failed to
consider any of the “relevant factors.”236

As the states’ brief highlights, “[a]rtificial transfers of contaminated water
from one water body to another harm water quality, degrade the environment,
endanger public health, and cause billions of dollars in economic damage.”237
The EPA decided not to consider these environmental, health, and
economic effects notwithstanding myriad public comments raising the issue
and factual evidence supporting various concerns.238
The issue goes beyond a simple disagreement regarding the quantum of
factual or empirical evidence in the administrative record necessary to
support the EPA’s policy-based conclusion. The EPA took the position that
it need not put forth any such policy-based evidence; instead, it took cover
behind its legal analysis, relying wholly on the very same materials (statutory
text, purposes, and legislative history) that led the court to conclude that there
was ambiguity at Chevron Step One.239 Again, the EPA was quite upfront
about this and complained that the district court “erroneously undertook a
searching and skeptical examination of EPA’s reasoning” and “improperly
required EPA to explain its choice in far more detail than the law requires.”240

234. See Brief for the State of New York et al., supra note 39, at 71.
235. Id. at 71 (citations omitted).
236. Id. at 73.
237. Id. at 4; see also id. at 5 (“Inter-basin transfers containing pollutants such as industrial
waste, toxic blue-green algae, or fecal coliform can contaminate waters used for drinking or
recreation, creating the risk of illness and even death. And conveying pollutants from one
water body to another often wreaks havoc on surrounding property values and businesses that
rely on a clean water supply, including fishing and tourism. Conveying polluted water into
clean water bodies can destroy aquatic ecosystems by introducing invasive species and disease
into new water bodies.” (citations omitted)).
238. Id. at 17 (“EPA thus never considered the severe environmental, health, and economic
harms caused by some inter-basin transfers that move polluted water into cleaner waterways,
despite receiving thousands of public comments warning of such dangers.”).
239. As the district court concluded, “It thus appears that EPA relied on the presumed
validity of its interpretation to justify its decision not to address an issue, consideration of
which was necessary to establish the validity of its interpretation. In other words, it put the
motor before the boat.” Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA (Catskill
III), 8 F. Supp. 3d 500, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), rev’d, 846 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 2017).
240. Brief for Defendants-Appellants EPA and Gina McCarthy, supra note 53, at 35, 37.
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2. Chenery and Review of Administrative Records
The Chenery doctrine241—that, in reviewing agency decisions, courts
should consider only those rationales the agencies offered in their
decisions—reinforces the normative ideal of the Chevron-State Farm
model.242 As the Supreme Court held in SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery
I)243, when Congress has delegated “a determination of policy or
judgment . . . [to] the agency alone . . . , a judicial judgment cannot be made
to do service for an administrative judgment.”244 The Second Circuit added:
Were courts obliged to create and assess ex-post justifications for
inadequately reasoned agency decisions, courts would, in effect, be
conscripted into making policy. Such an activity is, for myriad and obvious
reasons, more properly the province of other bodies, particularly where . . .
the other body is an agency that can bring to bear particular subject matter
expertise.245

Expounding on this rationale, Kevin Stack has argued that “Congress
delegates in part so that agencies will exercise their expertise and flexibility
in view of changing conditions, . . . [and] Chenery provides a way to ensure
that the agencies will do so.”246 More specifically, “the deference the Court
applies at Step Two is implicitly conditioned on the agency’s having worked
through the problem, with reason-giving as the overt expression of its
exercise of discretion and expertise.”247 In this way, “compliance with the
Chenery principle operates as a condition for the agency to receive deference
in Chevron Step Two.”248
It is thus striking in the Catskill Mountains decision—especially in light of
the EPA’s reliance solely on legal analysis—that the Second Circuit
reasoned, “Another factor favoring the reasonableness of the Water Transfers
Rule’s interpretation of the Clean Water Act is that compliance with an
NPDES permitting scheme for water transfers is likely to be burdensome and
costly for permittees, and may disrupt existing water transfer systems.”249
Here, the court looked not to the EPA’s administrative rulemaking record for

241. See SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947); SEC v. Chenery
Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943).
242. Others—most notably Kevin Stack—have noted “the extent to which the Chenery and
Chevron doctrines are conceptually intertwined, with each having implications for the other.”
Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 1004 (2007).
Stack has argued forcefully that “compliance with Chenery is a necessary condition for
Chevron deference.” Id.
243. 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
244. Id. at 88.
245. Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 184, 192 (2d Cir. 2005).
246. Stack, supra note 242, at 981; see also id. at 1007 (“[T]he core demand for reasongiving and justification provides a check that the agency has exercised its expertise.”).
247. Id. at 1005.
248. Id.
249. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA (Catskill IV), 846 F.3d
492, 529 (2d Cir. 2017), cert. denied No. 17-446, 2018 WL 1037580 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2018).

2400

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

relevant evidence but instead to factual information put forth in briefs filed
by the intervenor-defendants in the case.250
Oddly, the Second Circuit acknowledged that “[t]he district court made no
findings of fact in the course of answering the purely legal question before
it” and, for that reason, it “express[ed] no view as to the likelihood that
requiring NPDES permits for water transfers would lead to the results
identified above.”251 Instead, the court noted that “concerns that such results
might arise are plausible and could support the EPA’s interpretation of the
Clean Water Act in the Water Transfers Rule.”252 Had the court incorporated
State Farm into its Chevron review scheme, this post hoc rationalization of
the agency’s policy decision—not grounded in an evidentiary record—would
have been barred by Chenery. Not only does Chenery cohere with the
incorporation model in terms of directing the agency to develop fact-based
justifications in the administrative record but failure to embrace the
incorporation model threatens to weaken, if not erode, Chenery.253

250. The court’s description from the parties’ briefs is rather lengthy:
[S]everal intervenor-defendant water districts assert that it could cost an estimated
$4.2 billion to treat just the most significant water transfers in the Western United
States, and that obtaining an NPDES permit and complying with its conditions could
cost a single water provider hundreds of millions of dollars. Similarly, intervenordefendant New York City submits that if it is not granted the permanent variances it
has requested in its most recent permit application, it will be forced to construct an
expensive water-treatment plant, and amicus curiae the State of California argues
that requiring NPDES permits would put a significant financial and logistical strain
on the California State Water Project. Further, amici curiae the American Farm
Bureau Federation and Florida Farm Bureau Federation argue that the invalidation
of the Water Transfers Rule would (i) throw the status of agricultural water-flow
plans into doubt, and (ii) require state water agencies to increase revenues to pay for
permits for levies and dams, which they would likely accomplish by raising
agricultural and property taxes, and which in turn would raise farmers’ costs and
hurt their international economic competitiveness.
Id. (citations omitted). The States, though not invoking Chenery, nonetheless brought this
issue to the Second Circuit’s attention. See Brief for the State of New York et al., supra note
39, at 71–72 (“Although defendants now speculate that permitting will be so cost-prohibitive
as to interfere with States’ water allocations, EPA made no such finding—instead, it stressed
that the Rule was based on a legal analysis ‘rather than an assessment of [the] costs or
administrative burdens’ of permitting.”); id. at 72 n.14 (“Appellate counsels’ post-hoc claims
about permits’ theoretical burdens cannot save the Rule when EPA never assessed the realworld costs in jumping to its unsupported conclusions.” (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 49–50 (1983))).
251. Catskill IV, 846 F.3d at 529 n.34.
252. Id.; see also id. at 529 (“The potential for such disruptive results, if accurate, would
provide further support for the EPA’s decision to interpret the statutory ambiguity at issue so
as not to require NPDES permits for water transfers.”).
253. In Catskill IV, the Second Circuit, by failing to invoke Chenery, appears to have joined
the ranks of courts that have held that Chenery does not apply in cases of purely legal
reasoning. See Ark. AFL-CIO v. FCC, 11 F.3d 1430, 1440 (8th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he Supreme
Court clearly limited Chenery to situations in which the agency failed to make a necessary
determination of fact or of policy.”); Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor
Wage Appeals Bd., 829 F.2d 1186, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“The Chenery rule . . . does not
apply when the question presented is one of statutory construction.”); N.C. Comm’n of Indian
Affairs v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 725 F.2d 238, 240 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding no Chenery issue
because “interpretation of a federal statute is not ‘a determination or judgment which an
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C. Resuscitating State Farm
A formidable challenge to the incorporation model is the suggestion that,
even if Chevron Step Two is lax or defunct, it does not matter so long as,
thereafter, courts apply State Farm arbitrary and capricious review as a kind
of Step Three in the overall analysis.254
This Part begins with an analysis of the State Farm review as “Step Three,”
a model generally associated with the D.C. Circuit. This Article then
suggests two realms in which the incorporation model might make a
difference in practice. First, the model would potentially expand the reach
of State Farm review.255 Second, if more speculatively, it could augment (at
least in the short term) the stringency of judicial scrutiny overall.256
1. State Farm Review as “Step Three”
The D.C. Circuit seems fairly adept at applying State Farm as Step
Three.257 Judge Edwards, in particular, has been an avid purveyor of this
approach.
In United States Postal Service v. Postal Regulatory

administrative agency alone is authorized to make’” (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery
II), 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947))).
254. In a similar vein, Stephenson and Vermeule argue that “[t]rying to save Chevron’s two
steps by reading one of them as equivalent to arbitrary and capricious review serves no useful
purpose and creates additional problems.” Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 23, at 604. In
a sense, what follows is an attempt to respond to their forceful critique.
255. As should be clear, this Article’s main concern is with scenarios in which the
“reasoned decisionmaking” element of judicial review drops out altogether. While I argue
that the incorporation of State Farm into the Chevron framework will expand State Farm’s
domain, I do not mean to suggest that stand-alone State Farm challenges could not be raised
and addressed by courts. Cf. id. at 606 (“Courts may mistakenly conclude that they must
always resolve the question of interpretive plausibility before addressing the issue of reasoned
decisionmaking, because the former is part of Step One and the latter is part of Step Two.”).
256. This Article concedes that the predicted effect (both direction and magnitude) is
ultimately an empirical question (and highly speculative). My intuition is that, at least in the
short run, the incorporation of State Farm into the Chevron framework would heighten overall
scrutiny by drawing courts’ attention to the need for an additional element of review against
the backdrop of the status quo of relatively lax Step Two analysis.
257. For example, in Van Hollen v. FEC, 811 F.3d 486 (D.C. Cir. 2016), having decided
that the agency “easily clear[ed] the Chevron Step Two hurdle,” the D.C. Circuit panel
methodically proceeded to the arbitrary and capricious inquiry, id. at 495; see also Nat. Res.
Def. Council v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, No. 14-1225, 2016 WL 1639661, at *12
(D.C. Cir. Apr. 26, 2016) (“Having concluded the Commission’s interpretation of Rule (L) is
reasonable . . . we now consider whether NRDC’s petition for waiver was properly denied.
The Commission’s determination is entitled to deference as long as it was not arbitrary and
capricious.”). Likewise, in NetCoalition v. SEC, 615 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 2010), the D.C.
Circuit panel first concluded that the SEC had acted within the bounds of its statutory authority
when it adopted a particular approach to assessing certain New York Stock Exchange fees
under the Exchange Act, and thus rejected petitioners’ Chevron argument, id. at 533–34. The
court then took up petitioner’s State Farm challenge that the agency had insufficiently justified
some of the conclusions that it purportedly relied upon when making the decision to adopt this
approach and allowed it to proceed. Id. at 537–44; see also Sw. Power Pool, Inc. v. Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm’n, 736 F.3d 994, 995 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding FERC’s plausible
interpretation and resolution of a contract provision to be arbitrary and capricious under “both
the Administrative Procedure Act and [a] ‘Chevron-like analysis,’” given FERC’s failure to
consider record evidence and alternative methods of contractual construction).
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Commission,258 the agency survived Chevron, but not State Farm, review.259
The Postal Regulatory Commission claimed authority to regulate activities
that have “rate effects” rather than outright rate changes and rejected
proposals from the Postal Service concerning price adjustments to certain
“market-dominant” products.260 After deciding that the Commission’s
action survived Chevron review, the court proceeded to apply arbitrary and
capricious review.261 The court held that, although the Commission had the
requisite authority to “assess mail preparation requirements that have rate
effects,” the Commission nonetheless “fail[ed] to reasonably explain its
decision” in light of its “differential treatment of seemingly like cases.”262
The court remanded the order to the Commission “to enunciate an intelligible
standard and then reconsider its decision in light of that standard.”263
In American Petroleum Institute v. EPA,264 the EPA claimed to be
balancing competing policies to encourage recycling against the potential
dangers of creating a loophole for noncompliance.265 The court concluded
that the legal basis for the EPA’s decision on an interpretive question
survived Chevron Step Two,266 but the agency’s stated policy justifications
were inadequate to survive State Farm arbitrary and capricious review.267
Specifically, the court (per Judge David Sentelle) held that “[i]t may be
permissible for EPA to determine that the predominant purpose of primary
treatment is discard,” but the “EPA has not set forth why it has concluded
that the compliance motivation predominates over the reclamation
motivation.”268 In particular, “[l]egal abandonment of property is premised
on determining the intent to abandon, which requires an inquiry into facts and
circumstances.”269 Recognizing that “the second step of Chevron analysis
and State Farm arbitrary and capricious review overlap, but are not

258. 785 F.3d 740 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
259. Id. at 744.
260. Id. at 743.
261. Id. at 750–56.
262. Id. at 753.
263. Id. at 756.
264. 216 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
265. Id. at 57. At issue was a series of orders regulating oil-bearing wastewaters produced
in the process of petroleum refining as solid waste and hazardous waste for the purposes of
regulation under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). Id. at 54. EPA sought
to regulate the oil-bearing wastewaters, which they argued were discarded for the purposes of
RCRA. Id. at 54–55.
266. Id. at 57 (“Where an industrial byproduct may be characterized as discarded or ‘in
process’ material, EPA’s choice of characterization is entitled to deference.”).
267. Id. at 58 (“In short, EPA has not set forth why it has concluded that the compliance
motivation predominates over the reclamation motivation. Perhaps equally importantly it has
not explained why that conclusion, even if validly reached, compels the further conclusion
that the wastewater has been discarded. Therefore, because the agency has failed to provide a
rational explanation for its decision, we hold the decision to be arbitrary and capricious.”).
268. Id. at 57–58.
269. Id. at 57.
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identical,”270 the court struck down the EPA’s regulation of oil-bearing
wastewaters under arbitrary and capricious review.271
A decade earlier, American Mining Congress v. EPA272 presented a similar
statutory interpretation issue involving the same ambiguous statute as applied
to a different waste material.273 As in American Petroleum Institute, the
agency survived the Chevron challenge to the legal permissibility of its
interpretation but failed its duty, under State Farm, to articulate a sufficiently
rational connection between the information on the record and its ultimate
rule.274 Writing the majority opinion, Judge Edwards insisted that
“[d]eference to the agency does not . . . require us to abdicate the judicial
duty carefully to ‘review the record to ascertain that the agency has made a
reasoned decision.’”275
Judge Edwards, while conceding that “Chevron review and arbitrary and
capricious review overlap at the margins,”276 has consistently held the view
that Chevron and State Farm review are analytically distinct. Chevron is
“principally concerned with whether an agency has authority to act under a
statute.”277 And agencies are accorded great deference, particularly at Step
Two:
a reviewing court’s inquiry under Chevron is rooted in statutory analysis
and is focused on discerning the boundaries of Congress’ delegation of
authority to the agency; and as long as the agency stays within that
delegation, it is free to make policy choices in interpreting the statute, and
such interpretations are entitled to deference.278

270. Id.
271. Id. at 58. By comparison, in Solvay USA Inc. v. EPA, 608 F. App’x 10 (D.C. Cir.
2015), the court recognized “‘that EPA engaged in reasoned decisionmaking to decide which
characterization is appropriate’ for different types of non-hazardous materials.” Id. at 12
(quoting Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 216 F.3d 50, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). The court held that
“[b]ecause EPA ‘has considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made,’ we uphold the rule.” Id. at 13 (quoting Nat’l
Ass’n of Clean Air Agencies v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1221, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
272. 907 F.2d 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
273. Id. at 1186 (“This court has recently had occasion to consider the meaning of the term
‘discarded’ in RCRA under the first step of Chevron analysis. In [an earlier American
Petroleum Institute decision in the D.C. Circuit], we concluded that the term ‘discarded’ was
marked by the kind of ambiguity demanding resolution by the agency’s delegated lawmaking
powers.” (citing Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 906 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1990))).
274. Id. at 1192 (“The agency did not exceed its statutory authority in treating the six wastes
as ‘discarded,’ and thus subject to RCRA Subtitle C regulation. Nor did it run afoul of the
APA notice-and-comment requirement. However, EPA failed in the 1988 Rule to articulate a
rational connection between the data on which it purportedly relied and its decision to reject
the petitioners’ admittedly significant challenges.”).
275. Id. at 1187 (quoting Nat’l Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 968 (D.C. Cir.
1990)).
276. Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
277. Id.
278. Id.; see also id. (“The paradigmatic Chevron case concerns ‘[t]he power of an
administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . . . program.’ In such a case,
the question for the reviewing court is whether the agency’s construction of the statute is
faithful to its plain meaning, or, if the statute has no plain meaning, whether the agency’s
interpretation ‘is based on a permissible construction of the statute.’” (alterations in original)
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Judge Edwards characterized the distinction as between what is
“permissible” under Chevron versus what is “reasonable” under State
Farm.279
In some cases, then, much hinges on the courts’ characterization of the
case as a “Chevron” or “State Farm” case. In an oft-cited case, Arent v.
Shalala,280 the parties raised Chevron and State Farm challenges to the
FDA’s food labeling regulation defining “substantial compliance” under the
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990.281 Judge Edwards, for the
majority, distinguished Chevron and State Farm and found only the latter to
be applicable.282 Thus, because “there [was] no question that the FDA had
authority to define the circumstances constituting food retailers’ substantial
compliance with the NLEA’s voluntary labeling guidelines,” according to
Judge Edwards, “[t]he only issue . . . [was] whether the FDA’s discharge of
that authority was reasonable.”283
2. Expanding State Farm’s Domain
If jurisdictions were to follow the D.C. Circuit’s approach of using State
Farm as Step Three, that would be a step in the right direction. The
incorporation of State Farm into the Chevron Two-Step framework would
nonetheless be preferable as it would likely expand the domain of agency
rules subject to State Farm review.
a. Beyond Changes in Agency Position and Procedural Defects
Employing an acoustic separation approach to State Farm and Chevron
review, some courts, in statutory interpretation cases, unduly limit the
domain of State Farm to agency rules that suffer from procedural defects, or
scenarios where the agency has changed its interpretive position.284 Lower
courts, moreover, have looked to prior U.S. Supreme Court decisions to
support their position. Chief among these prior precedents is National Cable
& Telecommunication Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services,285 where the Court

(citations omitted) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 843
(1984))).
279. Id. at 616 n.6 (“In such situations, what is ‘permissible’ under Chevron is also
reasonable under State Farm.” (emphasis added)).
280. 70 F.3d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
281. More specifically, the FDA labeling requirements for raw fish and produce were to
remain voluntary unless the FDA determined that there was not “substantial compliance” with
the voluntary guidelines. Id. at 612–13. The FDA interpreted “substantial compliance” to be
met if sixty percent of stores evaluated were in compliance. Id. at 612.
282. Id. at 614–15 (“Although the parties argue this case in terms of both Chevron analysis
and arbitrary and capricious review, they interpret the case as one involving review of any
agency’s construction of a statute and look primarily to Chevron for the appropriate analytical
framework. We, however, do not find Chevron controlling.”).
283. Id. at 616.
284. See, e.g., Mizrahi v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 156, 173 n.21 (2d Cir. 2007) (concluding,
after conducting the Chevron Two-Step, that “State Farm is not applicable because the BIA
decision in Mizrahi’s case does not represent a change in agency course”).
285. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
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upheld Chevron deference to an agency’s change in interpretation and
suggested, in dicta, that:
Unexplained inconsistency is, at most, a reason for holding an
interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice
under the Administrative Procedure Act. For if the agency adequately
explains the reasons for a reversal of policy, ‘change is not invalidating,
since the whole point of Chevron is to leave the discretion provided by the
ambiguities of a statute with the implementing agency.’ ‘An initial agency
interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On the contrary, the
agency . . . must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its
policy on a continuing basis’ . . . or a change in administrations. That is no
doubt why in Chevron itself, [the] Court deferred to an agency
interpretation that was a recent reversal of agency policy.286

In an earlier case, Rust v. Sullivan,287 the Court likewise held that
regulations were entitled to Chevron deference notwithstanding their “sharp
break from the Secretary’s prior construction of the statute.”288 The case
involved the Court’s review of regulations promulgated by the Department
of Health and Human Services, which had revised its position on the
interpretation of Title X governing funds earmarked for family planning
services. In that context, the Court, citing State Farm, held that “the
Secretary amply justified his change of interpretation with a ‘reasoned
analysis.’”289
In the face of these decisions, several lower courts have conceded that State
Farm review may be incorporated as part of Chevron Step Two, but only in
the limited circumstance where the agency has changed its interpretive
position.290
Other courts limit the incorporation of State Farm into the Chevron
analysis to rules with “procedural defects.”291 Recall that the Second Circuit
286. Id. at 981–82 (first alteration in original) (first quoting Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A.,
517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996); then quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 863–64 (1984)).
287. 500 U.S. 174 (1991).
288. Id. at 186.
289. Id. at 187 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 42 (1983)). The Court elaborated:
The Secretary explained that the regulations are a result of his determination, in the
wake of the critical reports of the General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Office
of the Inspector General (OIG), that prior policy failed to implement properly the
statute and that it was necessary to provide “‘clear and operational guidance’ to
grantees about how to preserve the distinction between Title X programs and
abortion as a method of family planning.” He also determined that the new
regulations are more in keeping with the original intent of the statute, are justified
by client experience under the prior policy, and are supported by a shift in attitude
against the “elimination of unborn children by abortion.”
Id. (quoting 53 Fed. Reg. 2923–24 (Feb. 2, 1988) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 59)).
290. See, e.g., Ala. Educ. Ass’n v. Chao, 455 F.3d 386, 397 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (reversing an
agency statutory interpretation under Chevron Step Two because the agency “failed to supply
a reasoned analysis supporting its change of position”); AFL-CIO v. Brock, 835 F.2d 912, 917
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
291. In prior work, I have argued that procedural irregularities in agency rulemaking might
defeat Chevron deference and warrant, at most, Skidmore deference. See Catherine M.
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in Catskill Mountains embraced such a limited view of State Farm’s
applicability.292 This view of State Farm arbitrary and capricious review in
the statutory interpretation context as relegated exclusively to the
“procedural” realm, unconcerned with substantive aspects of the agency
decision, is erroneous. It gives short shrift to the part of the State Farm test
that looks to whether “the agency has relied on factors which Congress has
not intended it to consider.”293
Moreover, even after putting forward this narrow “procedural defect”
domain for State Farm review, the Second Circuit acknowledged that one of
the plaintiffs had indeed argued that the EPA’s rule was procedurally
defective but “only in the context of a Chevron Step Two argument.”294 The
court thus concluded that “the interpretive Rule here is properly reviewed
only under the Chevron standard, which does not incorporate the State Farm
standard.”295 It is not clear why the court did not feel compelled nonetheless
to consider this a stand-alone State Farm challenge, which the court could
decide before or after the Chevron Two-Step.296

Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2180
(2009) [hereinafter Sharkey, Federalism Accountability] (“My own view has been that the
agency’s views should be accorded Skidmore ‘power to persuade’ (not Chevron mandatory)
deference—a position apparently endorsed by the Court in Wyeth.”); see also Catherine M.
Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56
DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 256–57 (2007) (advocating that courts condition any deference to an
agency’s preemption position on that agency’s compliance with the strictures of the
Federalism executive order). I have also noted previously the link between Skidmore
deference and the importation of “hard look” review. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Products
Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 498 (2008)
(urging Skidmore “power to persuade” deference as a means to “encourag[e] agencies to
engage in formal notice-and-comment rulemaking processes that, arguably, vet the agency
decisionmaking process and make the agency respond to substantive concerns raised by all
affected parties”); see also Sharkey, Federalism Accountability, supra, at 2191 (“Skidmore
deference provides courts with an appropriate tool to scrutinize the ‘reasoned explanations’
provided by agencies.”). Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), featured prominently in this
account because the Court highlighted that the FDA’s failure to “offer[] States or other
interested parties notice or opportunity for comment” rendered its views on state law
“inherently suspect,” id. at 577.
292. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA (Catskill IV), 846 F.3d
492, 521 (2d Cir. 2017) (“State Farm is used to evaluate whether a rule is procedurally
defective as a result of flaws in the agency’s decisionmaking process.”), cert. denied No. 17446, 2018 WL 1037580 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2018).
293. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
294. Catskill IV, 846 F.3d at 524 n.31.
295. Id.
296. In this case, moreover, plaintiffs clearly raised State Farm challenges in their
complaint. See Complaint, Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA
(Catskill III), 8 F. Supp. 3d 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 08 Civ. 8430). This leads to the next
reason the incorporation model will widen the domain for State Farm review—namely, some
litigants who raise claims of error in statutory interpretation (clearly subject to the Chevron
framework) do not raise independent State Farm challenges. And several courts—the D.C.
Circuit among them—are sticklers for considering only the precise claims raised by the
litigants. Of course, one could readily object to the need for doctrinal changes on account of
litigant error (or misjudgment), whether based on lack of sophistication or neglect. But this
does not consider the much less appreciated category of private litigants who stand to lose,
which is addressed next in Part II.C.2.b.
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b. Indirect Agency Challenges in Private Party Disputes
When statutory interpretation challenges arise between private parties
where the agency is not a party, a direct State Farm challenge is not an
option.297 The incorporation framework thus enables a form of indirect
challenge to agency decision-making in this context.298
In prior work, I pioneered this concept in the context of federal preemption
decisions—where a preemption defense was raised by a defendant
manufacturer against state products liability claims—which I argued could
provide “an apt avenue for a new form of indirect challenge to agency
rulemaking and regulatory actions with wider applicability.”299 As I
explained: “What I have in mind is an extension of [the State Farm]
framework of hard look review in the context of court preemption decisions.
Courts are well poised to police agencies’ flouting of their responsibilities in
the domains of regulatory review and interpretation.”300 In the preemption
context, the indirect challenge would work as follows:
[C]ourts should import a “State Farm with teeth” standard from APA
rulemaking challenges . . . . [C]ourts should insist on substantial evidence
in the rulemaking record to support an agency’s conclusion that state law
conflicts with, or frustrates the purposes of, a federal regulatory scheme.
And courts should accord Skidmore “power to persuade” deference (rather
than mandatory Chevron deference) to an agency’s interpretive views on
preemption based upon the consistency, care, formality, and relative
expertise of the agency.301

297. For representative cases between private parties in which an agency regulation is at
issue, see generally Glob. Crossing Telecomms., Inc. v. Metrophones Telecomms., Inc., 550
U.S. 45, 58 (2007); Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 799 F.3d 633, 650–51 (7th Cir.
2015); Leyse v. Clear Channel Broad., Inc., 697 F.3d 360, 372 (6th Cir. 2012); Schafer v.
Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 61 (4th Cir. 2011); Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199,
221 (2d Cir. 2009); Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 2009);
Core Commc’ns, Inc. v. Verizon Pa., Inc., 493 F.3d 333, 335 (3d Cir. 2007); Cohen v. JP
Morgan Chase & Co., 498 F.3d 111, 124–25 (2d Cir. 2007); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v.
Asahi Tec Corp., 979 F. Supp. 2d 46, 70–72 (D.D.C. 2013); Newsome v. Young Supply Co.,
835 F. Supp. 2d 406, 415 (E.D. Mich. 2011).
298. This second rationale for the expansion of the domain of State Farm gains even more
significance in light of the Supreme Court’s Encino Motorcars decision, see infra Part
III.B.1.b, which is a statutory interpretation case between two private parties wherein the Court
nonetheless incorporated State Farm into its Chevron analysis (or so I argue).
299. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability, supra note 291, at 2185; id. at 2184 (“It remains
to be seen the extent to which courts will reinvigorate and expand ‘hard look’ review of agency
action. Wyeth v. Levine could expand the domain of direct challenges to preemption
provisions in notice-and-comment rulemakings should agencies be spurred in that direction.
It also stands as a progenitor of a new form of indirect challenge, arising when the preemption
defense is raised against state tort causes of action.”); see also Catherine M. Sharkey, State
Farm “With Teeth”: Heightened Judicial Review in the Absence of Executive Oversight, 89
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1589, 1639–40 (2014) (“The agency reference theory of preemption thus
harnesses the federal administrative process—including State Farm’s hard-look review of an
agency’s factual determinations and Skidmore’s ‘power to persuade’ deference—for purposes
of judicial resolution of preemption challenges in civil litigation (where the agency is not a
party).” (footnote omitted)).
300. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability, supra note 291, at 2185–86.
301. Sharkey, supra note 299, at 1640.
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The Eleventh Circuit’s analysis in Friends of the Everglades v. South
Florida Water Management District302 is one example in which the court
applied Chevron deference to the EPA’s rule in the context of a statutory
interpretation argument. Significantly, the court did not consider whether the
EPA provided a reasoned explanation for its interpretation—nor, in that case,
could the private parties to the litigation have raised an independent State
Farm challenge.
Contrast this with the Sixth Circuit’s approach in Leyse v. Clear Channel
Broadcasting, Inc.303 A consumer brought an action against a radio station
operator and alleged that the consumer received automated telephone calls
from the operator in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.304
An FCC rule exempted specific prerecorded telephone calls from the ambit
of the Act.305 Faced with interpreting an ambiguous provision of the Act, the
court reached Step Two of the Chevron inquiry. At that juncture, the court
specifically invoked the State Farm factors.306 Before according Chevron
deference to the FCC at Step Two, the court, invoking the State Farm factors,
probed the agency’s policy reasoning—specifically the rule’s effect on
privacy.307
One objection to this form of indirect agency challenge is that it could
upend private parties’ settled expectations or reliance on prior (unchallenged)
agency decisions. But recall that the agency was not a party in the seminal
Skidmore case either.308 Michael Herz aptly noted that Skidmore was private
litigation, and, as such, “[t]his setting requires independent judicial judgment
in a way that direct review of the agency’s exercise of delegated authority
might not.”309 But, whereas the origins of Skidmore deference may be linked
to the private party setting, following Mead, “the federal courts have invoked
Skidmore and stated that agency interpretations to which Chevron does not

302. 570 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2009).
303. 697 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 2012), amended and superseded on jurisdictional grounds, 545
F. App’x 444 (6th Cir. 2013). It is perhaps significant that the private parties themselves
embraced the Chevron-State Farm model. Compare Brief for Appellant at 40–41, Leyse, 697
F.3d 360 (No. 10-3739) (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)), with Brief for Appellee at 35, Leyse, 697 F.3d 360 (No. 10-3739)
(citing State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43).
304. Leyse, 697 F.3d at 362–63 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) (2012)).
305. Id. at 366 (citing Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991, 70 Fed. Reg. 19,330–31, 19,335 (Apr. 13, 2005)).
306. Id. at 372.
307. Id. at 365 (citing In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014, ¶ 136 (July 3, 2003); Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd. 17459, ¶ 30 (Sept. 18, 2002)). In its rulemaking, the FCC noted
that very few individuals indicated that they had been affected by prerecorded messages akin
to those at issue and, accordingly, found that they did not fall within the statutory term at issue.
In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991,
18 FCC Rcd. 14014, ¶ 145, (July 3, 2003).
308. See Herz, supra note 25, at 129, 131 (noting that Skidmore’s approach to judicial
review “seemed . . . linked to the nature of the lawsuit—in particular, to the fact that the agency
was not a party”).
309. Id. (citing Ronald M. Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74
GEO. L.J. 1, 56–58 (1985)).
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apply still merit respect under Skidmore.”310 And, as Herz pointed out, “[i]n
doing so, they have made no distinction whatever between private litigation
and suits to which the agency is a party.”311
A second objection in the collateral-challenge context is the absence of a
government lawyer to explain the policy bases for the agency’s action. Of
course, at least one of the private party’s lawyers would have an incentive to
take on that role. Moreover, a court could and should invite the agency to
file an amicus brief in which it defends and explains its rule.312
Third, the remedy in this type of “indirect” challenge is incomplete. Given
that the agency is not a party to the lawsuit, the court cannot remand back to
the agency for further elaboration. In this way, it resembles how preemption
challenges serve as an indirect challenge to FDA regulations. Moreover, just
as with the FDA in that example, an agency will be on notice that courts will
not defer to its regulation in litigation, which may induce a behavioral
response on the part of the agency. Specifically, the agency will be induced
to demonstrate its expertise by providing policy-based justifications based
upon facts and evidence vetted during the notice-and-comment rulemaking
process.
Courts might also consider wielding the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to
withhold adjudication until the agency acts and could enter an injunction in
the interim.313 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction “permits a court itself to
‘refer’ a question to the Secretary. . . . A court may then stay its
proceedings—for a limited time, if appropriate—to allow a party to initiate
agency review. Lower courts have sometimes accompanied a stay with an
injunction designed to preserve the status quo.”314 Whereas typically
primary jurisdiction is invoked in situations where the agency has not yet
engaged in rulemaking, in this context, courts might invoke primary
jurisdiction in order to send the issue back to the agency so that it can develop
fact-based policy evidence. In other words, primary jurisdiction could

310. Id. at 133.
311. Id.
312. See Bible v. United Students Aid Funds, Inc., 799 F.3d 633, 639 (7th Cir. 2015)
(discussing how the Secretary of Education was invited by the court to file an amicus brief
explaining the agency’s position). I have investigated this issue in the realm of FDA
prescription drug preemption cases, where I found that
not only are federal courts more likely to defer to federal agencies, but—equally
important in terms of explaining the decision-making process of courts—federal
courts are more likely than state courts to solicit the views of the FDA and the FDA
is more apt to intervene on its own in federal court cases.
Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism in Action: FDA Regulatory Preemption in Pharmaceutical
Cases in State Versus Federal Courts, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1013, 1020 (2007).
313. For a discussion of primary jurisdiction in the area of tort preemption, see Catherine
M. Sharkey, Tort-Agency Partnerships in an Age of Preemption, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES
L. 359, 383–85 (2014); see also id. at 385 (“Direct input from federal agencies and primary
jurisdiction . . . offer two alternative avenues for pursuing new forms of tort-agency
partnerships in the health and safety realm.”).
314. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 673–74 (2003) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted); see also Cox v. Gruma Corp., No. CV 12-6502-YGR, 2013
WL 3828800, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2013).
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function as a means in essence to remand the rulemaking back to the agency
in situations where the agency is not a party.
As a final note, private litigation may turn out to be the elusive context in
which the deference standard really matters. Thus, Michael Herz reported
(based on a study conducted by Bill Funk) that the court’s choice of Chevron
or Skidmore deference made a difference in only a single case of the first
twenty-five cases decided after Mead.315 Moreover (as noted in a footnote),
that one case was a private lawsuit.316
3. Against Minimum Rationality
A more subtle effect than expanding the domain of State Farm review is
the extent to which the incorporation model would heighten the stringency of
judicial review. This view is underpinned by my intuition that the
“redundancy” or overlap conception of Chevron Step Two and State Farm
has had the unfortunate consequence of allowing the “reasoned
decisionmaking” element to drop out of the equation.
The Chevron-State Farm conceptual framework provides an opportunity
to revisit the normative debate surrounding hard look review. There is an
ongoing debate whether State Farm review is akin to “hard look” review or
“minimum rationality” review.317 A long-standing argument in favor of hard
look review is its salient effect on the quality of enacted regulations.318 The
315. See Herz, supra note 25, at 153 n.99.
316. Id. (citing Matz v. Household Int’l Tax Reduction Inv. Plan, 265 F.3d 572 (7th Cir.
2001) (en banc)). In Matz, the court initially accorded Chevron deference to the IRS’s
interpretation (articulated in an amicus brief) of “partial termination.” Matz v. Household Int’l
Tax Reduction Inv. Plan, 227 F.3d 976 (7th Cir. 2000). On remand, after the Court decided
Mead, the court revoked its prior Chevron deference given the informality of the IRS amicus
brief. Matz, 265 F.3d at 574. Any private party distinction calls out for further empirical
testing. My nonsystematic review of private party cases yielded agency positions upheld and
overturned under Skidmore, with no discernible pattern. Compare Freeman v. Quicken Loans,
Inc., 626 F.3d 799, 805 (5th Cir. 2010) (rejecting HUD’s policy statement under Skidmore
deference), with Lozano v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1004
(N.D. Ill. 2010) (applying Skidmore deference to uphold the FCC’s interpretation).
317. Compare Sharkey, supra note 299, with Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin
Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1355, 1356 (2016), and Scott A. Keller, Depoliticizing
Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 84 WASH. L. REV. 419, 456 (2009) (“APA arbitrary
and capricious review after Fox Television simply asks whether the agency’s reasons were
‘rational’—it does not require courts to take a hard look at agency action or go through the
State Farm dicta criteria for invalidating agency action.”).
318. I have argued previously that State Farm is information-forcing; its advance into the
Chevron Two-Step will enhance this effect. Michigan v. EPA continues the path of heightened
judicial review of agency rulemaking and, in particular, agency consideration of costs and
benefits that was first forged by Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
If Business Roundtable was a wake-up call to the SEC and other financial service regulators,
then Michigan v. EPA, notwithstanding the environmental context in which it was decided,
sounded a second alarm. Internal changes that have been wrought within the EPA and SEC
provide vivid illustrations of this quality-forcing change on regulations that are promulgated
in the shadow of this heightened form of judicial scrutiny. See Sharkey, supra note 299, at
1632–34. Nonetheless, there is a paucity of empirical evidence (qualitative or quantitative) of
agencies’ behavioral response in the shadow of more aggressive judicial review. This is a call
for an empirical turn in future scholarship with a focus on ways the doctrine shapes agencies’
behavior.
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core of the argument is that agencies are incentivized to collect and analyze
sufficient data, which the court can consult when reviewing the agency’s
actions.319 Agencies are thereby forced to engage in more reasoned decisionmaking so that they are equipped to show courts that they considered all
relevant policy variables rather than simply setting forth conclusory
statements of their legal authority to act.
But, as this Article argues, if the starting point for courts is that Chevron
Step Two is a “highly deferential” standard, then any redundancy or overlap
view puts downward pressure on the State Farm level of stringency. Thus,
in Village of Barrington v. Surface Transportation Board,320 the D.C. Circuit
characterized its Chevron Step Two review as “highly deferential.”321 The
court seemed primed, after this, to engage in highly deferential arbitrary and
capricious State Farm review—especially given the way it melded the two
analyses.
The incorporation model, by contrast, draws attention to the need to
buttress the overall level of judicial scrutiny above and beyond the “anemic”
Chevron Step Two. This is consistent, for example, with Judge Wald’s
position in Arent, where she argued that State Farm adds stringency above
and beyond Chevron Step Two.322
Once again, the Second Circuit’s Catskill Mountains decision illustrates
how the incorporation model would augment the level of overall judicial
scrutiny of agency statutory interpretation.
Recall that the court
characterized State Farm as “a much stricter and more exacting review of the
agency’s rationale and decisionmaking process than the Chevron Step Two
standard.”323 And indeed, its rejection of an approach akin to the
incorporation model was outcome determinative.
III. TWO FORMS OF CHEVRON RETREAT
We stand at an important Chevron crossroads.324 Scholars and courts
embrace sharply conflicting views of the Supreme Court’s stance on Chevron
generally and, more particularly, the extent to which an agency must support
its statutory interpretation with factual materials or cost-benefit analyses to
be considered reasonable.
319. Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial Review,
58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 777 (2006) (providing a sophisticated theoretical account whereby
more stringent judicial review leads to better regulatory records, less action by agencies
overall, and increased average expected value associated with those actions that agencies do
undertake). For further discussion, see generally James R. Rogers & Georg Vanberg,
Resurrecting Lochner: A Defense of Unprincipled Judicial Activism, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
442 (2007); Mark Seidenfeld, Hard Look Review in a World of Techno-Bureaucratic
Decisionmaking: A Reply to Professor McGarity, 75 TEX. L. REV. 559 (1997).
320. 636 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
321. Id. at 667.
322. Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
323. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA (Catskill IV), 846 F.3d
492, 521 (2d Cir. 2017), cert. denied No. 17-446, 2018 WL 1037580 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2018).
324. See, e.g., Coglianese, supra note 2, at 1340 (“Having inspired a vast number of judicial
opinions and scholarly writings, today the decision finds itself at the center of an intensive
debate over its legitimacy and even its continued existence.”).
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At this critical juncture, when some academics and courts are signaling a
retreat from Chevron, it is important to disaggregate and sharply distinguish
two very different approaches. Scholars have typically grouped together the
Court’s separate lines of Chevron retreat. For example, Lisa Heinzerling has
put forth a provocative thesis—that the Court’s decisions (notably including
King v. Burwell325 and Michigan v. EPA) constitute the emergence of new
“power canons” of statutory interpretation whereby “the Court took
interpretive power from an administrative agency, power that would
normally have been the agency’s due under the Chevron framework, and kept
it for itself.”326
The more radical retreat—illustrated aptly by the Court’s decision in
King—entails setting the Chevron framework aside, in that case under the socalled “major questions” exception. This augments the authority of the court
to decide whether regulation comports with congressional statutes, thus
bypassing any need to engage with input from the underlying regulator.
Chevron’s death by a thousand cuts327—placing more questions outside of
Chevron’s domain at what has been termed the “Chevron Step Zero”
inquiry—is consistent with one view that links the Court’s hostility toward
the administrative state to a longer-term deregulatory project. Chevron Step
Zero is thus the battleground for making distinctions between issues of “law”
reserved to courts and issues of “policy” delegated to agencies.
But there is a second form of retreat that, this Article contends, as a
conceptual matter, is fundamentally distinct. This seeming rollback of
Chevron deference makes room for judicial scrutiny of agency policymaking
discretion under State Farm “hard look” review. Such a Chevron retreat thus
entails not judicial usurpation of the agency’s role in statutory interpretation
but instead judicial oversight of the reasoned decision-making of the
underlying regulator.
Against this backdrop, Michigan and Encino Motorcars signal a shift in
the direction of the new Chevron-State Farm conceptual framework, which
directs courts to scrutinize the factual premises and underlying policy reasons
supporting an agency’s interpretive position. The present moment of
Chevron retreat may thus be ushering in meaningful arbitrary and capricious
review at Step Two.

325. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
326. Heinzerling, supra note 6, at 1933; see also Seth P. Waxman, The State of Chevron:
15 Years After Mead, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. ACCORD 1, 3 (2016) (“[W]hat is new [in decisions,
including King v. Burwell and Michigan v. EPA] is that the Justices are more willing to be
explicit in their skepticism [of Chevron].”). But see Ronald A. Cass, Is Chevron’s Game Worth
the Candle?—Burning Interpretation at Both Ends, in LIBERTY’S NEMESIS: THE UNCHECKED
EXPANSION OF THE STATE 57, 57–69 (Dean Reuter & John Yoo eds., 2016) (depicting the
fragmentation of Chevron into different tests for different judges and positing that parts of the
Chevron formula are in the process of being weakened, amended, or abandoned).
327. See Asher Steinberg, Another Addition to the Chevron Anticanon: Judge Kavanaugh
on the “Major Rules” Doctrine, NARROWEST GROUNDS (May 7, 2017),
http://narrowestgrounds.blogspot.com/2017/05/another-addition-to-chevron-anticanon.html
[https://perma.cc/ZSS6-7U8H].
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A. Setting Chevron Aside
King fits the paradigm of a Chevron Step Zero determination that, given
the enormous political and economic significance of the issue at stake, the
court should resist implied delegation to the agency. Moreover, King
expands this Step Zero “major questions” inquiry by suggesting that the
agency before the court is not the right agency and thus the court should
proceed on its own to interpret the statute.328 It thus represents a distinct
form of a retreat from Chevron, one that could readily be deployed in service
of a broader project to tighten the bounds on the ever-inflating administrative
state. By aggressively applying Chevron Step Zero and setting Chevron aside
in areas wherein regulatory agencies operate, the court removes those
agencies from the realm of statutory interpretation, even where those
questions are highly policy dependent. The court thereby substitutes its
interpretation for the agency’s and, by default, becomes the relevant
policymaker. Seen in this light, Chevron Step Zero totally undermines the
allocation of issues of “law” to courts and issues of “policy” to agencies.
And, at a broader level, the Chevron Step Zero debate implicates the
legitimacy and appropriate scale of the administrative state.
King is the Court’s latest “Chevron Step Zero” decision involving the socalled “major questions” exception to Chevron deference. In these “major
questions” cases, the Court has set aside the Chevron framework on the
ground that the statutory interpretation issue was an “extraordinary” question
that carried too much economic and political significance for an agency to
decide.329
King implicated an enormously high-stakes question of statutory
interpretation involving several key provisions of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act. Section 1311 of the Act authorized all states to create
health insurance exchanges, which are government-run entities that facilitate
the buying and selling of health insurance.330 Section 1321 of the Act
authorized the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) to establish exchanges in states that declined to create an
exchange.331 Section 1401 of the Act added § 36B to the Internal Revenue
328. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89; see also Christine Kexel Chabot, Selling Chevron, 67
ADMIN. L. REV. 481, 497–506 (2015) (discussing King and its implications for Chevron Step
Zero); Adam J. White, Defining Deference Down, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT
(June 26, 2015), http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/defining-deference-down-by-adam-j-white
[https://perma.cc/8LKN-N8M8] (observing that “[a]fter King v. Burwell, the ‘major questions’
doctrine is emphatically a Chevron Step Zero question”).
329. See Abigail R. Moncrieff, Reincarnating the “Major Questions” Exception to
Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of Noninterference (Or Why Massachusetts v. EPA Got It
Wrong), 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 593, 603 (2008). Cass Sunstein has argued that King “entrenched”
the exception to Chevron for questions with great “economic and political significance.” Cass
R. Sunstein, The Catch in the Obamacare Opinion, BLOOMBERG (June 25, 2015, 2:22 PM),
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-06-25/the-catch-in-the-obamacare-opinion
[https://perma.cc/TS5S-S6HV]. According to Sunstein, King represents an assertion of
judicial power that could significantly impact the Court’s future application of Chevron and
“establishes a principle that’s likely to haunt future presidents.” Id.
330. 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2012).
331. Id. § 18041.
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Code, which authorized health insurance subsidies—in the form of new
refundable tax credits—for individuals enrolled in coverage through “an
Exchange established by the State under Section 1311.”332 The interpretive
question was whether such tax credits were thereby limited to state exchanges
created under section 1311 or should also be made available to individuals
covered by the federal exchanges established under section 1321.333 The
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), within the Department of Treasury, said the
latter.
More specifically, the IRS and Treasury Department issued a rule,
following the notice-and-comment process, that authorized premium
subsidies in both the state exchanges established in sixteen states and the
District of Columbia (established pursuant to section 1311), and in the federal
exchanges created by HHS in the states that did not create their own
exchanges (pursuant to section 1321).334 Plaintiffs challenged the IRSTreasury interpretation on the ground that it exceeded the agency’s authority
and was contrary to the plain text of the Act and, thus, that it failed at Chevron
Step One.335
The Fourth Circuit applied the conventional Chevron Two-Step
framework to this statutory interpretation issue. At Step One, the court held
that the statutory language was ambiguous.336 At Step Two, the court
deferred to the IRS’s interpretation, taking into account the agency’s reliance
on the policy objectives behind the law and the role of tax credits in
effectuating those goals.337
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit but on an alternative
ground. In a six-to-three decision, the majority, per Chief Justice Roberts,
set aside the Chevron framework in light of the “deep ‘economic and political
significance’” of the interpretive question at hand.338 According to Chief

332. I.R.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A) (2012).
333. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488.
334. Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377, 30,377 (May 23, 2012)
(to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 602).
335. See Brief for Appellants at 48, King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014) (No. 141158).
336. King, 759 F.3d at 367–72. In reaching its conclusion that the definition of “established
by the State” was ambiguous, the court looked to other aspects of the statute taken as a whole—
including the facts that the Act allowed, but apparently did not require, that states create their
own exchanges, and that federal and state insurance exchanges are subject to the same
disclosure requirements. See id. In rather sharp contrast, in Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390
(D.C. Cir. 2014), the D.C. Circuit panel majority held that the statutory language was clear (in
the opposite direction, namely limiting tax subsidies to state-created exchanges), and thus
resolved the case at Chevron Step One, id. at 412. Judge Edwards, in dissent, found the
language ambiguous. Id. at 414–15 (Edwards, J., dissenting). The D.C. Circuit granted a
petition for rehearing en banc and vacated the panel’s decision. Halbig v. Burwell, No. 145018, 2014 WL 4627181, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 2014) (per curiam). The proceedings were
stayed, however, pending the Supreme Court’s decision in King. Halbig v. Burwell, No. 145018, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 23434, at *11 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 12, 2014) (per curiam).
337. King, 759 F.3d at 373 (“In answering this question in the affirmative we are primarily
persuaded by the IRS Rule’s advancement of the broad policy goals of the Act.”).
338. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (“Whether those credits are available on Federal Exchanges
is thus a question of deep ‘economic and political significance’ that is central to this statutory
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Justice Roberts, the case was one of the “extraordinary case[s]” in which
there is reason to doubt that statutory ambiguity represented an implicit
delegation of interpretive authority to the agency.339 Moreover, the Chevron
framework was especially inappropriate here, Chief Justice Roberts
remarked, given that it would have empowered an agency—the IRS—that
had “no expertise in crafting health insurance policy” to decide questions that
would have enormous policy implications.340 While the Court ultimately
concluded that the IRS’s reading underlying the regulation was the correct
interpretation of the statute, the majority was emphatic: “This is not a case
for the IRS.”341
Reading the Supreme Court decision in King, one is left with the
impression that the only relevant agency is the IRS. But, as Judge Edwards
recognized in his dissent in Halbig v. Burwell342—the D.C. Circuit opinion
addressing the same issues as King—HHS and its actions are relevant here,
too.343 In Halbig, the panel majority held that the statutory language was
clear and thus resolved the case at Chevron Step One.344 Judge Edwards, in
dissent, however, found the language ambiguous and proceeded to Chevron
Step Two.345 At that juncture, he would have given deference to the IRS for
its determination, in coordination with HHS, to provide tax premium
subsidies for those enrolled in state or federal exchanges.346 According to
Judge Edwards, the Act delegated authority to HHS and IRS, which acted
jointly in administering certain tax provisions of the Act.347
There are thus two relevant agencies to consider and two respective
rulemaking records to probe at Step Two. The IRS apparently recognized
that HHS had relevant agency expertise on the matter. During the course of
its rulemaking, the IRS reached out to HHS so that HHS, in its exchange
regulation, could clarify the statutory ambiguity by “deeming HHS

scheme; had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it surely would have done
so expressly.” (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014))).
339. Id. at 2488–89 (“‘In extraordinary cases, . . . there may be reason to hesitate before
concluding that Congress has intended . . . an implicit delegation [to the agency].’ This is one
of those cases.” (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159
(2000))). According to the Chief Justice, this case fit the “extraordinary case” paradigm given
the high political and economic stakes. Id. at 2489 (“The tax credits are among the Act’s key
reforms, involving billions of dollars in spending each year and affecting the price of health
insurance for millions of people.”).
340. Id. at 2489.
341. Id.
342. 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
343. Id. at 415–17 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
344. Id. at 412 (majority opinion).
345. Id. at 414–15 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
346. See id. at 425.
347. Id. at 413 (“Because IRS and HHS have been delegated authority to jointly administer
the ACA, this case is governed by the familiar framework of [Chevron].”); id. at 415
(“Chevron applies because IRS and HHS are tasked with administering the provisions of the
ACA in coordination. . . . The IRS’s rule defines ‘Exchange’ by reference to the HHS’s
definition, which provides that subsidies are available to low-income taxpayers purchasing
insurance on an Exchange ‘regardless of whether the Exchange is established and operated by
a State . . . or by HHS.’”).

2416

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

exchanges to be exchanges established by States.”348 HHS issued a notice of
proposed rulemaking to include in the definition of “Exchange,” “an
Exchange established or operated by the Federal government if a State does
not establish an Exchange.”349 IRS and Treasury then incorporated the HHS
definition of exchange into their proposed and final premium tax credit
rules.350
In inquiring whether it had the correct agency before it, the Court should
have considered the relevance of HHS (and its rulemaking record) in addition
to the IRS.351 Chief Justice Roberts might still have been able to set aside
Chevron for such an “extraordinary” case, but he certainly could not have
348. JOINT STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, H. COMM. ON WAYS
& MEANS, 113TH CONG., ADMINISTRATION CONDUCTED INADEQUATE REVIEW OF KEY ISSUES
PRIOR TO EXPANDING HEALTH LAW’S TAXES AND SUBSIDIES 18 (2014). The House
Committees, in an in camera review of deliberative materials relevant to the IRS rule,
uncovered evidence of IRS officials reaching out to HHS officials on this issue. Id. at 17–18.
As the report details:
IRS employees . . . sent an email to several HHS officials [including the Deputy
Administrator at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Deputy Director
of the Center for Medicaid and CHIP Services, and Deputy Director for Policy and
Regulations at the Center for Consumer Information & Insurance Oversight] asking
that HHS remedy the problem by deeming HHS exchanges to be exchanges
established by states in HHS’s exchange regulation.
Id. at 18.
349. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of Exchanges and
Qualified Health Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,866, 41,868 (July 15, 2011) (to be codified at 45
C.F.R. pts. 155–56); see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of
Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans; Exchange Standards for Employees, 77 Fed. Reg.
18,310, 18,310 (Mar. 27, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 155–57). HHS offered its
view as a regulatory interpretation of section 1321 of the Act, which gave HHS authority to
set up exchanges in states that did not create an exchange. 42 U.S.C. § 18041 (2012).
350. Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 76 Fed. Reg. 50,931, 50,940 (Aug. 17, 2011)
(to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (“Exchange has the same meaning as in 45 CFR 155.20.”);
see also Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377, 30,378 (May 23, 2012)
(to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 206) (“[T]he term Exchange has the same meaning as in 45
CFR 155.20, which provides that the term Exchange refers to a State Exchange, regional
Exchange, subsidiary Exchange, and Federally-facilitated Exchange.”).
351. Lisa Heinzerling makes a related point:
Consider the Court’s insistence in King that Congress choose the right agency for
the interpretive job. Although the Court does not acknowledge it, in fact, the Court
needed to do important interpretive work even in deciding that the IRS was not the
right agency for this job. In choosing to focus on agency expertise, the Court needed
to choose a substantive frame for the Affordable Care Act: was it a health-care
statute, ill-suited to the IRS’s skill set, or was it a tax revenue statute, well within
the IRS’s wheelhouse? The best answer was probably that it was both—an
exceedingly complex regulatory regime that contained many different elements,
calling on a variety of forms of agency expertise. But the Court’s search for the
correct interpretive agent pressed it to identify just one characterization of the
Affordable Care Act. This was not a neutral—or even sensible—anterior
interpretive decision.
Heinzerling, supra note 6, at 1989. The question whether the Act in fact delegated joint
authority to HHS and IRS is a difficult one; for my purposes, it matters less what the correct
answer to this question is as opposed to when and how it is best to structure the inquiry. The
core point is that the question of implied delegation—especially when more than one agency
is involved—is one that might be better made in connection with the court’s scrutiny of the
agency’s administrative record.
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bolstered this determination on the ground that the agency before it, in the
case of HHS, “has no expertise in crafting health insurance policy of this
sort.”352 And the administrative record suggests joint policymaking
determinations on the part of the IRS and HHS.353
It is not too surprising that Chief Justice Roberts would seize the
opportunity in King to advance a broader agenda of resisting the
administrative state by cutting back on Chevron. As conservative newspaper
columnist George Will noted:
[T]he court denied the power of the IRS—and, inferentially, the power of
the executive branch—to be the final word on statutory interpretation.
....
Roberts’ ruling advanced a crucial conservative objective, that of
clawing back power from the executive branch and independent agencies
that increasingly operate essentially free from congressional control and
generally obedient to presidents.354

But what is somewhat mystifying is that the rest of the majority—including
Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan (the latter four
of whom are rarely aligned with their more conservative brethren in
bemoaning regulatory expansion and the encroachment of the administrative
state)—signed on to this proposition.355
The case that puts King in sharpest relief—and produces the strongest
suggestion that Chief Justice Roberts may have a broader project in mind—
352. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015).
353. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of Exchanges and
Qualified Health Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,866 (“The Departments of Health and Human
Services, Labor, and the Treasury (the Departments) are working in close coordination to
release guidance related to Exchanges in several phases.”); Health Insurance Premium Tax
Credit, 76 Fed. Reg. at 50,932 (“The Departments of Health and Human Services and Treasury
are working in close coordination to release guidance related to Exchanges, in several
phases.”).
354. George F. Will, The Wrinkle in Roberts’s Decision, WASH. POST, July 5, 2015, at A17.
355. Two immediate possible rejoinders come to mind. First, King—conceived of as a
straightforward application of the “major questions” exception to Chevron—applied here with
particular force, given the truly high stakes of the decision, namely with the fate of the Act
hanging in the balance. See Richard Lempert, In King v. Burwell, An Easy Answer to the
ACA’s Definition of “Exchange,” BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Mar. 3, 2015),
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2015/03/04-king-burwell-aca-exchangesupreme-court-lempert [https://perma.cc/7UBK-W3F6] (observing that the case “could
torpedo the Affordable Care Act”). Moreover, given the truly “extraordinary” nature of the
case, the more Chevron-friendly Justices could rest assured that King would be easily
distinguishable down the road. A second response hinges on the particular political stakes—
namely that upholding the Act on Chevron grounds, giving deference to the IRS’s
interpretation of ambiguous statutory language, would mean that the Act would be susceptible
to political unraveling down the road, should the IRS change its interpretation in a new
administration. Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts raised this concern at oral argument. See
Transcript of Oral Argument at 76, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114) (expressing concern
about the possibility that subsequent administrations might be able to change the operative
definition of “Exchange” if the Court were to uphold the IRS’s interpretation on the ground of
Chevron deference). On this view, the Justices’ signing on to this proposition involved an
explicit political calculus rather than an expression of any skepticism regarding the broader
administrative state.
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is another case implicating the scope of Chevron deference, City of Arlington
v. FCC.356 In that case, the majority refused to deploy Chevron Step Zero as
a means to grant the Court sole authority to determine questions of agency
jurisdiction.357 Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito)
disagreed and vociferously argued that it was entirely proper to reserve such
“legal” determinations for the Court to consider the question independently:
“[B]efore a court may grant such deference, it must on its own decide whether
Congress—the branch vested with lawmaking authority under the
Constitution—has in fact delegated to the agency lawmaking power over the
ambiguity at issue.”358
At one level, Chevron Step Zero is thus the battleground for making
distinctions between issues of “law” reserved to courts and issues of “policy”
delegated to agencies. But, at a broader level, the Chevron Step Zero debate
implicates the legitimacy and appropriate scale of the administrative state.
Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent in City of Arlington warned that “the danger
posed by the growing power of the administrative state cannot be
dismissed.”359 The Chief Justice’s majority decision in King—setting
Chevron aside on the basis that the agency before it is not relevant—enlarges
Chevron’s Step Zero and thereby signals a potential avenue for challenging
agency action.360
356. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013); see also Heinzerling, supra note 6, at 1958 (“It is not hard to
see how the Court’s roundabout route in King satisfies some of the [Chief’s] larger goals as
stated in his dissent in City of Arlington.”); Kristin E. Hickman, The (Perhaps) Unintended
Consequences of King v. Burwell, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 56, 58 (2015) (arguing that King represents
the Court’s cutting back on Chevron deference, particularly when viewed in light of the
similarities between Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in King and dissent in City of
Arlington); Leandra Lederman & Joseph C. Dugan, King v. Burwell: What Does It Portend
for Chevron’s Domain?, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 72, 79 (2015) (suggesting that King might constitute
a step in Chief Justice Roberts’s “massive revision” to Chevron, and thereby follow on the
heels of City of Arlington); Freeman, supra note 2 (“[E]nter the Chief Justice [in King]. His
artful and bold move today breathes new life into Brown & Williamson . . . and rectifies his
defeat in Arlington. That is a lot to accomplish in two paragraphs.”); Chris Walker, What King
v. Burwell Means for Administrative Law, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 25,
2015), http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/what-king-v-burwell-means-for-administrative-law-bychris-walker [https://perma.cc/2468-2TCF] (characterizing the Court’s assertion of authority
in King as “a judicial power grab over the Executive in the modern administrative state,” which
could have significant implications for future challenges to administrative agency actions).
357. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1874–75. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
reasoned that it would be unworkable to distinguish between jurisdictional questions (i.e., does
the agency have authority to act in this manner?) and nonjurisdictional questions (i.e., those
secondary questions that arise when it is clear that the agency has authority to act in this
manner). Id. at 1869–70. In sum, “[t]he reality, laid bare, is that there is no difference, insofar
as the validity of agency action is concerned, between an agency’s exceeding the scope of its
authority (its ‘jurisdiction’) and its exceeding authorized application of authority that it
unquestionably has.” Id. at 1870.
358. Id. at 1880 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). According to the dissent, the
lower court should not have accorded Chevron deference to the FCC’s interpretation unless
and until it had independently decided that Congress had delegated the authority to interpret
the specific regulatory provision at issue. Id. at 1879–80.
359. Id. at 1879; see also id. (characterizing federal agencies’ “poking into every nook and
cranny of daily life”).
360. See Jonathan H. Adler & Michael F. Cannon, King v. Burwell and the Triumph of
Selective Contextualism, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 35, 71 (noting how the Court, by setting
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B. State Farm Cutting In
In the last several years, in a progression of cases, the Supreme Court has
addressed whether agencies are obligated to conduct cost-benefit analysis or
some form of detailed fact finding when interpreting a statute. Embedded in
this issue is the related yet, to date, largely ignored issue of the interplay
between the respective conceptions of “reasonableness” under Chevron and
State Farm.
While scholars have seized upon Michigan and Encino Motorcars to signal
the demise or retreat of Chevron, they have missed a significant angle—
namely, that the Supreme Court seems to have signaled its embrace of a new
Chevron-State Farm framework.
1. In the U.S. Supreme Court
Michigan embraces the interplay between Chevron and State Farm in the
statutory interpretation realm. The majority rejected an EPA regulation at
Chevron Step Two—finding the agency’s interpretation of “appropriate and
necessary” statutory language unreasonable—while simultaneously relying
on State Farm to bolster its determination that the EPA’s failure to consider
costs as part of its threshold decision to regulate was unreasonable. Here,
this Article makes the case that, in considering the extent to which an agency
must support its statutory interpretations with factual materials or costbenefit analysis in order to be deemed “reasonable,” the Court has forged the
way for the new Chevron-State Farm conceptual framework.
a. Michigan v. EPA
In Michigan v. EPA, the Court invalidated (and remanded to the EPA) an
EPA rule limiting power-plant emissions of certain hazardous pollutants.361
In making a threshold determination to regulate, the EPA determined that it
was “appropriate and necessary” to regulate under the Clean Air Act without
considering costs.362 Industry groups and twenty-one states challenged the
emissions standards, arguing that the EPA’s interpretation of the Clean Air
Act was unreasonable and that the agency’s ultimate decision that it was
Chevron aside, “g[ave] opponents of agency action a new arrow for their legal quivers”);
Heinzerling, supra note 6, at 1984 (“[T]hreatening to throw out the Chevron framework
altogether when Congress is perceived to have chosen the wrong agency for the job may be
highly disturbing to a wide variety of regulatory regimes.”); id. at 1991 (“The interpretive
principle embraced in King did not, as it happens, upend the legislative work product at issue
in that case, but it did plant a land mine for future cases.”); cf. Freeman, supra note 2 (“At a
minimum, this will add an extra step and an extra hurdle to the government’s defense of every
regulation with an arguably significant impact on the economy. And at worst, it will mean
that more policy decisions fall outside the Chevron framework, and that agency regulations
that might once have received deference will be struck down more of the time.”).
361. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015).
362. Section 112(n) of the Clean Air Act directed the EPA to regulate, as “appropriate and
necessary,” hazardous air pollutants emitted by electricity-generating facilities. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412 (2012). The EPA was to conduct a study on the remaining health hazards posed by
these emissions after the implementation of other Clean Air Act provisions and to consider the
results of this study in deciding whether to regulate. See id. § 7412 (n)(1)(A).
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“appropriate and necessary” to regulate the emissions was arbitrary and
capricious.363 By applying Chevron, the D.C. Circuit rebuffed the
challenges, upheld the regulations, and ruled that the EPA’s interpretation
was “clearly permissible.”364
In a narrow five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court reversed. Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, reasoned that while “Chevron directs courts
to accept an agency’s reasonable resolution of an ambiguity in a statute that
the agency administers,” the EPA had “strayed far beyond th[e] bounds [of
reasonable interpretation]” in concluding that it could ignore costs when
making threshold determinations as to whether regulation would be
appropriate.365
Michigan v. EPA stands for many things to different commentators. What
is at first remarkable about it is the extent to which there is broad agreement
that (in the words of Justice Kagan in dissent) “sensible regulation requires
careful scrutiny of the burdens that potential rules impose.”366 And the
majority proclaimed (with no need for any citation whatsoever): “Agencies
have long treated cost as a centrally relevant factor when deciding whether
to regulate.”367 The majority elaborated: “Against the backdrop of this
established administrative practice, it is unreasonable to read an instruction
to an administrative agency to determine whether ‘regulation is appropriate
and necessary’ as an invitation to ignore cost.”368 Cass Sunstein heralded the
case as a “ringing endorsement of cost-benefit analysis by government
agencies.”369
Jacob Gerson and Adrian Vermeule, however, resisted this
characterization. They insisted on a narrower read of the decision as
“principally an interpretive holding, about the meaning of the phrase
363. See Joint Brief of State, Industry, and Labor Petitioners, White Stallion Energy Ctr.,
LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 12-1100). The plaintiffs challenged various
aspects of the EPA’s action as arbitrary and capricious, and they suggested (though they did
not explicitly argue) that the agency was not entitled to Chevron deference. See id. at 2–3, 33–
34; see also Joint Reply Brief of State, Industry, and Labor Petitioners at 24–28, White
Stallion, 748 F.3d 1222 (No. 12-1100) (countering the EPA’s argument that its action was
entitled to deference under Chevron).
364. White Stallion, 748 F.3d at 1238. The majority concluded that the word “appropriate”
was ambiguous in isolation and that the EPA’s reasonable interpretation of this ambiguous
statutory term was permissible. Id. at 1238–41.
365. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707 (citing Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427,
2442 (2014)). Justice Scalia likewise wrote the majority opinion in Utility Air, holding that
the EPA’s interpretation of the triggering event for the Clean Air Act’s permitting requirement
was “unreasonable because it would bring about an enormous and transformative expansion
in EPA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization.” Util. Air, 134 S. Ct.
at 2444. Michigan, following on the heels of Utility Air, likewise denied the EPA deference
at Chevron Step Two.
366. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2722 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
367. Id. at 2707 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
368. Id. at 2708.
369. Cass R. Sunstein, Thanks, Justice Scalia, for the Cost-Benefit State, BLOOMBERG (July
7, 2015, 9:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-07-07/thanks-justicescalia-for-the-cost-benefit-state [https://perma.cc/BFN2-GJHX] (observing that all nine
Justices adhere to a presumption that cost is relevant to regulatory decision-making absent
clear evidence of congressional intent to the contrary).
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‘appropriate and necessary’ in a particular section of the Clean Air Act.”370
In their article “Thin Rationality Review,” they argued that Michigan “stands
only for the unobjectionable proposition that rationality requires
consideration of both the ‘advantages and the disadvantages of agency
decisions.’”371 According to Gerson and Vermeule, “[t]he days of
systematically aggressive hard look review, as in the D.C. Circuit’s decisions
from the 1970s and early 1980s, are mostly behind us.”372 Today, they
claimed, “[i]n the run of cases, arbitrary and capricious review entails a
predictably and sensibly deferential review of agency policy judgments.”373
Even if their claim (which I have challenged on descriptive and on
normative grounds)374 is correct, the question remains: what about the
Court’s citation of State Farm in Michigan? Conspicuously absent from
Gerson and Vermeule’s account375 is any acknowledgment of the Court’s
citations of State Farm within its Chevron analysis. Could such citations in
fact signal a new conceptual approach by the Supreme Court?
At the outset, the Michigan majority framed its analysis as follows:
Federal administrative agencies are required to engage in “reasoned
decisionmaking.” “Not only must an agency’s decreed result be within the
scope of its lawful authority, but the process by which it reaches that result
must be logical and rational.” It follows that agency action is lawful only
if it rests “on a consideration of the relevant factors.”376

After previewing its conclusion that the EPA’s interpretation fails under
Chevron, the majority cited State Farm once again in the course of its
statutory interpretation analysis, reasoning that “[a]lthough th[e] [statutory]
term [‘appropriate’] leaves agencies with flexibility, an agency may not
‘entirely fai[l] to consider an important aspect of the problem’ when deciding
whether regulation is appropriate.”377
370. Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 317, at 1383.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 1367.
373. Id. at 1362.
374. See Sharkey, supra note 299.
375. Indeed, this feature was likewise overlooked by the Second Circuit in Catskill IV. The
parties briefed and argued the case before the Court decided Michigan v. EPA. However, the
case is cited in the Second Circuit’s decision: “Even under this deferential [Chevron]
standard, . . . agencies must operate within the bounds of reasonable interpretation.” Catskill
Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA (Catskill IV), 846 F.3d 492, 520 (2d Cir.
2017) (quoting Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707), cert. denied No. 17-446, 2018 WL 1037580
(U.S. Feb. 26, 2018). But, in the very next paragraph, the court faulted the district court for
incorporating State Farm into the Chevron analysis. Id. at 521. This is precisely what the
Court did in Michigan v. EPA. Nor did the dissent in Catskill IV recognize this feature of the
Chevron-State Farm interplay. The dissent invoked Michigan v. EPA in support of its
argument that “the Water Transfers Rule is not entitled to deference because it will lead to
absurd results.” Id. at 546 (Chin, J., dissenting) (citing Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707) (“No
regulation is ‘appropriate’ if it does ‘significantly more harm than good.’”). The thrust of
Judge Chin’s argument was that “[d]eference has its limits; I would not defer to an agency
interpretation that threatens to undermine that entire system.” Id. at 547.
376. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2706 (emphasis added) (first quoting Allentown Mack Sales
& Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998); then quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
377. Id. at 2707 (fifth alteration in original) (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43).
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The Court’s purpose in citing State Farm is concededly cryptic. During
oral argument, Justice Scalia offered a potentially far-reaching view: unless
the statute prohibits considerations of cost, State Farm arbitrary and
capricious review under the APA requires it.378 This goes farther than I
would.379 However, where agencies do perform cost-benefit analysis—as
they are often obliged to do pursuant to executive order—it is fair game for
judicial review.380
Michigan demonstrates that the Court might in fact have adopted
something akin to the Chevron-State Farm conceptual framework in the
context of evaluating the EPA’s choice to disregard costs in deciding whether
it was “appropriate” to regulate. But the decision, in order to be faithful to
this framework, should have acknowledged, at Chevron Step Two and
pursuant to State Farm, that the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA) had already scrutinized and approved the cost-benefit analysis
underlying the EPA’s rule.381 As I have argued, this would have
appropriately led to more deferential judicial review at this stage.382
378. Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Michigan, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (Nos. 14-46, 14-47, 1449) (“I’m not even sure I agree with the premise that . . . when Congress says nothing about
cost, the agency is entitled to disregard cost. I would think it’s classic arbitrary and capricious
agency action for an agency to command something that is outrageously expensive and . . . in
which the expense vastly exceeds whatever public benefit can be . . . achieved. I would think
that’s . . . a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.”).
379. Sharkey, supra note 299, at 1617 (“An agency’s failure to conduct a regulatory impact
analysis pursuant to the executive order is not judicially reviewable. Nor are agencies
expressly required to conduct cost-benefit analysis by the plain text of the arbitrary and
capricious standard of section 706 of the APA.”).
380. Id. at 1618–19 (“[I]f agencies (be they executive or independent) do undertake a costbenefit analysis, courts will review it. [Thus] regulatory impact analyses should—and as a
practical matter do—play a role in substantive judicial review of the underlying regulation
under State Farm arbitrary and capricious review.”); see also Richard L. Revesz, Cost-Benefit
Analysis and the Structure of the Administrative State: The Case of Financial Services
Regulation, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 545, 594 (2017) (“[A]ny fact on which the agency relied in
making its decision is subject to review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard of the
[APA].”). State Farm, moreover, is itself a prime example, whereby the court reviewed
NHTSA’s cost-benefit analysis in connection with its decision to revoke a previous passiverestraint requirement. See Sharkey, supra note 299, at 1609–11.
381. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and OilFired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-FuelFired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-CommercialInstitutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304, 9441 (Feb. 16, 2012) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63) (explaining that the Rule was subject to OIRA review).
382. See Revesz, supra note 380, at 599 (“[I]f more stringent review is appropriate for
agencies that do not undergo Executive Branch review, it reasonably follows that those that
are subject to such vetting deserve more deferential review. Sharkey embraces this view and
advocates ‘that a court should take into account whether OIRA has given its imprimatur to the
agency’s cost-benefit analysis when calibrating the level of scrutiny it directs to the task at
hand.’”); see also Brief of the Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of
Law as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 23–24, Michigan, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (Nos.
14-46, 14-47, 14-49) (arguing that agencies and OIRA are well equipped to conduct costbenefit analysis of regulations and that, “when courts can refer to such analysis and executive
branch review, there is less need to second-guess the agency’s analytical process” (citing
Sharkey, supra note 299, at 1592)). For a provocative counterargument, see generally Lisa
Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the Relationship Between the
Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 325 (2014). Heinzerling
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The EPA conducted a Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) of the
regulation—as was required under the Executive Order—which was subject
to OIRA review. This is amply supported in the regulatory record that the
Supreme Court reviewed. Indeed, it is referenced in the majority decision.383
Justice Kagan made the most explicit argument in dissent: “EPA knew that,
absent unusual circumstances, the rule would need to pass . . . cost-benefit
review in order to issue.”384 Indeed, based on the agency’s cost-benefit
analysis (which had received OIRA’s imprimatur), Justice Kagan stated that
the outcome here would be “a rule whose benefits exceed its costs by three
to nine times.”385 Justice Kagan thus framed the central question as “whether
EPA can reasonably find it ‘appropriate’ to trigger the regulatory process
based on harms (and technological feasibility) alone, given that costs will
come into play, in multiple ways and at multiple stages, before any emission
limit goes into effect.”386
But—as Justice Scalia responded, making an explicit link to the Chenery
doctrine—the EPA did not make these potentially powerful arguments put
forth by Justice Kagan.387 Indeed, before the Court, “EPA concede[d] that
served as Senior Climate Policy Counsel to the EPA Administrator and Associate
Administrator of the Office of Policy at the EPA. Id. at 325 n.**. According to Heinzerling,
OIRA “actively pressed EPA to interpret its governing statutes to allow cost-benefit analysis,
even where EPA had a long history of interpreting them not to allow it.” Id. at 350.
Heinzerling argues that agencies’ statutory interpretations should not be subject to Chevron
deference “when an interpretation is foist upon [the relevant agency] by OIRA.” Id.
383. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2705–06 (“In accordance with Executive Order, the Agency
issued a ‘Regulatory Impact Analysis’ alongside its regulation. This analysis estimated that
the regulation would force power plants to bear costs of $9.6 billion per year. . . . [T]he
regulatory impact analysis took [ancillary benefits] into account, increasing the Agency’s
estimate of the quantifiable benefits of its regulation to $37 to $90 billion per year.”).
384. Id. at 2721 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638
(1993)). Justice Ginsburg also highlighted this fact at oral argument:
[C]an you clarify for me why this [fact that the rule imposes high costs] is . . . at this
stage something that we should be concerned about because there is this regulatory
impact assessment and that . . . has said that the benefits vastly exceed the costs, and
that’s . . . an impact analysis and has gone through the [OIRA] process and [OIRA]
concluded that EPA appropriately calculated the costs.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 378, at 39–40. And the issue surfaced in an
interchange between Justice Scalia and Solicitor General Donald Verrilli, as well:
JUSTICE SCALIA: General Verrilli, let me . . . ask a question about costs.
There . . . are economic costs. There are other costs. Is it . . . the Agency’s position
that no cost can be taken into account? . . .
GENERAL VERRILLI: . . . I think that cost would be taken into account in the
OIRA regulatory impact analysis.
JUSTICE SCALIA: But not for the listing.
GENERAL VERRILLI: But . . . not for the listing.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Not for the listing. That’s right.
Id. at 70.
385. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2722 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
386. Id. at 2717.
387. Id. at 2710 (majority opinion) (“This line of reasoning contradicts the foundational
principle of administrative law that a court may uphold agency action only on the grounds that
the agency invoked when it took the action. When it deemed regulation of power plants
appropriate, EPA said that cost was irrelevant to that determination—not that cost-benefit

2424

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

the regulatory impact analysis ‘played no role’ in its appropriate-andnecessary finding.”388 It is important, then, to keep in mind that the majority
did not determine that the EPA’s action was indefensible.389
Indeed, on remand, the EPA justified the regulation by conducting cost
analyses.390 Seen in this light, the EPA chose a risky litigation strategy at the
outset (a strategy unlikely to be employed again)—namely, one that
repeatedly disclaimed any reliance whatsoever on costs at the threshold
stage.391 Michigan thus stands far removed from the classic situation
whereby an agency’s action would not withstand State Farm review at
Chevron Step Two. Disagreement with its ultimate holding—failing to
uphold the emissions regulation at issue—should by no means foreclose an
embrace of the Chevron-State Farm framework or cloud sober evaluation of
it.

analysis would be deferred until later. . . . What it said is that cost is irrelevant to the decision
to regulate.” (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943))).
388. Id. at 2706 (citation omitted); see also id. at 2711 (“The Government concedes . . .
that ‘EPA did not rely on the [regulatory impact analysis] when deciding to regulate power
plants,’ and that ‘[e]ven if EPA had considered costs, it would not necessarily have adopted . . .
the approach set forth in [that analysis].’” (citation omitted)).
389. Id. at 2711 (“It will be up to the Agency to decide (as always, within the limits of
reasonable interpretation) how to account for cost.”).
390. On December 1, 2015, the EPA published a notice of a proposed rule. See
Supplemental Finding That It Is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate Hazardous Air
Pollutants from Coal-and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg.
75,025 (Dec. 1, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63). The proposal was open for
comments until January 15, 2016, and received approximately forty comments. Supplemental
Finding That It Is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate Hazardous Air Pollutants from
Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, REGULATIONS.GOV (Jan. 15,
2016, 11:59 PM), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-023420497 [https://perma.cc/4X8N-AC6A]. The proposal stated that taking cost into consideration
did not alter the EPA’s original conclusion that it is appropriate and necessary to regulate
hazardous air-pollutant emissions from electric utility steam-generating units (EGUs).
Supplemental Finding That It Is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate Hazardous Air
Pollutants from Coal-and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at
75,025. The EPA specifically noted that a cost-benefit analysis was performed in accordance
with Executive Orders 12,866 and 13,563 as part of the MATS Rule regulatory impact
analysis. Id. at 75,039. The EPA estimated that even an underestimation of the annual benefits,
at $37 to $90 billion, would outweigh the estimated annual costs of $9 billion by a 3-to-1 or
9-to-1 ratio. Id. at 75,040. In sum, the EPA stated that these cost analyses, conducted in direct
response to the Court in Michigan v. EPA, had no effect on its conclusion that regulation of
EGUs was appropriate; in fact, cost analysis independently supported that conclusion. Id. at
75,041. On April 25, 2016, the EPA published its final finding: it is both appropriate and
necessary to regulate hazardous air pollutant emissions from EGUs. Supplemental Finding
That It Is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and
Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 81 Fed. Reg. 24,420 (Apr. 25, 2016) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63). After receiving public comments, the EPA concluded that “a
consideration of cost does not cause [the EPA] to change [its] determination that regulation . . .
is appropriate and necessary and the EGUs are, therefore, properly included on the CAA
section 112(c) list of sources that must be regulated under CAA section 112(d).” Id.
391. See also White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222, 1263 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“EPA’s official position in
this Court is that the costs identified in the Regulatory Impact Analysis should have ‘no
bearing on’ the determination of whether regulation is appropriate.” (emphasis added)).
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b. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro
Encino Motorcars likewise supports my reading of Michigan as signaling
the arrival of a new Chevron-State Farm conceptual framework. Moreover,
it highlights the significance of the framework as a means to expand the scope
of indirect State Farm challenges to agency rules in private party litigation.
The key statutory interpretation issue before the Court in Encino
Motorcars arose out of an overtime-pay dispute between private parties.
Several “auto service advisors” alleged violations of overtime pay under the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)392 against their employer car dealership.393
The defendant car dealership argued that service advisors were exempt from
the overtime requirements under the FLSA, which includes a statutory
exemption for “any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in
selling or servicing automobiles.”394 According to the defendant, a service
advisor is a “salesman” who “service[s] automobiles” and thus fits within the
plain language of the exemption.395 The Department of Labor (DOL),
however, had promulgated a 2011 rule (via notice-and-comment rulemaking)
that defined the statutory terms more narrowly and also specifically excluded
service advisors from the statutory exemption.396
The Ninth Circuit framed its analysis as follows: “We conduct the familiar
two-step [Chevron] inquiry to determine whether to defer to the agency’s
interpretation.”397 The court held that Step One was readily satisfied: “It is
not clear from the text of the statute whether Congress intended broadly to
exempt any salesman who is involved in the servicing of cars or, more
narrowly, only those salesmen who are selling the cars themselves.”398
Next, at Step Two, the court acceded to the plaintiffs’ demand that the
court defer to the agency’s interpretation.399 Specifically, the court noted that
392. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012).
393. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2121 (2016).
394. 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10)(A).
395. Navarro v. Encino Motorcars, LLC, 780 F.3d 1267, 1269–70 (9th Cir. 2015), vacated,
136 S. Ct. 2117.
396. As the agency explained in 2011, the regulatory definitions “limit[] the exemption to
salesmen who sell vehicles and partsmen and mechanics who service vehicles.” Updating
Regulations Issued Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 18,832, 18,838 (Apr. 5,
2011) (to be codified in scattered parts of 29 C.F.R.).
397. Encino Motorcars, 780 F.3d at 1271. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court,
which held that the agency’s action was not a legislative rule but a mere interpretation not
worthy of Chevron deference. Navarro v. Mercedes Benz of Encino, No. CV 12-08051-RGK,
2013 WL 518577, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2013), rev’d in part sub nom. Navarro v. Encino
Motorcars, LLC, 780 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2117. Moreover, the
district court declined to accord even a lesser form of deference on the ground that the agency’s
interpretation was an unreasonable construction of the statute. Id.
398. Encino Motorcars, 780 F.3d at 1272.
399. Appellants’ Opening Brief at 17, Encino Motorcars, 780 F.3d 1267 (No. 13-55323)
(citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001)) (arguing that the DOL should
be accorded deference “proportional to its power to persuade”). Plaintiff-appellants invoked
Skidmore, as opposed to Chevron, deference. Id. at 20–21. Appellees countered that Chevron
deference was not appropriate given that the regulation conflicts with the plain wording of the
statute. Brief for Appellee at 8, Encino Motorcars, 780 F.3d 1267 (No. 13-55323). Moreover,
as far as Skidmore deference was concerned, appellees argued that given “the shifting positions
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“[b]ecause we consider here a regulation duly promulgated after a noticeand-comment period, Chevron’s ‘reasonableness’ standard applies.”400
And—consistent with many other courts’ lax Step Two review—the court
found that “where there are two reasonable ways to read the statutory text,
and the agency has chosen one interpretation, we must defer to that
choice.”401
The Supreme Court, however, subjected the agency’s policy-inflected
statutory interpretation choice to closer inquiry. The Court probed the
regulatory record and found the agency’s reasoning wanting:
[T]he Department said almost nothing. It stated only that it would not treat
service advisors as exempt because “the statute does not include such
positions and the Department recognizes that there are circumstances under
which the requirements for the exemption would not be met.” It continued
that it “believes that this interpretation is reasonable” and “sets forth the
appropriate approach.”402

This cursory, wholly legalistic justification did not pass muster with the
Court.
The Court, moreover, repeatedly invoked State Farm. It recited the
familiar dictate for agency rulemaking; namely that “[t]he agency ‘must
examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its
action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made.’”403 The Court then linked this “procedural requirement[]” of
“giv[ing] adequate reasons for its decisions”404 to Chevron deference. It
stated that “Chevron deference is not warranted where the regulation is
‘procedurally defective’—that is, where the agency errs by failing to follow
the correct procedures in issuing the regulation.”405 Citing both Chevron and
State Farm, the Court opined that “[a]gencies are free to change their existing
policies as long as they provide a reasoned explanation for the change.”406

of the DOL, the clear Legislative action contrary to the DOL’s position, and the lack of fair
warning to potentially affected groups,” the DOL should be given no deference. Id. at 15.
400. Encino Motorcars, 780 F.3d at 1272.
401. Id. at 1277.
402. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2127 (2016) (quoting Updating
Regulations Issued Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 18,832, 18,838 (Apr. 5,
2011)); see also id. (“Whatever potential reasons the Department might have given, the agency
in fact gave almost no reasons at all.” (emphasis added)).
403. Id. at 2125 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
404. Id.
405. Id. (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001)); id. (“[W]here
the agency has failed to provide even that minimal level of analysis, its action is arbitrary and
capricious and so cannot carry the force of law.” (citing State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42–43)); id.
at 2126 (“An arbitrary and capricious regulation of this sort is itself unlawful and receives no
Chevron deference.” (citing Mead, 533 U.S. at 227)); id. at 2127 (“This lack of reasoned
explication for a regulation that is inconsistent with the Department’s longstanding earlier
position results in a rule that cannot carry the force of law. It follows that this regulation does
not receive Chevron deference in the interpretation of the relevant statute.” (citing State Farm,
643 U.S. at 42–43)).
406. Id. at 2125.
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Encino Motorcars is consistent with a new Chevron-State Farm
conceptual framework. This consistency becomes apparent when the case is
read against the background of the Ninth Circuit decision that it reversed (a
ringing endorsement of a permissive Step Two approach to deferring to the
regulatory agency) and considering how the Court repeatedly invokes State
Farm (hitherto absent from the lower courts’ Chevron analyses).407
But this Article fully recognizes that Encino Motorcars is susceptible to
different interpretations.408 To begin, in concluding that “the 2011 regulation
was issued without the reasoned explanation that was required in light of the
Department’s change in position and the significant reliance interests
involved,” the Court highlighted the relevance of two somewhat related
variables, namely, the change in agency position and industry reliance.409
According to the Court, the 2011 rule represented an abrupt volte-face by the
DOL from its “decades-old practice of treating service advisors as
exempt.”410 And “[i]n light of this background [of reliance on the part of the
407. See Navarro v. Encino Motorcars, LLC, 780 F.3d 1267, 1272–77 (9th Cir. 2015),
vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016); Navarro v. Mercedes Benz of Encino, No. CV 12-08051RGK, 2013 WL 518577, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2013), rev’d in part sub nom. Navarro v.
Encino Motorcars, LLC, 780 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2117. The Court
vacated and remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit to interpret the statute without
according Chevron deference to the DOL’s interpretation. On remand, the Ninth Circuit came
to the same conclusion—this time as a matter of de novo statutory interpretation. Navarro v.
Encino Motorcars, LLC, 845 F.3d 925, 939–40 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 54
(2017) (No. 16-1362). The court noted that it was not clear whether it was to apply Skidmore
deference to the agency’s position—but, to cover all bases, ruled that even if it did not, it
would reach the same conclusion. Id. at 929 n.3 (noting that, “[a]lthough the agency held a
contrary position in intervening years,” the agency’s reasoning is “persuasive and thorough”).
408. There is no consensus regarding where Encino Motorcars fits within the Chevron
framework; but most seem to agree that the case is not an example of heightened scrutiny at
Step Two. Dan Hemel and Michael Pollack characterize Encino Motorcars as Chevron Step
0.5 (not Step Two)—where courts ask whether the agency has followed the proper procedures
to fill the gaps Congress intended. Michael Pollack & Daniel Hemel, Chevron Step 0.5, YALE
J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 24, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/chevron-step-0-5-bymichael-pollack-and-daniel-hemel/ [https://perma.cc/PN3W-QYK4]. Moreover, they insist
that it is not a State Farm case because State Farm has nothing to do with agency statutory
interpretation. Id.
409. Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2126.
410. Id. at 2123. In fact, as demonstrated by the regulatory history, spanning more than
four decades, the agency reversed course on two separate occasions. In 1970, in an interpretive
regulation (not subject to notice and comment), the DOL set forth regulatory definitions of the
statutory terms. Significantly, DOL limited the term “salesman” to those who sell vehicles
and also specifically excluded service advisors (who sell repair and maintenance services but
not vehicles) from the exemption. But, in 1978, DOL changed its position and issued an
opinion letter that defined “salesman” to include service advisors. See Dep’t of Labor, Wage
& Hour Div., Opinion Letter No. WH–467 (July 28, 1978), 1978 WL 51403. And in 1987,
the agency amended its Field Operations Handbook consistent with its opinion letter. See
DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., FIELD OPERATIONS HANDBOOK § 24L04–4, Insert No.
1757 (1987). Twenty-one years later, DOL issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to amend
its 1970 regulation to adopt the broader definitions (ensconced in the 1978 opinion letter and
1987 handbook revisions). See Updating Regulations Issued Under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,654, 43,658–59, 43,671 (July 28, 2008) (to be codified in scattered parts
of 29 C.F.R.). But, four years later (and with a change in presidential administration), in 2011,
DOL changed course again and issued a final rule that did an about-face from the proposed
rule and reverted back to the agency’s 1970 position.
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retail automobile and truck dealership industry], the Department needed a
more reasoned explanation for its decision to depart from its existing
enforcement policy.”411 Read in this light, DOL was denied deference not
because it failed to provide sufficient policy-based justifications for its
interpretation but because it failed to justify its interpretation against decades
of contradictory practice. Thus, while Encino Motorcars holds that agency
reason giving of some kind is required at Chevron Step Two—absent an
abrupt about-face and concomitant thwarted reliance interests—the
requirement may be minimal (i.e., more than “almost nothing”).412
Next, focusing on the Court’s multiple invocations of State Farm has led
some to conclude that Encino Motorcars is really a State Farm, not Chevron,
case. Thus, Adrian Vermeule characterized the case as banal, standing
simply for the proposition that “[a]rbitrary regulations are directly invalid;
and although that does also entail they should receive no deference, one
hardly needs to say so, and there is no need at all to comment on it.”413 In a
similar vein, the Second Circuit in Catskill Mountains read the case “to stand
for the proposition that where a litigant brings both a State Farm challenge
and a Chevron challenge to a rule, and the State Farm challenge is successful,
there is no need for the reviewing court to engage in Chevron analysis.”414
But this overlooks a significant feature of the Encino Motorcars
litigation—namely, that it was between private parties, neither of which
invoked State Farm as a direct challenge to the agency’s 2011 rulemaking.
Instead, by importing State Farm into the Chevron framework sua sponte,
the Supreme Court in effect sanctioned an indirect challenge to the agency’s

411. Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2126.
412. See id. at 2127 (“In light of the serious reliance interests at stake, the Department’s
conclusory statements do not suffice to explain its decision.”); see also Asher Steinberg,
Encino Motorcars, Cuozzo, and the Impossible Dream of Step Two Arbitrary and Capricious
Review, NARROWEST GROUNDS (June 29, 2016), http://narrowestgrounds.blogspot.com/
2016/06/encino-motorcars-cuozzo-and-impossible.html [https://perma.cc/DMB6-EYHV]. In
a separate concurrence, Justice Ginsburg made the point that “the extent to which the
Department is obliged to address reliance will be affected by the thoroughness of public
comments it receives on the issue.” Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2128 n.2 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring). The majority, too, noted the link between the notice-and-comment record and
the sufficiency of the agency’s reasons: “[T]hough several public comments supported the
Department’s reading of the statute, the Department did not explain what (if anything) it found
persuasive in those comments . . . .” Id. at 2127 (majority opinion).
413. Adrian Vermeule, Encino Is Banal, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 23,
2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/encino-is-banal-by-adrian-vermeule/ [https://perma.cc/7ZHMNSKF]. Vermeule argues that when an agency action is procedurally defective, it is not valid
and invalid actions cannot receive deference. Vermeule does not think that there is any
element of reasonableness that came into play; the DOL simply did not follow procedure. Id.
414. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA (Catskill IV), 846 F.3d
492, 522 (2d Cir. 2017), cert. denied No. 17-446, 2018 WL 1037580 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2018).
The government echoed this view in its brief in opposition to a petition for certiorari. Brief for
the Federal Respondents in Opposition, supra note 62, at 27 (“[W]hen a court concludes that
agency action is invalid under State Farm, it need not engage in a Chevron analysis.”); see
also id. at 28 (“The Court [in Encino Motorcars] thus treated the agency’s failure to offer a
reasoned explanation as a ground for declining to engage in Chevron analysis, not as a
circumstance to be considered at Chevron’s second step.”).
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rulemaking in a private lawsuit where the agency was only an amicus (and,
moreover, not until the case reached the Supreme Court).415
Far too little attention has been paid to the implications of such indirect
challenges, both in terms of the proper role of the agency as well as the proper
remedy when remand to the agency is not an option.416 At oral argument in
Encino Motorcars, Justice Breyer remarked, “I was sort of surprised that
nobody in the Ninth Circuit referred to a doctrine that nobody refers to
anymore. It’s called primary jurisdiction. And it can be used to ask the
relevant department to file a brief, and nobody did that.”417
This particular feature—namely the potential for increasing the scope of
pre-enforcement review of agency rules in cases between private parties—
may be the most novel component of the new Chevron-State Farm
conceptual framework.
2. In the D.C. Circuit
It is telling to return to the D.C. Circuit jurisprudence to see whether, in
fact, the trend towards heightened judicial scrutiny—by way of State Farm
as Step Three or incorporation of State Farm into Chevron review—has
advanced in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Michigan and
Encino Motorcars.418
a. State Farm as Step Three
The D.C. Circuit has developed a line of jurisprudence in which a
relatively lax Step Two, focused on the legal interpretive question, is
followed by a more robust application of State Farm arbitrary and capricious
review scrutinizing the agency’s administrative record to find support for its
interpretive stance. Moreover, a few post-Michigan cases seem to point in
the direction of such enhanced judicial scrutiny by emphasizing that an
agency, even as it sails through the Chevron Two-Step, may fail State Farm
arbitrary and capricious review by failing to consider an important aspect of
the issue before it or by disregarding policy alternatives without adequate
explanation.

415. The Secretary of Labor participated as an amicus (for the first time in the case) at the
Supreme Court level, and then supplied a brief in support of the plaintiffs-appellants at the
Ninth Circuit on remand. See Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellants, Navarro v. Encino Motorcars, LLC, 845 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 2016) (No.
13-55323).
416. See supra Part II.C.2.b.
417. Transcript of Oral Argument at 36–37, Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct.
2117 (2016) (No. 16-1362). Justice Breyer advocated this approach in a concurring opinion
in Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 673 (2003)
(Breyer, J., concurring), a Medicaid preemption case.
418. There is likewise some evidence this shift is catching on outside of the D.C. Circuit as
well. For example, in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Mortgage Law Group, LLP,
157 F. Supp. 3d 813 (W.D. Wis. 2016), the federal district court relied on Michigan v. EPA
and invalidated a portion of a regulation as arbitrary and capricious under Chevron Step Two.
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Judge Edwards has steadfastly maintained that an “[a]gency action may be
consistent with the agency’s authorizing statute and yet arbitrary and
capricious under the APA”—in other words, it can readily pass Chevron but
fail State Farm.419 On this view,
a court may conclude that an agency action is based on a permissible
interpretation of its enabling statute, yet, nevertheless find the action an
invalid exercise of decisionmaking authority under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A),
because the agency ‘entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem’ or otherwise failed to engage in reasoned decisionmaking.420

Judge Edwards has written the majority opinion in two noteworthy postMichigan cases. In Global Tel*Link v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit refused to defer
to the agency’s interpretation of the statute, evincing great concern for the
process and reasoning behind the agency’s policy.421 The case concerned an
FCC order to regulate intrastate rates for inmate payphone providers in
response to market failure.422 Judge Edwards wrote the majority opinion
holding that there was no longer a Chevron deference issue in the case
because the agency abandoned its argument for deference to a prior
interpretation.423 Judge Edwards then proceeded to review the factual basis
for the FCC’s order under State Farm asking whether the agency exercised
“reasoned decisionmaking” in arriving at its conclusion.424 Judge Edwards
subsequently clarified that there was no justification on the record or support
by way of reasoned decision-making.425 Moreover, addressing the interplay
of State Farm and Chevron, Judge Edwards concluded—with a clear nod,
albeit without citation, to Encino Motorcars—“[i]t is clear that no Chevron
deference is due to agency decisions that are unsupported by reasoned
decisionmaking.”426
In Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Perdue,427 the appellants argued that the
USDA renewed zoo operators’ licenses in violation of the Animal Welfare
Act, which states that “no license shall be issued until the dealer or exhibitor
shall have demonstrated that his facilities comply with the standards
promulgated by the Secretary.”428 The court (per Judge Edwards) applied

419. Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Perdue, 872 F.3d 602, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
420. EDWARDS ET AL., supra note 190, at 218 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)); see also EchoStar Satellite L.L.C. v. FCC,
704 F.3d 992, 1001–02 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“[T]he agency’s decision fails for want of reasoned
decisionmaking, not for lack of authority.”).
421. See generally Global Tel*Link v. FCC, 859 F.3d 39 (D.C. Cir. 2017), amended by 866
F.3d 397 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
422. Id. at 43–44.
423. Id. at 50.
424. Id. at 51.
425. Global Tel*Link v. FCC, 866 F.3d 397, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
426. Id.
427. 872 F.3d 602 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
428. Id. at 606 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2133 (2012)). Appellants alleged that the USDA was
aware of multiple violations of the AWA by the zoo operators. Id. Moreover, they “asserted
that the agency’s reliance on the Sellners’ self-certification of compliance as part of its renewal
determination, despite having knowledge that the certification was false, was arbitrary and
capricious” in violation of the APA. Id.
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the Chevron Two-Step. At Step Two (after finding the statutory provision
ambiguous at Step One), the court was quite deferential to the agency’s legal
interpretation. The USDA “assert[ed] that its renewal scheme balances the
AWA’s ‘dual, but sometimes competing, goals of protecting both the animals
and the businesses that exhibit them.’”429 Moreover, the agency claimed that
“it would be too burdensome to require more from applicants in the context
of license renewals than the regulations currently demand.”430 At that point,
the USDA’s legal reasoning resembles the EPA’s in Catskill Mountains—
putting forth its view based upon the purposes of the statute and its
conclusory assertion that it has struck the right balance.
But, unlike the EPA in Catskill Mountains, the USDA was not home free
once it cleared the Chevron Two-Step. Nor did reasoned decision-making
fall out of the equation altogether. Instead, State Farm reared its head.
Indeed, the court highlighted that arbitrary and capricious review does not
depend “on the agency’s legal authority, but instead on the agency’s ability
to demonstrate that it engaged in reasoned decisionmaking.”431 And the
court, finding that “the agency’s explanation for its decision runs counter to
the evidence allegedly before it,”432 remanded the case back to the agency
for additional investigation or explanation.433
Humane Society of the United States v. Zinke434 is another notable foil to
Catskill Mountains. The Humane Society sued the Department of the
Interior, alleging that one of its rules violated both the Endangered Species
Act and the APA.435 At issue were two distinct statutory interpretation
questions implicated by a controversy over delisting a subsegment of the grey
wolves’ population so as to remove it from the auspices of the Act.
The D.C. Circuit applied “the familiar two-step Chevron framework.”436
At Chevron Step One, the court readily found ambiguity in two statutory
phrases—“distinct population segment” and “range”—neither of which is
defined by the Act or relevant regulations.437
429. Id. at 617.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 619 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 52 (1983)).
432. Id.
433. Id. at 620 (“We hold that, on this record, the District Court erred in granting the
Government’s motion to dismiss Appellants’ arbitrary and capricious claim. We therefore
vacate that judgment and remand the case to the District Court with instructions to remand the
record to the agency. ‘Where we “cannot evaluate the challenged agency action on the basis
of the record before [us], the proper course . . . is to remand to the agency for additional
investigation or explanation.”’” (alteration in original) (quoting CSI Aviation Servs., Inc. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 637 F.3d 408, 416 (D.C. Cir. 2011))).
434. 865 F.3d 585 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
435. Id. at 594.
436. Id. at 595.
437. The first interpretation question was whether the Act permits the Service to carve out
of an already listed species a “distinct population segment” for the purpose of delisting that
segment and withdrawing it from the Act’s purview. Id. at 590 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16)
(2012)). The statute listed five factors and suggested that agency actions must be based on the
best available scientific and commercial data. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A)). The
second interpretive question was whether, under the Act, a determination of endangered or
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At Step Two, the court concluded that the Fish and Wildlife Service’s
interpretations, respectively, were a “reasonable reading of statutory text”438
and “based on a permissible construction of the statute.”439 The court’s Step
Two analysis examined the statutory text and purposes. Throughout its
analysis, the court relied heavily on the Service’s 2011 Rule440—with some
striking parallels to the EPA’s Rule in Catskill Mountains. Similar to the
“Klee Memorandum” issued by the EPA General Counsel, the Solicitor of
the Department of the Interior issued a memorandum analyzing the statutory
authority for designating distinct population segments for the specific
purpose of delisting them.441 After a false start of sorts (a rule published
without notice and comment that was vacated due to this procedural
infirmity), the Service issued a subsequent rule that likewise relied upon the
Solicitor’s earlier memorandum.442 Specifically, “the Service again
expressly adopted the legal analysis in the Solicitor’s Opinion regarding its
authority to delist a segment.”443 The Rule also included the Service’s
interpretation of “range” to refer to a species’s current range at the time its
status is evaluated for listing.444
Summing up its Chevron inquiry, the court—like the Second Circuit in
Catskill Mountains—signaled a highly deferential approach at Step Two.
First, highlighting that Congress delegated “broad administrative and
interpretive power to the [Service],” the court emphasized that the task of
defining and listing endangered species “requires an expertise and attention
to detail” that favors deferring to agency so long as its interpretation is
“reasonable.”445 Finally, citing Encino Motorcars, the court noted
parenthetically that “[a]gencies are free to change their existing policies so
long as they provide a reasoned explanation for the change.”446
But, unlike in Catskill Mountains, the court’s analysis did not end there.
The court, invoking State Farm, rebuked the agency for failing to consider

threatened status turns on threats the species faces “throughout all or a significant portion of
its range.” Id. at 603 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6), (20)); see also id. at 604 (“[T]raditional
rules of statutory construction do not answer the question of whether ‘range’ means current or
historical range.”).
438. Id. at 597.
439. Id. at 605; see also id. at 603 (“Because the Service’s interpretation of ‘range’ as
focusing on ‘current range’ is reasonable, we uphold it.”).
440. See id. at 597–98, 605.
441. Id. at 592.
442. Id. at 592–93; see also id. at 590 (“The Secretary of the Interior has delegated the
authority to determine whether a species is ‘endangered’ or ‘threatened’ to the Fish and
Wildlife Service.”).
443. Id. at 594; see also id. at 599 (“The Solicitor’s Opinion, formally adopted by the
Service, has now explicitly interpreted the Act to allow the segment tool for delisting.”). The
Service also analyzed the five statutory endangerment factors and concluded that the Western
Great Lakes segment was neither endangered nor threatened throughout a significant portion
of its range. Id. at 594.
444. Id. at 603.
445. Id. at 600 (alteration in original) (quoting Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys.
for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995)).
446. Id. at 599 (quoting Encino Motorcars, L.L.C. v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125
(2016)).
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“an important aspect of the problem” it faced.447 Moreover, it signaled the
relevance of agency findings and record evidence to the pertinent statutory
interpretation questions.448 “Such a failure to address ‘an important aspect
of the problem’ that is factually substantiated in the record is unreasoned,
arbitrary, and capricious decisionmaking.”449
The court’s State Farm inquiry followed its resolution of the Chevron
Two-Step, and it specifically addressed the Chevron-State Farm interplay.
“While analysis of the reasonableness of agency action ‘under Chevron Step
Two and arbitrary and capricious review is often the same, the Venn diagram
of the two inquiries is not a circle.”450 The question thus remained whether
the agency “arbitrarily and capriciously” failed to consider an important
aspect of the problem it faced.451 The court ensured that the reasoned
decision-making element did not fall out as a consequence of an overly
deferential Chevron Step Two. Moreover, the court was prepared to thwart
an agency that had attempted to insulate itself from such heightened judicial
inquiry.452
b. State Farm Cuts In
In MetLife, Inc. v. Financial Stability Oversight Council,453 the federal
district court rescinded the Financial Stability Oversight Council’s (FSOC)
final determination, which designated MetLife as a nonbank financial
company subject to enhanced supervision—what has come to be known as a
“SIFI” or “systemically important financial institution.”454 The FSOC voted
nine to one to designate MetLife pursuant to its finding that MetLife’s
“material financial distress . . . could pose a threat to the financial stability of

447. Id. at 605. With respect to the first interpretive question, the “fundamental error” was
that “the Service failed to address the impact that extraction of the segment would have on the
legal status of the remaining wolves in the already-listed species.” Id. at 600. And, with respect
to the second, “because the Service categorically excluded the effects of loss of historical range
from its analysis,” the court determined that the Service’s conclusion was “insufficiently
reasoned, and therefore arbitrary and capricious.” Id. at 603.
448. Id. at 595 (concluding that the Act permits the designation “but only when the Service
first makes the proper findings”); see also id. at 605 (“As with the Service’s designation of
distinct population segments, the rub in this case is not with the Service’s interpretation of the
statute, but with its application of the statute to the record at hand.” (emphasis added)).
449. Id. at 606 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983)); see also id. (“An important factor—the possible enduring consequences
of significant loss of historical range—was left out of the analysis all together.”).
450. Id. at 605 (citation omitted) (quoting Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. FTC, 790
F.3d 198, 209 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
451. Id.
452. Id. at 606 (“[I]n undertaking that omitted analysis on remand, the Service will have to
grapple with predicate questions that the Service has evaded thus far.”).
453. 177 F. Supp. 3d 219 (D.D.C. 2016).
454. Id. at 230. Section 113 of the Dodd-Frank Act authorizes the FSOC to designate
certain nonbank financial companies for supervision by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System under enhanced prudential standards. 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(1) (2012); see also
DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS
(UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 6, 79–80 (2011).
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the United States.”455 The FSOC promulgated its designation rule—
sometimes referred to as “Guidance”456—by notice and comment.457 In its
rule, the FSOC interpreted the quoted statutory language from the DoddFrank Act as follows: “The Council will consider a ‘threat to the financial
stability of the United States’ to exist if there would be an impairment of
financial intermediation or of financial market functioning that would be
sufficiently severe to inflict significant damage on the broader economy.”458
MetLife challenged the FSOC’s final determination on the basis that its
designation was arbitrary and capricious.459 The district court, relying
heavily on Michigan’s “reasoned decisionmaking” mandate,460 rescinded the
455. 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(1). Congress provided two determination standards in the statute:
(1) when “material financial distress” at a company “could pose a threat to the financial
stability of the United States” or (2) when the very “nature, scope, size, scale, concentration,
interconnectedness, or mix of the [company’s] activities” could pose the same threat. Id. In
its final determination, the FSOC relied on the first determination standard. MetLife, 177 F.
Supp. 3d at 238 (“The First Determination Standard requires a causal connection between the
company’s material financial distress and the resultant ‘impairment of financial intermediation
or of financial market functioning.’” (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 1310 Appendix A.II.a)). With
respect to this standard, Congress listed eleven nonexhaustive statutory factors for FSOC to
consider. 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(2) (identifying factors such as “extent of the leverage of the
company,” “extent and nature of the off-balance-sheet exposures of the company,” “the
amount and nature of the financial assets of the company,” as well as “any other risk-related
factors that [FSOC] deems appropriate”). Once so designated, a company is subject to
“[e]nhanced supervision” and “prudential standards” to be set by the Federal Reserve. See id.
§ 5365.
456. See Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial
Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 21,637, 21,637 (Apr. 11, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1310)
(providing “Proposed Guidance” referred to as “interpretive guidance” by the FSOC).
457. The FSOC promulgated a Final Rule and an Appendix to the Rule entitled “[FSOC]
Guidance for Nonbank Financial Company Determinations.” Id. at 21,656; see also Authority
to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial Companies, 76 Fed. Reg.
64,264, 64,264 (Oct. 18, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1310) (second notice of
proposed rulemaking); Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank
Financial Companies, 76 Fed. Reg. 4555, 4555 (Jan. 26, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
1310) (first notice of proposed rulemaking); Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
Regarding Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial
Companies, 75 Fed. Reg. 61,653 (Oct. 6, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. ch. XIII). Public
comments were received on the Guidance. See Authority to Require Supervision and
Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. at 21,640–47. The federal
district court treated the FSOC’s designation as a legislative rule but suggested that its analysis
would not be affected even if it were instead considered an interpretive rule. MetLife, 177 F.
Supp. 3d at 227 n.6 (“[E]ven if the Guidance were an ‘interpretive rule’ . . . the agency would
still be required—to avoid acting arbitrarily and capriciously—to explain any changes.” (citing
Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1209 (2015))).
458. Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial
Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. at 21,657 (emphases added). The FSOC further identified three
“transmission channels” through which “significant damage on the broader economy” might
be inflicted: (1) exposure, (2) asset liquidation, or (3) critical function or service. Id. The
Council also laid out a three-stage designation process. Id. at 21,660–62. In its final
determination, the FSOC analyzed whether material financial distress could spread through
the exposure and asset-liquidation channels. See MetLife, 177 F. Supp. 3d at 229.
459. MetLife, 177 F. Supp. 3d at 238. Congress provided that judicial review is “limited to
whether the final determination made . . . was arbitrary and capricious.” 12 U.S.C. § 5323(h).
460. MetLife, 177 F. Supp. 3d at 230 (quoting Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706
(2015)).
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final determination on two grounds: FSOC’s “unacknowledged departure
from its guidance” and its “express refusal to consider cost.”461
The district court highlighted two components of State Farm’s “reasoned
decisionmaking” mandate relevant to its analysis. First, State Farm
“ordinarily demands that an agency acknowledge and explain the reasons for
a changed interpretation.”462 The court held that “FSOC made critical
departures from two of the standards it adopted in its Guidance, never
explaining such departures or even recognizing them as such.”463 More
specifically, the court concluded that “FSOC reversed itself on whether
MetLife’s vulnerability to financial distress would be considered and on what
it means to threaten the financial stability of the United States.”464 The court
reasoned that “[a]lthough an agency can change its statutory interpretation
when it explains why, FSOC insists that it changed nothing.”465 Moreover,
the court insisted that the FSOC would have had to demonstrate “good
reasons” for its change of policy.466
Second, and separate and apart from the agency change-of-position
scenario, reasoned decision-making requires “consideration of [all of] the
relevant factors,”467 including (at least when relevant) cost. The court
chastised the FSOC for “assum[ing] the upside benefits of designation . . .
but not the downside costs of its decision.”468 By “focus[ing] exclusively on
the presumed benefits of its designation and ignor[ing] the attendant costs,”
the court held that the FSOC’s action was “unreasonable under the teachings
of Michigan v. Environmental Protection Agency.”469

461. Id. at 223.
462. Id. at 233; see also id. (“An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in
stone.” (quoting Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 636 (D.C. Cir. 2014))).
463. Id. at 230.
464. Id. at 223; id. at 230 (“That alone renders FSOC’s determination process fatally
flawed.”).
465. Id. at 223; see also id. at 233 (“Although it denies having changed course, FSOC
invokes Fox Television for the proposition that any change was explained and, therefore,
permissible. FSOC is incorrect on both points.”); id. at 235 (“FSOC has steadfastly refused
(and still refuses) to acknowledge that it changed positions on whether Dodd-Frank requires
FSOC to assess vulnerability to financial distress.”).
466. Id. at 235 (citing FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009)); id.
at 236 (“Having changed policies from the Guidance to its Final Determination, FSOC was
required to state ‘good reasons’ for doing so.” (quoting Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 515)); see
also id. at 235 n.14 (“In short, ‘a reasoned explanation is needed for disregarding facts and
circumstances that underlay or were engendered by the prior policy.’” (quoting Fox Television,
556 U.S. at 516)).
467. Id. at 240 (quoting Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706 (2015)).
468. Id. at 230. The court, moreover, stated that “FSOC purposefully omitted any
consideration of the cost of designation to MetLife.” Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 239
(“There is no doubt that FSOC refused to consider the costs of its Final Determination to
MetLife, and purposefully so.”).
469. Id. at 223; see also id. at 230 (“That is arbitrary and capricious under the latest
Supreme Court precedent.” (citing Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2699)); id. at 241 (“Because FSOC
refused to consider cost as part of its calculus, it is impossible to know whether its designation
‘does significantly more harm than good.’ That renders the Final Determination arbitrary and
capricious.’” (quoting Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707)).

2436

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

The court read Michigan as a directive to regulatory agencies (and to courts
reviewing agency action) to consider cost as a significant aspect of the
decision to regulate.470 The court, moreover, highlighted the Michigan
Court’s recognition of the centrality of cost-benefit analysis to the
administrative state.471 Turning to the particular statutory language at issue,
the court drew a parallel between the Michigan Court’s interpretation of
“appropriate” in the Clean Air Act and “‘[a]ppropriate’ [as] the touchstone
of the catch-all factor in Dodd-Frank Section 113.”472 Thus, the court
concluded that, “[i]n light of Michigan and of Dodd-Frank’s command to
consider all ‘appropriate’ risk-related factors, FSOC’s position [was] at odds
with the law and its designation of MetLife must be rescinded.”473
There has been a great deal of academic commentary on MetLife, but scant
attention has been given to its significant implications for heightened judicial
scrutiny.474 Indeed, MetLife is an exemplar of the Chevron-State Farm
incorporation model. The FSOC argued that “[a]t a minimum, the Council’s
interpretation of the statute is a permissible one that merits Chevron

470. Id. at 240 (“One would not say that it is even rational, never mind ‘appropriate,’ to
impose billions of dollars in economic costs in return for a few dollars in health or
environmental benefits.” (quoting Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707)).
471. Id. (“Agencies have long treated cost as a centrally relevant factor when deciding
whether to regulate. Consideration of cost reflects the understanding that reasonable
regulation ordinarily requires paying attention to the advantages and the disadvantages of
agency decisions.” (quoting Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707–08)).
472. Id.
The court nonetheless appreciated an important distinction—namely,
“Notwithstanding this facial similarity between Dodd-Frank and the Clean Air Act, . . . DoddFrank only requires FSOC to consider appropriate ‘risk-related’ factors.” Id.; see also id. at
241 (“The same textual hook in 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(2)(K) (‘appropriate’) would thus require
FSOC to consider the cost of designating a company for enhanced supervision, provided that
cost is a ‘risk-related’ factor.”).
473. Id. at 242 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(2)(K)).
474. Two recent notable exceptions are Geoffrey Miller and Adam White. Geoffrey Miller
characterizes the MetLife decision as “an example of appropriately deferential, but
nevertheless meaningful review.” Miller, supra note 3 (manuscript at 57). As Miller recounts,
“Judge Collyer rejected [FSOC’s] designation in a devastating opinion pointing to the FSOC’s
failure to follow discernible standards, failure to undertake reasoned analysis, failure to engage
with bona fide arguments put forward by the company, pervasive use of unsupported
assumptions, and unexplained changes of position.” Id. (manuscript at 58). According to
Miller, “This sorry bill of particulars would probably not have sufficed to overcome Chevron
deference in its maximal form, but it was more than enough for Judge Collyer.” Id. Adam
White makes the case that “Dodd-Frank requires the FSOC to provide substantial evidence for
its nonbank SIFI determinations” “through its express incorporation of the ‘arbitrary and
capricious’ standard of review.” Adam J. White, Too Big for Administrative Law?: FSOC
Designations and the Fog of “Systemic Risk” 39 (Dec. 9, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with the Fordham Law Review). Moreover, White concludes that the FSOC’s approach
“seems to exceed the minimal limits on agency discretion imposed by the D.C. Circuit.” Id.
(manuscript at 42). But instead of looking to heightened judicial scrutiny, White instead turns
his attention to Congress. See id. (“[I]f the FSOC’s nonbank SIFI designation framework falls
short of the requirements of administrative law—then fault does not lie primarily with the
FSOC. Rather, it reflects Congress’s failure to make the substantive policy decision itself.”);
see also id. (manuscript at 13) (“[Congress] gave the FSOC effectively open-ended statutory
discretion to define the systemic-risk inquiry on a case-by-case basis.”).
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deference.”475 The district court did not dispute the relevance of Chevron;476
indeed, at the outset of its analysis, the court made clear that “[u]nder the
Chevron framework, an agency merits deference to a reasonable
interpretation of an ambiguous statute.”477 But then—relying heavily upon
Michigan—the court likewise imposed State Farm scrutiny at the second
step.478 Moreover, while the court characterized the State Farm standard as
“‘[h]ighly deferential,’”479 at the same time it insisted that “[t]he standard is
not toothless.”480
In deciding to designate MetLife, the FSOC interpreted the statutory
provisions of Dodd-Frank by promulgating a rule that set forth the standards
that governed the agency’s determination.
Specifically, the FSOC
interpreted a “‘threat to the financial stability of the United States’ to exist if
there would be an impairment of financial intermediation or of financial
market functioning that would be sufficiently severe to inflict significant
damage on the broader economy.”481 These standards are fact-based policy
considerations and thus appropriately subject to State Farm review. The
district court was thus on solid ground in concluding that “[t]his Court cannot
affirm a finding that MetLife’s distress would cause severe impairment of
financial intermediation or of financial market functioning—even on
arbitrary-and-capricious review—when FSOC refused to undertake that
analysis itself.”482
To be sure, the fact that the underlying fact finding necessitates predictive
judgments may appropriately temper the nature of the court’s review.483 But
it should not serve to insulate the agency from judicial scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
The present moment of Chevron retreat may usher in meaningful judicial
scrutiny at Step Two by incorporating State Farm arbitrary and capricious
review. Agencies and courts have danced the Chevron Two-Step in a manner
475. MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219, 236 n.18
(D.D.C. 2016).
476. Specifically, the court did not dispute the FSOC’s invocation of Chevron deference.
See id. at 236 n.18 (“The Court does not deny that FSOC has the authority to interpret the
statute. However, having formally interpreted congressional intent to require a vulnerability
analysis . . . , FSOC was not free to abandon that approach without explanation.”).
477. Id. at 233 n.12.
478. Id. at 230.
479. Id. at 229 (quoting AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 220 F.3d 607, 616 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
480. Id. at 230.
481. Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial
Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 21,637, 21,657 (Apr. 11, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1310
Appendix A.II.a) (emphases added).
482. MetLife, 177 F. Supp. 3d at 237; see also id. (agreeing with MetLife’s allegation that
“[b]ecause it never projected any estimated losses, FSOC never established a basis for a
finding that MetLife’s material financial distress would ‘materially impair’ MetLife
counterparties within the meaning of the Council’s Interpretive Guidance”).
483. See id. (“Predictive judgment must be based on reasoned predictions; a summary of
exposures and assets is not a prediction.”); see also White, supra note 474 (manuscript at 40)
(“Even if courts owe substantial deference to an agency’s predictive expertise, such deference
does not overcome these basic factual requirements.”).
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that has devolved into judicial acquiescence to agencies’ legal statutory
interpretations, thus evading judicial scrutiny of their policy-based choices.
By requiring that the “reasoned decisionmaking” by agencies includes fact
finding or cost-benefit analysis of underlying policy choices vetted in the
administrative record, the Chevron-State Farm model will ensure that agency
expertise is at the center of the discussion and will produce more effective
regulatory decisions. Moreover, the model expands the realm of indirect
State Farm challenges to agency rules in private party litigation implicating
Chevron statutory interpretation issues.
While the heightened judicial scrutiny of the Chevron-State Farm model
is most closely associated with imposing fact-finding and cost-benefit
analysis requirements upon agencies,484 suggesting a conservative valence,
it can just as readily be put to use by courts in terms of scrutinizing
deregulatory actions by agencies485 when not backed by sufficient policy
reasons evaluated against the background of the existing administrative
records.486
Given the era of hyperpartisan political polarity in which we live, this
should be a significant selling point. At the agency level, this polarity
translates into scores of dramatic flip-flops in agency positions when a
President of one party replaces a President of the other party. The ChevronState Farm model would enable courts to temper the effects of this tendency
by forcing agencies to give robust policy-based reasons for their changes in
policy-inflected statutory interpretation. In other words, it would put the
brakes on what Justice Gorsuch decried as agency actions driven solely by a
“shift of political winds”487—without sacrificing Chevron.
The incorporation model is nonpartisan in nature; it is aimed at good
governance. Its time has come.

484. The MetLife decision discussed above provides a particularly vivid illustration. FSOC
made a decision to regulate by designating MetLife; this regulatory decision was then
overturned by the court. See supra Part III.B.2.b.
485. The Catskill Mountains case would fit here because the courts were called upon to
review the EPA’s decision not to impose permitting requirements. See supra Part I.A.
486. In a recent blog posting, Jack Beermann makes a related point (which leads me to
believe that he would endorse the Chevron-State Farm model). See Jack Beermann, The
Deregulatory Moment and the Clean Power Plan Repeal, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Nov. 30,
2017),
https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/the-deregulatory-moment-and-the-clean-powerplan-repeal [https://perma.cc/47W6-R39Q] (“And when an agency decides to change course,
whether to increase or decrease the level of regulation, it should be based upon a thorough and
reasoned re-evaluation of the policies embodied in the relevant statutory scheme, not a
legalistic reinterpretation of the underlying statute. Deregulation should be evaluated on its
policy merits, not on the legalistic musings of agency and Justice Department lawyers.”).
487. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).

